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While innovation and growth can be promoted internally through focus on 
research and development (R&D), many firms find acquisition from external sources 
to be a speedy and attractive alternative. Despite the numerous theories of merger and 
acquisition (M&A) in the literature, no empirical study has tackled the problem of 
target selection in an acquisition. The existing studies on M&A outcomes also fail to 
control for the endogenous matching between the acquirer and the target.  
Essay 1 of this dissertation is the first to study the target selection criteria in an 
empirical setting. It quantifies the elusive concept of synergy by developing new 
measures of similarity and complementarily between the acquirer and the target that 
are more comprehensive than the existing measures in the literature. Using an 
innovative application of the discrete choice model, I find that firms use acquisition to 
promote growth and innovation in areas of strategic interest. Specifically, acquirers 
choose target firms whose product markets match their own R&D projects, and target 
firms whose R&D projects match their own product markets.  
Essay 2 enriches the modeling approach for merger partner selection in essay 
1. I use a game-theoretic matching model and study the impact of matching on merger 
performance. With a Bayesian estimation method, I apply the model to 1895 mergers 
in five high-tech industries that occurred between 1992 and 2008. I find that the 
unobserved strategic fit between the two merging partners has a significant effect on 
the post-merger innovation abilities of the combined firm. Managers wisely choose 
merger partners that deepen their technical knowledge, but under-estimate the 
 challenges in integrating foreign partners and partners with similar technology. I also 
find evidence of estimation bias due to matching induced endogeneity. 
Essay 3 of the dissertation is a comprehensive review of the M&A related 
research published in top marketing journals. This review will provide marketing 
scholars with a research background on M&A, both in terms of theories and marketing 
applications of those theories. This review will help readers to appreciate the 
contribution made by marketing researchers to M&A knowledge, and hopefully 
inspire more marketing scholars to incorporate M&A topic in their research.  
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                           
PROMOTING GROWTH AND INNOVATION THROUGH ACQUSITION: A 
CHOICE MODELING APPROACH 
1.1 ABSTRACT  
While innovation and growth can be promoted internally through focus on 
research and development (R&D), many firms find acquisition from external sources 
to be a speedy and attractive alternative. Despite the numerous theories of merger and 
acquisition in the literature, no empirical study has tackled the problem of target 
selection in an acquisition. This paper is the first to study the target selection criteria in 
an empirical setting. It quantifies the elusive concept of synergy by developing novel 
measures of similarity and complementarily between the acquirer and the target that 
are more comprehensive than the existing measures in the literature. Using an 
innovative application of the discrete choice model, the author find that firms use 
acquisition to promote growth and innovation in areas of strategic interest. 
Specifically, acquirers choose targets whose product markets match their own R&D 
projects, and targets whose R&D projects match their own product markets. These 
findings provide support for the knowledge based view of the firm and lay the 
foundation for future research in this area. 
1.2 INTRODUCTION 
"The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps capitalist engine in motion comes 
from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production, the new markets, the 
new forms of industrial organization,…, that incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new 
one." (Schumpeter 1942, p83). 
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Because of their essential roles in a firm’s success, innovation and growth have 
long been research priorities in the marketing discipline (2008 and 2010 MSI research 
priorities). While internal R&D can help promote innovation and growth, the process 
of building a healthy market share and R&D pipeline takes considerate amount of 
time. A fast and attractive alternative for firms facing intense competition in the 
marketplace and strong pressure from the stock market is to acquire another firm with 
existing products and R&D projects. Due to these and other reasons1, the number of 
acquisitions (used interchangeably with mergers, M&A) involving US firms is quite 
high; it peaked in 2006 at 12,000 deals with the total value exceeding 1.4 trillion 
dollars.  
Due to such large amount of acquisition activities and their impact across all 
organizational functions, acquisitions have been studied in many disciplines (such as 
economics, strategy, finance and marketing).  While numerous theories have been 
proposed on why firms undertake acquisitions, the empirical literature tests these 
theories using acquisition outcomes rather than test acquisition motives directly. 
However, the findings on acquisition outcomes have been mixed23, and many different 
acquisition motives may lead to the same acquisition outcome. Therefore, it is difficult 
to establish a clear link between acquisition outcomes and motivations. Moreover, 
these studies ignore the integration process in an acquisition (Jemison and Sitkin 
                                                 
1 Chapter 3 offers a comprehensive review of M&A motivations, and alternative strategies to M&A, 
such as alliance and direct investment to enter new market 
2 .Case studies show that many acquirers fail to materialize the promised synergies from an acquisition 
(Porter 1987). The stock price of the acquiring firm usually decreases, the stock price of target firm 
usually increases, and that of combined firm is shown to be positive in the short-term (Andrade and 
Stafford 2004) and negative in the long-run (Loughran and Vijh 1997). However there is no universally 
accepted measurement for long term stock market return, because the baseline return is under much 
debate. The impact of acquisitions on R&D is shown to be positive (Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin 
2004). 
3 .Case studies show that many acquirers fail to materialize the promised synergies (Porter 1987). The 
stock return of combined firm is shown to be positive in the short-term (Andrade and Stafford 2004) 
and negative in the long-run (Loughran and Vijh 1997). The impact of acquisitions on R&D is shown to 
be positive (Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin 2004). 
 
  12
1986) which can drive a wedge between the outcome of an acquisition and its motive. 
For instance, a failed acquisition could have been caused by sincere but unsuccessful 
integration effort, rather than selfish empire building incentives of the managers at 
acquisition planning stage (Amihud and Lev 1981).  
Table 1-1: Synergy Measures in Merger and Acquisition Literaturea 
 
  
Market 
Similarity 
Market 
Complemen-
tarity 
R&D 
Similarity 
R&D 
Complemen-
tarity 
Market and 
R&D 
Interactions  
Singh and Montgomery 
(1987)b 
yes  yes   
Harrison et al.(1991) c   yes yes  
Ramaswamy (1997) c yes Yes    
Hitt et al. (1998) yes  maybe   
Larsson and Finkelstein 
(1999) 
yes Yes    
Swaminathan at el. (2008)d yes  yes   
Prabhu et al.(2005)   yes   
Sorescu et al. (2007) yes     
This papere yes Yes yes yes yes 
a. I acknowledge that the papers in this table may have contributions other than synergy 
measurement. Here I merely intend to illustrate the design of synergy measures in the 
literature, with no intention to undermine the contributions of these papers.  
b. Similar measures are shared by Shelton (1988) and Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan (1992).  
c. In these papers the “similarity” measure is a distance measure, and the complementarity is 
considered to be the opposite of similarity. Therefore, one measure is counted for two aspects.  
d. In this paper the synergy measurement is "Strategic emphasis alignment", which is absolute 
difference between the acquirer and target strategic emphasis [(advertising expenditures - 
R&D expenditures)/total assets of the firm].  
e. The current paper uses different measures for similarity and complementarity. My measures 
for complementarity capture the new products or knowledge that the potential target brings to 
the acquirer, not the other way round. In comparison, my similarity measure is symmetric 
between acquirer and target. Therefore, my similarity and complementarity measures are not 
polar opposite of each other.  
Against this background, this chapter directly tests the theoretical reasons for 
acquisitions without relying on acquisition outcomes and without being tainted by the 
integration process. The focus is on the empirical target selection criteria, especially 
the strategic criteria used by acquirers to choose targets. 
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  Why do two firms want to become one? Synergy has often been cited as one of 
the prime reasons underlying acquisition decisions4 (Walter and Barney, 1990). 
Synergy is said to exist when the combined return on a merged company’s resources is 
greater than the sum of its parts. It can arise from many sources, such as economies of 
scale in operations, increased market power, assimilation of technical or tacit 
knowledge5, favorable financial market treatment of larger firms, diversification of 
risks, etc (Salter and Weinhold 1979).  
Although frequently used in the theoretical literature, synergy remains an 
elusive concept that has defied accurate measurement. In the empirical literature (as 
shown in Table 1-1), synergy is often measured by relatedness or similarity (rather 
than complementarity) in the product markets (rather than R&D projects). The few 
studies that measure R&D synergy rely on the number and citation of patents (Prabhu, 
Chandy and Ellis 2005) or R&D spending (Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland, 
2008). However, R&D spending measures the input not the output of innovation 
whereas patents are an approximate measure for innovation since patent applications 
represent very early stage of R&D. I quantify the concept of synergy in a holistic 
manner by developing novel measures of similarity and complementarity between the 
acquirer and the potential target in product markets and in R&D projects, with the 
latter weighed by their probability of conversion to final products. Besides developing 
the most comprehensive measures of market and knowledge synergies so far, I also 
                                                 
4 In this and the next chapter, I adopt the efficient market assumption (Samuelson 1965; Fama 1965). 
Under this assumption, it is not possible for acquirer firm to buy target firm on the stock market at a 
price lower than the target’s true value.  
5 Tacit knowledge is unwritten, unspoken, and hidden vast storehouse of knowledge held by practically 
every normal human being, based on his or her emotions, experiences, insights, intuition, observations 
and internalized information. It is integral to the entirety of a person's consciousness, is acquired largely 
through association with other people, and requires joint or shared activities to be imparted from one to 
another. Tacit knowledge has also been extended to knowledge held by individuals in an organization. 
Concept of tacit knowledge was introduced by the Hungarian philosopher-chemist Michael Polanyi 
(1891-1976) in his 1966 book 'The Tacit Dimension.' 
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capture the interaction between these two which has not been measured in the 
literature.  
M&A synergies have been categorized into operational synergies, collusive 
synergies, managerial synergies and financial synergies according to their 
measurability and the ability to generate benefits (Weston et al 2001, Larsson and 
Finkelstein 1999). Operational synergies result from economies of scale, for example 
in production, R&D, staff functions and marketing. This chapter focuses on 
operational synergies, which are concrete and measurable, and more relevant to 
marketing field. Collusive synergies result from increased market power and 
bargaining power. It is captured as part of market synergy in this chapter. Managerial 
synergies correspond to the efficiencies from the market for corporate control. The 
underlying assumption is that inefficiently managed firms will be acquired by 
efficiently managed ones. However, in the pharmaceutical industry (which is the 
context of this chapter), Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) found that firms experiencing 
declines in internal productivity (and hence less likely to have superior management) 
are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-type acquisition in an effort to replenish 
their research pipelines. Therefore managerial synergies do not appear to be very 
relevant in the context of this paper. Financial synergies refer to the payoff generated 
through either higher cash flows or a lower cost of capital (discount rate). A 
combination of a firm with excess cash, or cash slack, (and limited project 
opportunities) and a firm with high-return projects (and limited cash) can yield a 
payoff in terms of higher value for the combined firm. This is likely to contribute to 
the union of cash rich large firms and small firms with promising projects. However, 
such synergies cannot exist if the capital markets are efficient since a firm with high 
return projects can always raise money from the market without relying on internal 
capital transfers from a cash rich parent. Such synergies are more relevant in 
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developing countries where capital markets are not well developed (this is also the 
reason why so many conglomerates exist in developing countries).        
Through my measures of operational synergy, I test several hypotheses on 
acquisition motives suggested by the strategy theory and the knowledge based view of 
firms (I will review these two in the theory section). I use product market synergy 
measures to test market power, as well as economies of scale and scope from various 
firm functions that are related to markets, ranging from production, distribution to 
marketing. Due to the data limitation, I am not able to further differentiate the sources 
of these synergies. But I do differentiate them by the different patient markets they 
serve. I use R&D synergy measures to test knowledge specialization and knowledge 
spillover effects. Finally, I use synergy measures to capture the interaction between 
product markets and R&D projects to test the strategic direction of acquirer in terms of 
balancing short term revenue growth and long term innovation potential.  
The empirical setting of this paper is the pharmaceutical industry. Due to the 
significant amount of acquisition activity and the essential role innovation plays in this 
industry, it is an ideal testing ground for my topic. This industry has been the focus in 
several other marketing papers on acquisition and innovation. Swaminathan, Murshed 
and Hulland (2008) suggest that strategic emphasis alignment—the extent to which the 
resource configurations of acquirer and target firms are similar to or distinct from one 
another—is a key construct that facilitates value creation. Homburg and Bucerius 
(2005) find that market-related performance after the merger or acquisition has a much 
stronger impact on financial performance than does cost savings. Sorescu, Chandy and 
Prabhu (2007) claim that the acquirer’s product capital affects the success of an 
acquisition. Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis (2005) find a positive effect of acquisition on 
innovation. These studies take acquisition deals as given and study their impact on 
  16
growth and innovation. In contrast, I study the target selection decision and its link to 
acquirer’s incentive such as achieving growth and innovation synergies.  
Using an innovative application of the discrete choice model, I find that firms in 
the pharmaceutical industry use acquisition to promote growth and innovation in areas 
of strategic interest. Instead of seeking targets whose R&D portfolios match their own, 
acquirers choose targets whose products match their R&D projects, thus leapfrogging 
from research knowledge to immediate market expansion in strategic areas where the 
acquirer desires to establish its presence and exploit the acquired knowledge to 
improve its R&D projects. Moreover, instead of acquiring targets with similar product 
portfolios, acquirers focus on targets whose R&D projects match their products an 
innovation pipeline in strategic areas with aging products that can be transformed 
using its experience and resources into marketable products in the future.  
These findings provide support for knowledge-based theories of the firm which 
argue that acquisitions are driven by the desire to acquire tacit knowledge and 
potential for innovation that are otherwise locked within the boundaries of firms. An 
ideal target should fit with acquirer’s existing knowledge so that the acquired 
knowledge can be fully utilized, and it should bring in new knowledge to expand the 
acquirer’s reach in future directions, thus promoting growth and innovation in areas of 
strategic interest. 
 This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, this paper 
pioneers the empirical study of target selection in acquisitions. The extant empirical 
literature has either studied the outcome of acquisitions (see Trautwein 1990 for a 
review) or the conditions under which firms tend to initiate mergers (Higgins and 
Rodriguez 2006, Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson 2007). The choice of target in an 
acquisition and its link with the acquirer’s incentives has been ignored by the 
empirical literature. To fill this gap, several simulation studies and survey-based 
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researches have explored target choice (Silhan and Thomas 1986, Kroll and Caples 
1987, Schniederjans and Fowler 1989, Rao, Mahanjan and Varaiya 1991), but these 
approaches lack supports from real data. The empirical target choice studied in this 
paper serves as a missing link between the theoretical reasons for acquisition and the 
management decisions in reality.  
Second, this paper explicitly models the elusive concept of synergy, thus 
allowing more accurate and refined testing of the theories on mergers and acquisitions. 
Using my novel measures of synergy which are more comprehensive than the existing 
measures, I am able to obtain a better picture of the potential fit between acquirer and 
target in terms of their products and R&D. These synergy measures help reveal how 
firms in a knowledge intensive industry use acquisition to achieve immediate growth 
and long-term innovation potential, complementing the findings of marketing 
literature on the positive effect of acquisition on growth and innovation.  
Third, this paper provides a novel application of the discrete choice model 
beyond its conventional scope in marketing. The primary application of this model in 
marketing has been to study brand choice by individuals or households in a Business 
to Consumer setting. This paper provides a new application of the choice model in 
Business to Business decision settings. By incorporating the potential synergies from a 
deal in the decision maker’s utility, my model can be adapted to other business 
settings where mutual gains and strategic fit are important.  
1.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
1.3.1 Theory 
While many theories have been proposed across academic disciplines6 to 
explain acquisitions, I will focus on the strategy theory and the knowledge based view 
                                                 
6. I did an extended review of M&A theories including strategy theories, process theories, financial 
theories, governance theories and competence- based theories (including resource-based and 
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of firm.  For a comprehensive review of various acquisition theories, refer to Parvinen 
(2003).  
In the strategy theory, three sources of synergy have been identified related to 
mergers and acquisitions. These are technical economies, pecuniary economies, and 
diversification economies (Lubatkin, 1983). Technical economies are scale economies 
that occur when the physical process inside a firm is altered so that the same amounts 
of inputs, or factors of production, produce a higher quantity of outputs. The two main 
types of technical economies are marketing and production economies (Shepherd 
1979). These economies can occur in several situations: (i) when the products of two 
or more businesses use common distribution channels; (ii) where there is an 
opportunity for tie-in sales that can increase the productivity of the sales force; (iii) 
where opportunities for common advertising and sales promotion exist; (iv) where 
common production facilities can be utilized and the overhead spread over larger 
volume; and (v) when there is R&D carryover from one product to another, and so on 
(Salter and Weinhold 1979).  
Pecuniary economies are achieved by the firm’s ability to dictate prices by 
exerting market power achieved primarily through larger size. The two types of 
pecuniary economies are monopoly and monopsony economies. The former comes 
from the ability of a firm to force buyers to accept higher prices. The later comes from 
the firm’s ability to force suppliers to accept lower prices (Porter 1980).  
Diversification economies are achieved by improving a firm’s performance 
relative to its risk attributes or by lowering its risk attributes relative to its performance 
(Lubatkin 1983). Diversifying acquisitions have been shown to bring less gain for 
acquirers than non-diversifying ones (Singh and Montgomery 1987). Such 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge-based views of the firm). Web appendix B discusses these theories and their relevance to 
this paper in details. 
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acquisitions are more prone to agency problems. In order to avoid the confounding 
effect of agency issues, I study deals wherein both acquirer and target are in the same 
industry, thus ruling out diversification economies as the source of synergy in this 
study.  
The knowledge based view of firm provides a theoretical justification for 
acquisition based on knowledge and learning. According to this school of thought, 
firms exist because they produce and utilize knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge, 
more efficiently than markets (Kogut and Zander 1992); firms’ internal organization is 
a shared context to integrate and utilize essentially local knowledge in order to build 
and leverage core competencies (Foss and Foss 2000); M&A is the amalgamation of 
two sets of knowledge resources in order to attain a resource combination, which 
would not have been attainable otherwise. Such a situation occurs most often in the 
presence of possibilities for promoting learning and innovation (Parvinen 2003).  
The knowledge-based theory has been used by many researchers as the 
foundation for R&D motivated acquisition (Prabhu, Chandy, Ellis 2005). A distinct 
stream of literature has concentrated on the transfer and acquisition of unique 
technologies through M&A (Hagedoorn and Sadowski 1999). Organizational learning 
through M&A (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999) and M&A for technological and 
organizational innovation (e.g. Kabiraj and Mukherjee 2000) are related explanations 
for a merger. The main idea behind these explanations is that acquisition provides 
access to target’s tacit knowledge which is difficult to imitate but is a critical source of 
innovation. 
There are areas of overlap between the strategy theory and the knowledge based 
theory. For example, the acquisition of products can be explained by the strategy 
school as production economies of scale and by the knowledge-based theory as the 
desire to learn the production knowledge embedded in the target product. Similarly, 
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the acquisition of R&D projects can be motivated by the strategy school as scale 
economy in R&D, and by the knowledge-based theory as the only way to obtain 
target’s proprietary technology and tacit knowledge. I now develop more refined 
hypotheses on acquisition incentives using these two theories.        
1.3.2. Hypotheses  
In the following subsections I specify six hypotheses derived from M&A 
related theories. These hypotheses are not necessarily in agreement with each other, 
and they may not be all supported at the same time. It is possible that one theory 
works for some M&A deals and another theory works for other deals. The empirical 
model test the overall effect of the M&A motivations, and the dominant incentives 
will be significant in the estimation result.  
1.3.2.1 Market Intensification 
An acquirer may want to choose a target that has products similar to itself. On 
the supply side, efficiency can increase when resources are shared for the production 
and distribution of larger quantity of similar products. Such scale economies can occur 
in functional areas, such as manufacturing, R&D, and selling and distribution (Salter 
and Weinhold, 1979; Rumelt, 1974), as well in administration and financial 
management. The scale economy can also be explained by transaction cost economics 
since the larger scale lowers the transaction costs of using a factor of production 
(Richter 1999). 
On the demand side, acquisition of similar products may increase the market 
power of the combined company. A market participant is said to have market power 
when it has the ability to influence price, quantity, and the nature of the product in the 
marketplace (Shepherd, 1970:3). Market power, in turn, may lead to excess returns. A 
firm’s market power may be increased through horizontal acquisitions or through 
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market extension acquisitions since its effective size is increased relative to its 
competitors. These arguments lead to my first hypothesis: 
H1: In an acquisition, the acquirer seeks a target whose product portfolio reinforces 
its own. 
Empirical research by Ajuha and Katila (2001) suggests that too much business 
overlap causes redundancy and reduces learning from each other, whereas too little 
overlap causes difficulty in integration. Therefore the relationship between similarity 
in business and synergy may resemble a bell curve: synergy increases first as 
companies are far apart from each other, but starts decreasing after a certain point. I 
will test for such bell curve shape as a robustness check for H1. 
1.3.2.2 Market Expansion 
Many firms regard acquisition as a quick way to expand into new markets, 
obtain new distribution channels, and acquire new production techniques. Referred to 
as economy of scope, synergy arising from such situations can come from utilization 
of the same set of resources, such as production facilities, distribution channels, and 
management personnel (Salter and Weinhold, 1979; Rumelt, 1974). The difference 
between economy of scale and economy of scope lies in the degree of resource 
sharing. Scale economies arise when capacity utilization is increased through 
additional production of a single (type of) product, and scope economies arise when 
capacity utilization is increased though the shared production of two or more (different 
types of) products (Singh and Montgomery 1987). For example, two antibiotic drugs 
can share common production facilities and sales force, whereas a cancer drug and a 
common cold drug may only benefit from managerial sharing and financial 
economies. These arguments lead to my second hypothesis:  
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H2: In an acquisition, the acquirer seeks a target with product markets that the 
acquirer lacks 
1.3.2.3 R&D Intensification 
An acquirer interested in pipeline replenishment may want to choose targets 
that have R&D projects similar to itself. As in the case of product markets, economies 
of scale in R&D can also generate potential efficiency gains through sharing of R&D 
facilities, and collaboration of research scientists. Moreover, acquisition of similar 
R&D can be motivated using knowledge specialization. Knowledge is created by 
individual human beings, and to be efficient in knowledge creation and storage, 
individuals need to specialize (Simon 1991). Developing depth of knowledge in key 
fields enables firms to gain competency and produce new knowledge in those fields, 
and thus innovate (Hamel and Prahalad 1994). Expertise in a field also enables an 
acquiring firm to judge whether a target firm’s technology is genuinely valuable, thus 
helping pick better targets (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Moreover, the similarity of 
knowledge between the acquirer and the target is crucial to the acquirer’s ability to 
absorb the target’s knowledge and use it for innovation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: In an acquisition, the acquirer seeks a target with pipeline projects that 
strengthen the acquirer’s existing R&D portfolio.    
However, in the case of highly similar R&D acquisitions, there will be less new 
knowledge to absorb. Too much relatedness may result in overlapping and redundant 
research (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001) and fewer opportunities to combine 
different types of knowledge in creative ways. Cockburn and Henderson (2001) find 
no returns to scale for pharmaceutical firms in their research effort. Prabhu, Chandy 
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and Ellis (2005) suggest a bell shape relationship between knowledge similarity and 
innovation. I will address this issue as a robustness check.  
1.3.2.4 R&D Expansion  
Although specialization can improve efficiency, with changes in market 
preferences and technological opportunities, knowledge that was once a source of 
competitive advantage may become irrelevant (Volberda 1996). To avoid being locked 
out of emerging technical domains, firms need a broad base of knowledge (Leonard-
Barton 1995). Although some researchers find that greater breadth can cause a firm to 
spread resources too thinly (Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988), most of the research 
suggests that breadth in knowledge is helpful for innovation (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990; Henderson and Cockburn 1994). The broader a firm’s existing knowledge, the 
greater is its ability to combine knowledge in related fields in a more complex and 
creative manner (Kogut and Zander 1992), and the knowledge spillover may result in 
unexpected discoveries (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005). Cockburn and Henderson 
(2001) found that diversity of research portfolio help pharmaceutical companies 
deliver superior performance in drug development. Therefore, the acquirer may want 
to achieve breadth of knowledge through acquisitions, which is the base for the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: In an acquisition, the acquirer seeks a target with pipeline projects extending 
beyond the acquirer’s existing R&D project portfolio.    
1.3.2.5 Market to R&D Intensification 
The knowledge based theory provides us a new lens to look at all activities in a 
firm as knowledge. As Kogut and Zander (1992) claim, firms exist because they 
produce and utilize knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge more efficiently than 
markets. From this perspective, the firms which successfully convert R&D projects 
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into marketable products and support those products with marketing, sales, and 
distribution channels possess important knowledge from these experiences. Such 
experiences can be very valuable for other firms that have incomplete R&D project in 
similar areas. Successful implementation of these processes also requires upfront 
investment in production, marketing, and distribution channels, which a small firm 
with a good R&D project may not be capable of. Therefore synergies can be created 
through the fusion of a firm with existing products and sufficient revenue, and a firm 
with R&D projects in similar areas that need prelaunch support. Such acquisitions can 
also help the acquirer build its long-term innovation potential in strategic areas with 
aging products that can be transformed into marketable products in the future. 
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis. 
H5: In an acquisition, the acquirer seeks a target with product pipeline in markets 
similar to its existing products.  
1.3.2.6 R&D to Market Intensification 
Visionary CEOs set their eyes on the future when they choose which R&D 
projects to develop. Therefore a company’s pipeline should reflect its future direction. 
However, the progress of R&D projects is slow and not always on schedule. If the 
company is eager to enter a new market, but its internal R&D is not ready, acquiring 
existing products is a natural alternative. Taking over a potential rival firm can 
alleviate the need for future price competition and increase future profit. The expertise 
acquirer has gained from its existing R&D projects can help judge the potential of the 
target firm’s products (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). From the knowledge-based theory, 
synergies can arise in such a case if the acquirer can exploit the knowledge gained 
from the acquired products to improve its delayed R&D project or create new 
knowledge. In short, an acquirer may seek immediate revenue growth by choosing a 
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target whose products match its R&D portfolio because of its desire to establish its 
presence in those markets and exploit the acquired knowledge to improve its R&D 
projects. This leads to my final hypothesis: 
H6: In an acquisition, the acquirer seeks a target that has existing products in 
areas similar to the acquirer’s R&D projects.      
1.4 MODEL AND ESTIMATION METHOD 
1.4.1 Model Specification 
I use the discrete choice model to study the firm’s choice of acquisition target. 
This paper is one of the pioneers to apply the choice model to corporate decision 
making context and the first to apply it to study acquisition choice. Levine (2007) has 
applied the choice model to corporate decision making in the drug licensing market.  
I introduce the choice model with random utility framework (McFadden 1973). 
Acquirer, labeled j, faces a choice among K alternative targets. The acquirer j chooses 
an alternative that provides the highest utility Ujk > Ujd,  d ≠ k, d, k∈(1, . . . , K). The 
utility expression can be decomposed as Ujk = Vjk + εjk, where εjk captures the factors 
that are observed by the acquirer but are not observed by the researchers (Train 2003, 
p24). To obtain a close form solution, εjk is assumed to follow i.i.d. extreme value 
distribution with mean 0 and variance π2/6. Under this assumption, the probability that 
acquirer j chooses alternative k is: P jk = Prob(Ujk > Ujd    d ≠ k )= )/(d VV jdk ee . 
Given that I utilize data over multiple years, I add the subscript for time. The model is 
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with the log-likelihood expression: 
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In the utility specification, I include three sets of variables. O is the number of 
financial variables, M is the number of control variables, and N is the number of 
synergy variables.  
 ),...,,( ,,,2,,,, tOktktoktk fffF   denotes the vector of financial attributes of the 
alternative k at time t. 
 tmkD ,, denotes control variables, such as the target to acquirer sales ratio. I will 
discuss these variables in detail in following paragraphs.  
 tnkj ,,,  denotes the non-financial synergy between the acquirer firm j and 
alternative firm k at time t. I measure this synergy using intensification and 
expansion factors as discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 tkj ,,  follows i.i.d. extreme value distribution  
I do not include acquirer characteristics as stand-alone variables because in 
conditional logit model. Any j specific terms that are not interacted with target k 
related-variables will drop out from the estimation and cannot be identified. The 
variables Fk,t, tmkD ,, and tnkj ,,,  used in the estimation are provided in Table 1-2. 
These three components of the utility function are described below. 
Financial variables: The first component of the utility function comprises three 
variables selected out of 22 financial and accounting variables that measure the overall 
wellbeing of the target. I use factor analysis to assist in the variable selection process, 
the details of which are discussed in the data section. The three selected variables are 
Total Assets, Book Leverage, and Return on Assets. Total Assets measures the overall 
scale of the firm’s business and is correlated with sales and R&D expenditure. Book 
Leverage measures the proportion of the firm’s book assets that are financed by book 
debt rather than book equity. If this ratio is too high, the company may face the risk of 
financial distress because of high interest expense and if this ratio is too low, the 
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company is not fully utilizing the tax shield of debt. Return on Assets is a profitability 
measure calculated as the income generated by the firm as a proportion of its assets.  
Table 1-2: Explanation of Variables 
Parameters Explanation 
First component: financial variables 
Total Assets potential target firms' annual sales (billion $) 
Debt to Asset Ratio 
(DTA) 
potential target firm's total liabilities over total assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) potential target firm's net income over total shareholder equity 
Second component: control variables 
Large_dummy dummy variable representing firms with market value greater 
than 10 billion dollars 
Alliance_dummy dummy variable indicating that the alternative had alliance 
relationship with the acquirer firm prior to the acquisition 
Biotechnology Dummy variable for biotechnology focus, proxy for scientific 
culture 
Sales Ratio Ratio of target sales to Acquirer sales, proxy for organizational 
culture 
SIC Matching Dummy indicating whether the acquirer and target are in the 
same SIC category, proxy for market culture 
Third component: synergy variables        
Product and Pipeline synergies 
Market Intensification similarity between acquirer and alternative based on approved 
drugs (for H1) 
Market Expansion complementarity between acquirer and alternative based on 
approved drugs (for H2) 
R&D Intensification similarity between acquirer and alternative based on pipeline 
(for H3) 
R&D Expansion complementarity between acquirer and alternative based on 
pipeline (for H4) 
Market to R&D 
Intensification 
similarity between acquirer’s products and target’s pipeline  
(for H5) 
R&D to Market 
Intensification 
similarity between acquirer’s pipeline and  target’s products 
(for H6) 
Financial synergies 
(Assets_a - Assets_t)^2 dispersion of acquirer’s and potential target’s total assets 
(DTA_a - DTA_t)^2 dispersion of acquirer’s and potential target's debt-to-asset ratio 
(ROA_a - ROA_t)^2 dispersion of acquirer’s and potential target's return of assets 
Control variables: I use several control variables based on the findings of 
previous research. An “alliance” dummy is included based on the findings of Higgins 
and Rodriguez (2006) that firms are more likely to acquire past or current alliance 
partners because they have more information about those firms through the alliance 
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relationship. A “large firm” dummy is motivated by the finding of Danzon, Epstein 
and Nicholson (2007) that large acquisitions behave very differently from small ones. 
This is intuitive since acquiring a large firm is expensive and requires considerable 
executive resources to plan the challenging integration processes after merger. I 
include “culture” variables used by Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis (2005), because cultural 
differences can affect the integration process. The culture here refers to organizational 
culture, market culture, and scientific culture of the acquirer and the potential target 
firms. I measure organizational culture with the ratio of acquirer’s size and potential 
target’s size (measured by sales); market culture with a dummy variable indicating the 
matching of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of acquirer and potential 
target; scientific culture with a dummy variable indicating whether the potential target 
is a biotechnology company.  
Synergy variables: In this section, I provide a general framework for 
calculating potential synergies which can be readily adapted to other industries. The 
data section explains how the framework is used in this paper.  
Assume that the set of all drugs D={ D1, D2 …. ,DI+J} comprising approved 
drugs A={ A1, …. ,AI} and pipeline drugs  P={ P1, ….,PJ} with PAD   can be 
classified into therapy classes C={ C1, …. CK} using some criteria such as the type of 
disease each drug treats. Let this classification be given by the mapping CDl : . 
Also, assume that the mapping  RDg :  assigns a positive real valued score to 
each drug in D, based on the market potential of that drug. The market potential of a 
drug could be measured by the sales revenue for an approved drug and the expected 
sales revenue for a pipeline drug. If sales figures are not available, market potential 
could be proxied by the clinical probability of FDA approval for a pipeline drug and 
the patent status for an approved drug.  
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Assume that C can be partitioned as a tree with non-overlapping nests based on 
the proximity of therapy classes in C. Let this partition be represented by 
NCCCC  ......21  subject to the conditions  1\  nn CCj njn CC  and 
 nknj CC  1\,  nn CCkj  where njC  include the node 1\ nnjC  itself and all the 
branch structure below this node. Here n represents the level of hierarchies in the tree 
(ranging from the highest level 1 to lowest level N), Cn is the set of all therapy classes 
that are at level n or below, 1\ nn CC  is the set of all therapy classes at level n (but not 
below), and njC  is the sub-tree originating from therapy class j at level n. A proximity 
tree is illustrated in Figure 1-1. The classification of therapy classes into various nests 
of a proximity tree could be done using a variable d(Ci,Cj) which measures the relative 
distance between therapy classes Ci and Cj.  
 
 
Figure 1-1: An Illustration of Proximity Tree 
Assume that a firm x has a portfolio of drugs xxx PAD  . The market score 
of firm x for therapy class Ci given by 
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)(),(  captures the market potential of all pipeline drugs of firm x in 
therapy class Cj. 
The market intensification factor I aa,  (x,y) for acquirer x and potential target 
firm y measures the similarity of the two firms’ approved drugs using the following 
expression: 
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Here, )),(),,(),,(( yCsxCsCCdh jaiaji  captures the similarity of the acquirer’s 
approved drugs in therapy class Ci and the target’s approved drugs in therapy class Cj. 
This similarity factor decreases with the distance between Ci and Cj and increases with 
the market potential of acquirer’s approved drugs in Ci and the target’s approved drugs 
in Cj. The market intensification factor is the sum of these similarity factors across all 
the acquirer and target therapy classes. 
The R&D intensification factor I pp, (x,y) is defined similar to the market 
intensification factor except that it uses R&D scores to measure the similarity of the 
two firms’ pipeline drugs  
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The market to R&D intensification factor I pa, (x,y) is defined similar to the 
above factors  to measure the similarity of the acquirer’s approved drugs with the 
target’s pipeline drugs. 
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The R&D to market intensification factor Ir,m (x,y) is defined similar to the 
above factors  to measure the similarity of the acquirer’s pipeline drugs with the 
target’s approved drugs. 
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The market expansion factor Eaa, (x,y)  measures the complementarity of the 
target’s approved drugs to the acquirer’s approved drugs. It is given by  
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 ),(),,( yCsCCdr jmjx  captures the complementarity of the target’s approved drugs in 
therapy class Cj to all the approved drugs of acquirer in any therapy class. This 
complementarity factor increases with the minimum distance between Cj and the set Cx 
of all therapy classes to which acquirer’s approved drugs belong and increases with 
the market potential of target’s approved drugs in Cj. The market expansion factor is 
the sum of such complementarity factors across all target therapy classes. This 
specification aims to capture the new products brought by the target to the acquirer 
and not the other way round. 
The R&D expansion factor E pp, (x,y) is defined similar to the market 
expansion factor to measure the complementarity of the target’s pipeline drugs to the 
acquirer’s pipeline drugs.   
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Table 1-2 summarizes the above six factors and lists the hypothesis each factor is 
meant to test. An example of the synergy factors calculated is included in 1.5.3. 
1.4.2 Model Robustness and Out of Sample Prediction 
I use several methods to test the robustness of my result. First, I perform a 
bootstrapping procedure on the model to see whether my findings are biased by the 
small sample. Second, I use the parameter estimates to make out of sample predictions 
to see whether the inclusion of synergy variables improves the model’s predictive 
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power. Third, I test the nonlinearity of product and R&D intensification factors as 
suggested in the hypotheses section. Finally, I include financial synergies between the 
merging firms based on the balance model in Rao, Mahajan and Varaiya (1991). These 
financial synergies are measured using the dispersion (variance) of the financial 
variables of the acquirer and the potential target. 
1.4.3 Methodological Challenges 
There are two methodological challenges to the current setup. One is choice set 
determination; the other is manager’s incentives.  
1.4.3.1 Choice set determination  
One challenge in applying the choice model to the acquisition setting is that the 
researcher does not observe the choice alternatives. The acquiring firm reveals the 
chosen target but says little about the other firms that were considered for the same 
deal. In theory, the choice set includes all the pharmaceutical firms existing at the deal 
announcement date. However, my comprehensive synergy measures are too 
cumbersome to calculate for all the firms in each year. Therefore I adopt the random 
sampling of alternatives suggested by McFadden (1977) and Train (2003).  This 
method estimates the conditional logit model on a subset of alternatives comprising 
the true target and a random sample of alternatives selected from the entire alternative 
pool7. A proof from Train (2003, p68-69) in the next paragraph shows that the logit 
estimation with such sampling of alternatives produces consistent estimates of the true 
parameters. I also include the estimation results with this method on simulated data 
with various sample sizes to support the use of this method for my sample size. The 
                                                 
7 According to Train (2003), “With a logit model, consistent estimation can be performed on a subset of 
alternatives. For example, a choice situation involving 100 alternatives can be estimated on a subset of 
10 alternatives for each sampled decision maker, with the person’s chosen alternative included as well 
as 9 alternatives randomly selected from the remaining 99. The estimation proceeds on the subset of 
alternatives as if it were the full set.” 
 
  33
random sampling of alternatives has been used in many situations with the more 
general nested logit models. Examples include households’ choices of  automobiles 
(Mannering and Winston, 1985), households’ choices of dwelling location and unit 
(Weisbrod, Lerman, and Ben-Akiva, 1980), travelers’ choices of destination (Daly, 
1982), and the demand for residential telephone service (Train, McFadden and Ben-
Akiva, 1987). 
Logit Estimation with Randomly Sampled Alternatives Proof of Consistency 
This section reproduces a proof from Train (2003) regarding the consistency of 
logit estimation with randomly sampled alternatives.  
Suppose that the researcher has used some specific method for randomly 
selecting alternatives into the subset that is used in estimation for each sampled 
decision maker. Denote the full set of alternatives as F and a subset of alternatives as 
K. Let q(K | i ) be the probability under the researcher’s selection method that subset K 
is selected given that the decision maker chose alternative i . Assuming that the subset 
necessarily includes the chosen alternative, I have q(K | i ) = 0 for any K that does not 
include i . The probability that person n chooses alternative i from the full set is Pni . 
My goal is to derive a formula for the probability that the person chooses alternative i 
conditional on the researcher selecting subset K for him. This conditional probability 
is denoted Pn(i | K). This conditional probability is derived as follows. The joint 
probability that the researcher selects subset K and the decision maker chooses 
alternative i is Prob(K, i ) = q(K | i )Pni . The joint probability can also be expressed 
with the opposite conditioning as Prob(K, i ) = Pn(i | K)Q(K) where Q(K) 
=  )|( jKqPnjFj  is the probability of the researcher selecting subset K marginal 
over all the alternatives that the person could choose. Equating these two expressions 
and solving for Pn(i | K), I have 
  34
Pn(i | K) =   Fj nj
ni
q(K | j )P
q(K | i )P
= Fj V
V
q(K | j )e
q(K | i )e
nj
ni
  = Kk V
V
q(K | j )e
q(K | i )e
nk
ni
 
where the second line has canceled out the denominators of Pni and Pnjj, and the 
third equality uses the fact that q(K|j)=0 for any j not in K.  
Suppose that the researcher has designed the selection procedure so that q(K | j 
) is the same for all j  ∈ K. This property occurs if, for example, the researcher assigns 
an equal probability of selection to all non-chosen alternatives, so that the probability 
of selecting j into the subset when i is chosen by the decision maker is the same as for 
selecting i into the subset when j is chosen. McFadden (1977) calls this the “uniform 
conditioning property,” since the subset of alternatives has a uniform (equal) 
probability of being selected conditional on any of its members being chosen by the 
decision maker. When this property is satisfied, q(K | j ) cancels out of the preceding 
expression, and the probability becomes: Pn(i | K) = )/(kj VV njni ee , which is simply 
the logit formula for a person who faces the alternatives in subset K. 
Simulation with different sample sizes 
This section contains simulation results with different sample sizes. I conduct a 
simulation to study the ability of the model to recover parameters with different 
sample sizes and different number of true alternatives. In this simulation, I assume a 
utility function of the form U=b1*x1+b2*x2+e, where x1 and x2 are object attributes, 
and e is an error term following extreme value distribution with shift 0 and scale 1. 
The true values used for b1 and b2 are 1 and 2 respectively, and x1 and x2 are 
simulated using standard normal distribution. I simulate various scenarios: the number 
of true alternative targets M is 100 or 500, and the number of acquirers N who make 
the choice is 30 or 100. My sample has 29 deals (and hence 29 acquirers) and I 
randomly draw 9 alternative targets (besides the true chosen target) from a pool of 
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500-600 true alternative targets. So the simulation that best corresponds to my case is 
where the number of acquirers is 30 and the number of true alternative targets is 500. 
Table 1-3: Simulation for Logit with Random Sampling Method 
Full Sample Randomly Selected Sample of 10 alternate targets 
No. of 
Acquirers
N 
No. of 
True 
Alterna-
tive 
Targets 
M 
True 
Value 
Para- 
meter 
Esti-
matea 
Std 
Erra 
True 
Value 
lies 
within 
1 
StdErr 
True 
Value 
lies 
within 2
StdErr
T-test on 
two 
sample 
estimateb 
Para-
meter  
Esti-
matea
Std 
Erra 
True 
Value 
lies 
within 
1 
StdErr 
True 
Value 
lies 
within 
2 
StdErr 
30 100 1 1.02 c 0.26c 69% 95% 0.90 1.15 0.39 87% 100% 
  2 2.05 c 0.29 c 68% 95% 0.90 1.93 0.39 92% 100% 
 500 1 1.01 c 0.21 c 68% 96% 0.92 1.11 0.34 86% 100% 
  2 2.02 c 0.23 c 69% 96% 0.87 2.19 0.52 89% 100% 
100 100 1 1.01 0.14 70% 96% 0.96 1.06 0.33 89% 100% 
  2 2.02 0.16 70% 97% 0.82 2.25 0.38 73% 100% 
 500 1 1.00 0.12 68% 96% 0.84 1.21 0.24 60% 98% 
  2 2.00 0.13 67% 96% 0.86 2.18 0.26 70% 98% 
Notes: 
a The reported values here are means of estimation results from 1000 repetitions. 
b. The t-test was conducted on two sets of parameter estimates of 1000 each from full and randomly 
selected sample. c. One estimation result is removed, because it has standard error >600. 
I first conduct conditional logit estimation on the full sample, and then I apply 
random sampling as described in the paper, with 9 randomly drawn alternative targets 
plus the true chosen target, and run conditional logit estimation on the selected sample. 
I repeat this process 1000 times and report the results for both estimations in Table 1-
3. As expected, the estimation with randomly selected sample has greater bias in 
parameter estimates and larger standard errors than the full sample estimation. 
However, the selected sample estimations use much less observations than full sample 
estimation. Taking this into account, the selected sample estimation does a reasonable 
job in recovering the true value. In Table 1-3 the true value falls within 2 standard 
errors of the parameter estimate almost all the time, and within 1 standard error of the 
parameter estimate most of the time. I also conduct t-tests between the parameter 
estimates in the two samples and fail to reject the null hypothesis that the two 
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parameter estimates are equal. Therefore, the simulation study supplements the 
theoretical proof by Train (2003) and supports the use of the random sampling logit 
method for my sample size. 
1.4.3.2 Managers’ incentives 
As corporate finance and agency theories suggest, managers may undertake 
sub-optimal acquisitions due to empire building or risk diversification motives. To 
avoid the assumption of optimality, I not only exclude diversifying acquisitions across 
industries, but also do not include the outside option of not acquiring in the model. In 
other words, I take the decision to acquire as given and look only at target choice. 
Even if the acquisition is not entirely optimal, I assume that the managers try to 
choose the most suitable target after the decision to acquire has been made.  
1.5 DATA 
1.5.1 Sample and Data Collection Procedure 
Three main pieces of data are used in the empirical analysis: (a) deal related 
information (b) accounting and financial information for the acquirer and the potential 
targets; and (c) product and pipeline drugs of the acquirer and the potential targets. 
The data sources for these three pieces are included in Table 1-4. 
I select deals between January 2002 and June 2008 where both the acquirer and 
the target were US public companies in the pharmaceutical industry (SIC code in 2830 
category). The reason for restricting the sample to this period is explained in the 
subsequent paragraphs. The study is restricted to US companies to keep the choice set 
manageable (it is hard to get comprehensive information on pharmaceutical companies 
around the world) and to make the accounting data comparable across firms (since 
accounting standards differ across countries). I choose public acquirers and targets 
because public firms have relatively complete accounting data. However, I believe my 
findings can be generalized to private targets to some extent because a multivariate 
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variance analysis (MANOVA) suggests that acquisition samples with public and 
private targets are not statistically different from each other8. I also delete the deals for 
which no product and pipeline information can be found in Inteleos. The final 
observation sample has 29 deals9. Since this is a relatively small sample (although it 
meets the requirement for central limit theorem and the simulations in 1.4.3.2 support 
the random sampling logit estimation for this sample size), I conduct bootstrap 
analysis to verify the robustness of my findings.    
Table 1-4: Data Sources 
 
Information 
Description Variables Data source 
Deal related 
information 
Deal date; acquirer and target firm name, 
public status, industry SIC code, deal 
purpose; etc.  
SDC Platinum* 
M&A  
Financial information Sales, assets, liabilities, market value, etc. Compustat 
Full choice set of 
potential targets 
List of public pharma firms in 2001-2008 Compustat 
Product and pipeline 
information 
Each firm's approved and pipeline drugs in 
all clinical stages 
Inteleos**/Capital IQ 
Alliance Information Dummy for alliance history SDC Platinum 
Strategic 
Alliance/Capital IQ 
 
* SDC Platinum is a professional dataset offered by Thomson Financial 
* Inteleos™ (online version of NDA Pipeline) is a commercial database provided by Elsevier that tracks the drug 
development activity from late-stage preclinical through launch and post-marketing studies. It is updated daily and 
has coverage of more than 8000 drugs from more than 1200 companies.  
Comparison between public and private target sample 
I have conducted Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) to measure 
differences in financial ratios of public acquirers and public or private target firms. 
                                                 
8 I conducted individual and joint MANOVA tests on public and private samples based on four 
financial ratios, namely sales ratio; total assets ratio; current assets ratio; and liability ratio (calculated 
as target value/acquirer value). None of the tests reject the null hypothesis that the two samples are not 
different from each other. Results are available upon request. 
9 SDC Platinum contains 644 acquisition deals in the Pharma industry between January 2002 and June 
2008. Of these, 594 deals dropped out because the acquirer or the target is not a public firm. Additional 
20 deals dropped out due to missing product and pipeline information in Inteleos. Finally, one deal is 
dropped as an outlier because the target is unusually larger the acquirer (their ratio is more than two 
standard deviations higher than the historical mean).  
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Firstly four financial ratios tested individually. Then a joint test is conducted on the 
two samples based on these four financial ratios. The financial ratios are: sales ratio 
(target_sales/acquirer_sales); total assets ratio (target_total_assets 
/acquirer_total_sales); current assets ratio (target_current_assets 
/acquirer_current_assets); and liability ratio (target_liabilities /acquirer_liabilities). 
The results are shown as following:  
Table 1-5: Individual Testing of the Financial Ratios between Private and Public 
Targets 
Variable DF Contrast Sums of Squares F-value Pr>F 
sales ratio 1 0.5131 0.71 0.3981
total asset ratio 1 0.4889 0.15 0.7014
current assets ratio 1 1.1668 0.18 0.6718
current liability ratio 1 0.081 0.16 0.6942
The “contrast sums of squares” is a test on the incremental improvement in 
error sums of squares as the effect is added to the model. The tests null hypothesis of 
private and public targets financial ratios not different from each other can not be 
rejected.  
Table 1-6: MANOVA Test Criteria and Exact F Statistics for the Hypothesis of  
No Overall Public vs Private Target Effect 
Statistic                             Value F value Num DF Den DF Pr > F
Wilks' Lambda 0.97 0.46 4 52 0.77 
Pillai's Trace 0.03 0.46 4 52 0.77 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.03 0.46 4 52 0.77 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.04 0.46 4 52 0.77 
Notes: For the MANOVA Test, H = Contrast SSCP Matrix for Public vs Private Target, E = 
Error SSCP Matrix 
These joint tests show that the null hypothesis that public and private target 
sample are the same cannot be rejected. Therefore my study based on public acquirer 
and public target can be generalized to broader settings.   
The random sampling of target alternatives discussed in the previous section is 
done as follows. The full choice set for each deal consists of all US pharmaceutical 
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firms that were publicly owned in the same year or the year before the deal 
announcement.  The full choice set is around 500 firms for each deal. For each deal, I 
keep the target and randomly select 9 other firms from the full choice set for that deal. 
Data are collected for these subsets of alternatives.    
The financial and accounting data are obtained for the quarter ending just 
before the announcement of a deal. I collect data on 23 relevant variables. Because 
these variables are highly correlated, I do factor analysis with Varimax rotation to 
reduce the number of variables. The first three factors explain 75% of the total 
variance. I take the variable with the highest factor loading on each of these three 
factors. The three variables so obtained, namely total assets, book leverage, and return 
on assets, are used as independent variables in the estimation.  
Since Inteleos contains current rather than historical snapshot of product and 
pipeline data (my data was collected as of June 2008), following steps and 
approximations are used to recover the product and pipeline status at the time of each 
deal. First, I purge the approved and pipeline drugs that were acquired by the acquirer 
and target alternatives through later acquisitions after the deal date in my study10. The 
list of acquisitions by the acquirer and target alternatives after the deal announcement 
date is obtained from the Capital IQ database. Second, I use the research project status 
comments in Inteleos to recover the research stage at time of merger. When the status 
comments are not available, I use the average duration in each clinical phase from 
DiMasi and Grabowski (2007)11 to recover the product and pipeline status of the 
                                                 
10 In some cases the target firm is not directly available in Inteleos after the acquisition because Inteleos 
counts the acquired drugs as acquirer’s. However, Inteleos puts a note to this effect in the license 
overview of the acquirer’s drugs. In such cases, I obtain the target pipeline by searching the target 
firm’s name in the license overview section of the acquirer’s drugs. 
 
11 The average duration of preclinical, phase I, phase II, phase III, and pending approval stages are 5.03, 
1.80, 2.14, 2.54, and 1.52 years respectively. 
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acquirer and target alternatives on the deal date12. Since the average duration between 
preclinical stage and drug approval is around 6 years, I do not use deals prior to 2002 
in my sample because the further back I go back from June 2008 when the data was 
collected, the less accurate it is to recover the clinical stage of a drug on the deal date. 
Finally, I obtain the history of any alliances between the acquirer and the target 
alternatives from the licensing review section in Inteleos database and from SDC 
Platinum strategic alliance database.  
1.5.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1-7: Summary Statistics for Targets and Alternative Target Firms 
Target Alternatives 
Variable  
Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median 
Assets (Million $)a 1047.76 4107.63 186.78 449.96 2300.66 41.76 
Return on Assets(ROA)b -0.06 0.12 -0.04 -0.28 0.89 -0.12 
Book Leverage(BL)c 0.45 0.67 0.23 0.71 1.55 0.35 
Large 0.03 0.19 0 0.01 0.11 0 
Alliance  0.21 0.41 0 0.01 0.09 0 
Market Intensification 131.07 571.18 0 49.29 381.23 0 
Market Expansion 2.06 5.99 0 0.77 3.66 0 
R&D Intensification 355.26 1162.91 36.96 208.52 752.32 8.77 
R&D Expansion 2.54 4.72 0.64 1.44 2.96 0.25 
Market to R&D  
Intensification 184.59 602.89 4.82 110.95 470.12 3.21 
R&D to Market  
Intensification 235.62 957.12 0 67.97 502.33 0 
Biopharma 0.28 0.45 0 0.4 0.49 0 
Sales Ratio 0.27 0.59 0.03 0.1 0.36 0 
SIC Match 0.59 0.5 1 0.44 0.5 0 
(Assets_a-Assets_t)^2 1.73E+09 4.36E+09 1.59E+07 1.77E+09 4.20E+09 1.73E+07 
(ROA_a-ROA_t)^2 0.02 0.04 0 0.85 8.99 0.02 
(BL_a-BL_t)^2  0.69 2.2 0.07 2.49 20.77 0.06 
a. The acquirer’s mean assets is 22,063, Std Dev 36,663, and Median 4,179 Million $.  
b. The acquirer’s mean ROA is -0.004, Std Dev 0.06, and Median 0.02.  
c. The acquirer’s mean BL is 0.51, Std Dev 0.48, and Median 0.43. 
                                                 
12 For example, if the deal took place in Jan 2002 and Inteleos shows that a target has a drug that was 
approved in May 2007, then I move backwards in time using the average duration of each phase and 
conclude that this drug most likely must have been in Phase 2 in Jan 2002. 
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I present the summary statistics of my sample separately for acquirers, chosen 
targets, and alternative targets in Table 1-7. The acquirers’ size ranges from $1.6 
million to $123 billion in assets. The target firms with median assets of $186 million 
are relatively smaller than the acquiring firms with median assets of $3.8 billion.  
In general, acquirers are more profitable than targets and alternatives. The real 
targets have larger size, higher return on assets and lower book leverage (debt to assets 
ratio) than the alternative targets, suggesting that the real targets are financially 
healthier than the alternative targets on average. The real targets also score higher than 
the alternative targets on all the six synergy measures with acquirers, namely market 
intensification, market expansion, R&D intensification, R&D expansion, market to 
R&D intensification, and R&D to market intensification. 
1.5.3 Measurement of Synergy 
In this section, I discuss how I adapt the general framework mentioned in the 
previous section for calculating the synergies between the acquirer and the target 
alternatives. All notations refer to the method section.  
I use the therapy class tree structure in Inteleos, which has 22,372 therapy 
classes organized into 10 levels of hierarchy. Since I do not have the distance between 
therapy classes in Inteleos, I assume that ,CCi   0),( ii CCd , 5.0),( 1, pii CCd  
and nCCd npii 5.0),(
,   where 1,piC is the immediate parent node and npiC , is the n level 
above parent node of Ci. I also assume that this distance is symmetric 
( ),(),( ijji CCdCCd  ) and additive 
( nCCifCCdCCdCCd npijjpipiiji  ,1,1, ),(),(),( ). These assumptions specify 
every distance on the tree. To illustrate the distance calculation, in Figure 1-1, 
d(C6,C8).=d(C6,C4)+ d(C4,C8)= d(C6,C4)+ d(C4,C2)+d(C8,C2)=0.5+0.5+0.5*2=2, 
where the first two equalities use the additivity assumption and the third equality uses 
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the assumption d(Ci, Ci p,n)=0.5n. Hence, d(Ci,Cj)=1 Ci ≠Cj that share the same 
immediate parent. 
The mapping CDl :  is obtained from Inteleos which classifies each drug 
into one or more therapy classes. Since I do not have the data on drug sales, I proxy 
the market potential of each drug in the mapping  RDg : using the clinical 
probabilities of success in each phase of clinical trial13. In particular, approved drugs 
are given a market score of 1 and pipeline drugs in a given phase are given a R&D 
score equal to the clinical probability of approval for that phase.  
The similarity factor h: R3→R+ in the intensification factor equations (1-1)-(1-
4) is specified as: 
otherwise                  0                 
2 )(
2
1),,(

 difssssdh yxdyx
                         (1-7)
 
The complementarity factor r: R2→R+ in the expansion factor equations (1-5)-
(1-6) is given by: 
otherwise                     
2 
2
1),(
z
zz
s
difdssdr


                                        (1-8)
 
These functional forms imply that for d≤2, the similarity and complementarity 
factors are almost mirror opposite of each other in terms of sensitivity to distance; for 
d>2, the complementarity factor is capped by sz so as to not amplify the effect of 
market potential sz on this factor whereas the similarity factor is discontinuous so as to 
maintain its opposite relation with the former factor.  
                                                 
13 Following Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), I study all the five phases of drug development namely 
Pre-clinical, Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, and Pending Approval. The clinical probabilities of approval in 
these phases are 0.07, 0.22, 0.30, 0.69, and 0.9 respectively. 
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1.5.3.1 An Illustration for the Calculation of Intensification and Expansion 
Factors 
Assume that the therapy class structure is as given in Figure 1-2. Further 
assume that acquirer’s and target’s pipeline and approved drugs’ therapy classes and 
their corresponding market and R&D scores are as given in Table 1-8.  
 
Figure 1-2: Example of Therapy Class Structure 
 
Table 1-8: Example for Coding Representation of Therapeutic Classes 
in Figure 2-2 
 
Therapy class  Market Score R&D Score 
Panel I: Acquirer 
glaucoma surgery 2 0.07095 
caudal anesthesia 0 0.9 
Panel II: Target 
glaucoma surgery 1 0.215 
endocrine surgery 0 0.685 
inhalation anesthesia 0 0.07095 
In Table 1-8, the acquirer’s market score of 2 for glaucoma surgery may arise 
because the acquirer has two approved drugs (each with a weight of 1) in this therapy 
class. Likewise, the acquirer’s R&D score of 0.0795 for glaucoma surgery may arise 
 
Analytical, Diagnostic 
and Therapeutic 
Techniques, etc. 
 
Anesthesiological 
Techniques 
Surgical and  
Obstetric care 
 
Anesthesia   Surgery 
 Epidural  
Anesthesia 
Surgery  Endocrine  
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because it has one drug is in the pre-clinical phase (with its clinical approval 
probability of 0.0795). The similarity factors between therapy classes with acquirer’s 
pipeline drugs and therapy classes with target’s pipeline drugs are calculated in Table 
1-9. The R&D intensification factor is 1.06323, the sum of similarity factors for each 
of the therapy class combinations in Table 1-9. 
Table 1-9: Example for Calculation of R&D Intensification Factors 
 
Therapy classes with acquirer pipeline drugs Therapy 
classes 
i h
glaucoma surgery caudal anesthesia 
glaucoma (1/20)*(0.07095+0.215)=0.28595 0*(0.9+0.215)=0 
endocrine (1/20.5)*(0.07095+0.685)=0.5345 0*(0.9+0.685)=0 
inhalation 0*(0.07095+0.07095)=0 (1/22)*(0.9+0.07095)=0.2
The similarity factors between therapy classes with acquirer’s approved drugs 
and therapy classes with target’s approved drugs are calculated in Table 1-10. The 
market intensification factor is 3, the sum of similarity factors for each of the therapy 
class combinations in Table 1-10. 
Table 1-10: Example for Calculation of Market Intensification Factor 
 
Therapy classes with acquirer approved drugs Therapy classes with 
target approved drugs glaucoma surgery 
glaucoma surgery (1/20)*(2+1)=3 
 
The similarity factors between therapy classes with acquirer’s approved drugs 
and therapy classes with target’s pipeline drugs are calculated in Table 1-9. The 
Market to R&D intensification factor is 4.1136, the sum of similarity factors for each 
of the therapy class combinations in Table 1-11. 
The similarity factors between therapy classes with acquirer’s pipeline drugs 
and therapy classes with target’s approved drugs are calculated in Table 1-10. The 
R&D to Market intensification factor is 1.0795, the sum of similarity factors for each 
of the therapy class combinations in Table 1-12. 
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Table 1-11: Example for Calculation of Market to R&D Intensification Factor 
Therapy classes with acquirer approved drugs Therapy classes with 
target pipeline drugs  glaucoma surgery 
glaucoma surgery (1/20)*(2+0.215)=2.215 
endocrine surgery (1/20.5)*(2+0.685)=1.8985 
inhalation anesthesia 0*(2+0.07095)=0 
Table 1-12: Example for Calculation of R&D to Market Intensification Factor 
Therapy classes with acquirer pipeline drugs  Therapy classes with 
target approved drugs glaucoma surgery caudal anesthesia
glaucoma surgery (1/20)*(0.0795+1)=0.0795 0*(0.9+1)=0 
The complementarity factors for therapy classes with target’s pipeline drugs 
are calculated in Table 1-13. The R&D expansion factor is 0.2422, the sum of 
complementarity factors for each of the target therapy classes in Table 1-13.  
Table 1-13: Example for Calculation of R&D Expansion Factor 
 
Therapy classes with 
target pipeline drugs 
Complementarity Factors 
glaucoma surgery 0.5*0*0.215=0 
endocrine surgery 0.5*0.5*0.685=0.1712 
inhalation anesthesia 0.5*2*0.07095=0.07095 
The complementarity factors for therapy classes with target’s approved drugs 
are calculated in Table 1-14. The market expansion factor is 0, the sum of 
complementarity factors for each of the target therapy classes in Table 1-14.  
Table 1-14: Example for Calculation of R&D Expansion Factor 
 
Therapy classes with 
target approved drugs 
Complementarity Factors 
glaucoma surgery 0.5*0*1=0 
1.6 RESULTS 
1.6.1 Conditional Logit Result  
The conditional logit estimates are reported in Table 1-15. As compared to the 
estimation without the pipeline and market synergy variables (not reported, available 
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upon request), the full model estimation in Table 1-15 improves the McFadden’s LRI 
(a goodness of fit measure) from 0.29 to 0.47 and the Adjusted Estrella (another 
goodness of fit measure adjusting for number of parameters) from 0.58 to 0.68. The 
likelihood ratio test shows that the improvement in log likelihood from -43.21 to -
33.57 is statistically significant at 0.01 level (the chi square is 19.28 with 6 degrees of 
freedom). These results show that the market and R&D synergy variables increase the 
model’s explanatory power significantly. 
Table 1-15: Parameter Estimates for Conditional Logit 
 
Parameter 
Parameter 
Estimate Std Err t Value 
Pr > 
|t| 
Hypo-
theses 
Total Assets 4.51E-04 6.79E-04 0.66 0.51 
Return on Assets 4.73 2.55 1.86 0.06 
Book Leverage -1.37 0.96 -1.42 0.15 
Market Intensification -0.05 0.02 -2.36 0.02 H1 
Market Expansion 0.04 0.14 0.31 0.76 H2 
R&D Intensification -0.02 0.01 -2.23 0.03 H3 
R&D Expansion 0.05 0.07 0.69 0.49 H4 
Market to R&D Intensification 0.03 0.01 2.42 0.02 H5 
R&D to Market Intensification 0.04 0.02 2.52 0.01 H6 
Alliance 29.84 4681 0.01 0.99  
Large -54.8 30.26 -1.81 0.07 
SIC Matching 0.97 0.59 1.63 0.1 
Sales Ratio 0.39 0.52 0.74 0.46 
Biopharma Matching -0.3 0.57 -0.52 0.6 
Notes: 
a. Number of obs.: 29; Number of cases: 264  
b. McFadden’s LRI: 0.47. This is a goodness of fit analogous to the R2 in the linear regression model. 
R2M = 1 - [lnL/(lnL0)] where L is the maximum of the log-likelihood function and L0 is the maximum 
of the log-likelihood function when all coefficients, except for an intercept term, are zero. 
McFadden's likelihood ratio index is bounded by 0 and 1. 
c. Adjusted Estrella: 0.73. Adjusted Estrella is another goodness of fit measurement suggested by 
Estrella: RE22 = 1 - [(lnL - K) / lnL0]-(2 / N) lnL0, where lnL0 is computed with null parameter values, 
N is the number of observations used, and K represents the number of estimated parameters. 
The market intensification factor and the R&D intensification factor are 
negatively significant, implying that the acquirers shun targets that simply strengthen 
their existing markets or R&D base. Therefore H1 and H3 are rejected. The market to 
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R&D intensification factor and the R&D to market intensification factor are positively 
significant, implying that the acquirers prefer targets with either approved drugs that 
match their existing pipeline, or R&D products that match their existing products.  H5 
and H6 are supported. 
The positive significance of R&D to market intensification (H6) suggests that 
acquirers seek to achieve immediate revenue growth by establishing presence in 
markets of strategic interest and generate synergy by exploiting the acquired 
knowledge to improve its R&D. The acquirer’s pipeline reflects its belief in the 
marketability of those drugs in the future. However, the acquirer may not want to wait 
for the slow R&D process to deliver if it is eager to enter that market. Therefore, the 
acquirer may choose a target which possesses approved drugs that match the pipeline 
it is developing. The acquirer can generate synergy by exploiting the knowledge 
gained from the acquired products to improve its delayed R&D project or create new 
knowledge.  
The positive significance of market to R&D intensification (H5) suggests that 
acquirers’ seek to boost their long-term innovation potential and generate synergies 
from pipeline to product transformation. An acquirer may want to replenish it pipeline 
even when its current drugs are generating revenue because current drugs may suffer a 
loss in revenues once the patent expires, thus resulting in production shutdowns and 
sales force layoffs. So the acquirer may want to acquire pipeline drugs that could get 
approved by the time its current drugs run out of patent, and can utilize the existing 
sales force and production capacity. Danzon, Nicholson and Pereira (2005) found that 
pharmaceutical companies with more experience in drug development are more likely 
to take large and complex late-stage trials to success. The acquirer can use its 
experience and resources to help carry those R&D projects through the final stages 
besides providing valuable pre-launch and post-launch support in areas such as 
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production, marketing and sales coverage. Also, an experienced pharmaceutical 
acquirer can help the target in the FDA’s New Drug Application process, which takes 
an average of 20 months (Berndt 2001). 
The above two motives (R&D to market intensification and market to R&D 
intensification) have different planning horizon, with the first one aiming at immediate 
revenue generation and the second one aiming at promoting innovation to generate 
revenues few years down the road. Therefore, both considerations can exist in the 
same deal if the acquirer’s pipeline is in some therapeutic areas and its products are in 
other therapeutic areas. Alternately, the significance of these two motives could be 
because different deals focus on one of these motives. Unfortunately, the small sample 
size restricts the further splitting of the sample, since each subset will have too few 
observations to make the estimation outcome significant. 
The negative significance of market and R&D synergies (H1 and H3 
respectively) in my estimation doesn’t necessarily contradict the positive results in the 
empirical literature on “related” mergers (e.g. Amihud and Lev 1981). Instead, the 
differences may be driven by the degree of “relatedness”. The cross-industry studies 
on “relatedness” consider all firms in the same industry as related whereas I capture 
the “relatedness” within an industry. So the findings in the literature may hold that 
mergers in the same industry are more likely to create synergy, but within an industry, 
it seems the acquirers don’t want targets that are similar to themselves. The bell 
shaped effect between relatedness and synergy (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005) might 
peak at the boundary of the industry, and generate the results found in the literature 
and in this paper.  
I do not find significant evidence for the market and R&D expansion factors 
(H2 and H4 respectively). This finding does not necessarily mean that the acquiring 
firms do not use acquisition as an expansion tool. Instead, it might be that acquirers 
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have certain aims in their market or R&D expansions. In particular, R&D to market 
intensification is a subset of R&D expansion because the complementarity of target’s 
R&D to acquirer’s R&D doesn’t preclude the possibility that the target’s R&D could 
be similar to acquirer’s markets. Using the same logic, market to R&D intensification 
is a subset of market expansion. Since the acquirer needs expertise in the area that it 
wants to enter to assimilate the new products and knowledge, it may want to expand in 
areas that it is familiar with (positive significance of interaction synergies) instead of 
expanding in totally new areas (lack of significance of expansion synergies). 
As for the other variables, none of the culture matching variables turn out to be 
significant. This is more or less expected, because “culture” of a firm is always 
difficult to define, not to mention quantify. The return on assets of the target firm is a 
significant factor for target selection. Obviously target firms with higher returns are 
more attractive to acquirers. Targets greater than 10 billions are less likely to be 
selected, which confirms my conjecture that challenges specific to large firm 
acquisition such as difficulty in integration and culture shock hold back acquirers from 
acquiring these large targets.  
1.6.2 Bootstrapping Test 
I conduct a bootstrap study pioneered by Efron (1979) to verify the robustness 
of my findings. Following the standard bootstrap procedure in Mooney and Duval 
(1993), I draw 1000 times, 29 observations with replacement from the original sample, 
and calculate summary statistics for the 1000 parameter estimates. Table 1-16 contains 
the mean, median and confidence interval of the parameter estimates. My findings 
from the main estimation regarding market and R&D synergies hold in the Bootstrap 
study.  
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Table 1-16: Bootstrap Analysis 
 
Parameters Mean Median 5th 
percent 
95th 
Percent
Total Assets -4.98E-03 0.00 -0.00333 0.00273
Return on Assets 45.79 6.08 1.02 28.3
Book Leverage -3.87 -2.39 -8.27 -0.6
Market Intensification -0.46 -0.08 -0.5 -0.03
Market Expansion 0.14 0.02 -0.41 0.76
R&D Intensification -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 0
R&D Expansion 0.06 0.02 -0.24 0.37
Market to R&D Intensification 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.13
R&D to Market Intensification 0.33 0.06 0.03 0.26
Alliance  118.93 33.26 21.1 120.52
large                     - -149.78 -62.41 -303.52 214.6
SIC Matching  3.24 0.98 -0.29 2.81
Sales Ratio 22.15 0.36 -1.62 8.89
Biopharma Matching -2.78 -0.59 -2.65 0.36
1.6.3 Predictive Power  
I do the following analysis to test the out of sample predictive power of the 
model: 1) remove 2 deals from the 29 deals , 2) run the conditional logit estimation 
with the remaining 27 deals and estimate the parameters, 3) use the parameter 
estimates to predict the target for the two deals that were dropped from the estimation 
sample, 4) record the accuracy of the prediction, and 5) repeat steps 1-4 for all 
possible combinations of 2 deals out of 29, which is 406 in total (I use 2 deals instead 
of 1 in each round, because the former gives us a much larger sample for statistical 
testing). With the six markets and R&D synergy variables, the accuracy of the model 
prediction is 54.56%, whereas the accuracy without these synergies is 44.46% (the 
difference is statistically significant at 0.01 level). The chance of random selection is 
10%. This test shows that the model does a significantly better job than chance in 
predicting target choice. And the inclusion of market and R&D synergies improves the 
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model’s predictive power significantly as compared to having financial variables 
alone.  
1.6.4 Tests for Nonlinearity of R&D and Market Intensification 
I include the square term of the R&D intensification factor together with the 
first order term in the estimation to see whether a bell-shaped effect of the R&D 
intensification factor exists14. The effect of R&D intensification does not change: 
neither the first order term nor the squared term is significant. However, the effect of 
market intensification changes with the inclusion of its square term: the market 
intensification factor is positively significant and its square term is negatively 
significant. This result may be arising due to the positive correlation between the 
pipeline and approved drugs of the acquirers. To test this conjecture, I include the 
market and R&D intensification and expansion factors together with the squared term 
of the market intensification factor in the estimation.  The market intensification factor 
is negatively significant and the square term is not significant, confirming my 
conjecture that correlation is driving the non-monotonic effect of market 
intensification in the earlier estimation.  
1.6.5 Test for Financial Synergies 
To verify the effect of financial synergies proposed by Rao et al. (1991), I 
include the dispersion of financial variables of the acquirer and target alternatives in 
the main estimation. My findings from the main estimation are unchanged in this new 
specification. And none of the financial synergy variables is significant (results not 
reported, available upon request). The goodness of fit measured by McFadden’s LRI 
increases from 0.47 to 0.49, which means that the financial synergy variables increase 
the explanatory power; however, the Adjusted Estrella decreases from 0.73 to 0.67 
after the increased number of independent variables are taken into account. While the 
                                                 
14 Results not reported, available upon request. 
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financial synergy may explain some of the “fit” between acquirers and targets, my 
market and R&D synergy variables are much more refined measures of synergy 
between the merging firms, and therefore overshadow the significance of financial 
synergy.   
1.7 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
My findings provide considerable support for the knowledge based view of the 
firm. Knowledge, in the form of product knowledge and R&D knowledge, is a strong 
motivation for acquisition target selection. This point has been suggested by the 
competence based theories of the firm (of which knowledge based view of the firm is 
a subset) and has had a strong influence on the M&A literature (e.g. Hamel and 
Prahalad 1994, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). As the organization is dependent on 
the current and aspired configuration of capabilities, these capabilities influence the 
extent of mergers and acquisitions by determining the boundaries of the firm and 
acting as the first and foremost decision-making determinant in the M&A due 
diligence process. Even more generally, resource endowments and synergy seeking 
can be argued to influence pre-merger processes like growth strategy selection, 
candidate selection, strategic and financial due diligence as well as negotiations. In 
this empirical study I find concrete support for this school of thought.  
Although this research is conducted in the pharmaceutical industry, the findings 
can be generalized to many high tech industries that emphasize on innovation and 
have frequent consolidation through acquisition. For example, similar acquisition 
patterns can be found in the information technology industry where firms such as 
Microsoft, Google and Cisco have acquired successful products in new markets where 
these giants wanted to enter (for instance, Google acquired the popular “You Tube” 
while its “Google Video” was struggling to enter this market). 
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This research can help managers in several ways. It provides the acquiring firm 
a viable tool to quantify its potential synergy with a target. The manager’s qualitative 
guidelines of “strategic fitness” can be quantified using my synergy measures and the 
fit with different potential targets can be compared to choose the best target. Managers 
can enhance my synergy measures by including more variables such as geographic 
regions, market shares, sales figures, sales force expertise, distribution coverage, and 
management and scientific personnel. Better measures for cultural fit can also be 
included in anticipation of the integration process. Also, the framework in this paper 
can be adapted by executives to make other business to business relationship decisions 
such as the choice of an advertising agency. 
1.8 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
There are several limitations of this paper. First, since the reasons for 
acquisition often differ across industries, certain effects in a single industry study may 
not hold in cross industry studies. Therefore more empirical studies are needed with 
data from industries with different levels of reliance on innovation. Second, within my 
application context, I do not have detailed information on production facilities, sales 
force, market share, etc. Although my synergy measures serve as a proxy for these 
operational factors, including these explicit measures can verify the findings in this 
paper. Third, as in most empirical studies, I assume the same acquisition incentive 
across deals. It is possible that different acquisitions are conducted for different 
reasons, even within the same industry. With a larger dataset and more readily 
available pipeline and product information, one can test more refined hypotheses on 
acquisition incentives specified by acquirer types. For example, this heterogeneity in 
incentive can be introduced through acquirer specific parameters with different 
distributional assumptions and estimated through Hierarchical Bayesian methods.  
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As for future research, my choice modeling in an acquisition context can be 
extended by researchers to study other managerial decisions in the Business to 
Business context, such as alliances and joint ventures, where the needs of both the 
initiator and the recipient are to be considered, and the best results can be achieved 
through synergy creation. The model can also be generalized by researchers in many 
non-business settings, such as dating and social networking. 
This paper also suggests a new direction for the empirical acquisition 
literature. Instead of studying the acquisition outcome unconditionally, this paper 
suggests that it might be better to condition the outcome on acquisition motive. The 
knowledge of acquirer’s motive can help in deciding which aspect of acquisition 
outcome to evaluate. For instance, if an acquirer chooses a target whose pipeline can 
deliver products in 5 years time, it is not useful to evaluate the acquisition based on 
earnings growth in a shorter duration such as 3 years. Controlling for target selection 
in the acquisition outcome can also help in ascertaining the impact of integration 
process because the inability of achieving the acquirer’s initial motives must be due to 
an unsuccessful integration.  
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                     
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF MERGERS ON INNOVATION WITH A 
MATCHING MODEL 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
Innovation is one of the key motivations for mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
While many studies have explored the effect of M&A on innovation output, these 
studies do not control for the endogenous matching between the acquirer and the 
target, which not only obscures the effect of integration on innovation performance, 
but also yield biased estimates of the drivers of innovation output. Therefore, I study 
the impact of M&A on innovation using a two stage model: a matching model is used 
to explain the sorting of firms into pairs, and an innovation output function is linked to 
the matching model through error correlation. This joint specification reduces the bias 
in estimation of innovation outcome and helps determine the drivers of merger 
integration process. Using a Bayesian estimation method, the model is applied to 1895 
mergers in five high-tech industries between 1992 and 2008. I find that the unobserved 
strategic fit between the two merging partners has a significant effect on the post-
merger innovation abilities of the combined firm. Managers wisely choose merger 
partners that deepen their technical knowledge, but underestimate the challenges in 
integrating foreign partners and partners with similar technology. I also find potential 
bias in the effect of knowledge breadth on post-merger innovation performance in the 
existing literature due to matching induced endogeneity. 
  61
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is central to marketing discipline. Often, it is a central motivation 
for mergers and acquisitions15 (Sorescu et al, 2007). Consequently, many researchers 
have explored the link between merger and innovation. While initial research mostly 
from the strategy literature suggested that mergers tend to hurt innovation due to 
integration distractions, scientist turnover, or R&D budget reductions (Hitt et al. 1991; 
Hitt et al. 1996; Ernst and Vitt, 2000), many recent studies suggest that mergers can 
assist innovation (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis, 2005; Sorescu, 
Chandy and Prabhu, 2007). Specifically, firms with strong internal knowledge (depth, 
breadth and similarity of knowledge) produce more innovation from acquisition 
(Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis, 2005) and acquirers with large product capital (product 
development and product support) are better able to select and deploy target’s 
innovation potential (Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu, 2007).  
While the acquirer’s internal knowledge and product capital may influence the 
innovation output in an acquisition, it is not clear how much of this influence comes 
from generating innovation synergies or from facilitating the integration process. This 
ambiguity arises because the existing empirical studies directly estimate the impact of 
relevant variables on post-merger innovation output without controlling for the 
endogenous matching between the acquirer and the target. Ignoring the matching 
process not only obscures the effect of integration on the outcome of the merger, but 
may also yield biased estimates of the determinants of post-merger innovation output 
if unobserved variables affect both matching and outcome of a merger.  
In this paper, I control for the endogenous matching of merging firms to estimate 
the influence of various drivers of innovation output in a merger. I use a structural 
matching model to explain the sorting of firms into merging pairs, and then evaluate 
                                                 
15 Mergers, acquisitions and M&A are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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the innovation outcome of the merger based on the matching process. This joint 
specification reduces the bias in estimation of innovation outcome and helps determine 
the drivers of integration process. A Bayesian method is employed to estimate the 
model. 
The model is estimated on 1,895 deals from five high-tech industries. The joint 
estimation significantly improves upon OLS in explaining the innovation output in a 
merger. I find that unobserved strategic fit in a merger has a strong effect on post 
merger innovation abilities, measured by post merger number of new patents produced 
by the firms. Moreover, the joint estimation uncovers many new facts about 
innovation outcome, merger matching and merger integration. First, I find that 
similarity of knowledge non-monotonic and positively affects partner choice and 
negatively affects merger innovation output, suggesting that managers do not prefer to 
merge with too similar firms and fail to fully anticipate the problems in integrating 
firms with similar knowledge base. Second, depth of knowledge is non-monotonically 
related to both matching and innovation outcome, suggesting that managers prefer 
firms with intermediate knowledge depth and that managers tend to anticipate the 
effect of knowledge depth on innovation performance. Third, breadth of knowledge 
has a marginal positive significance on innovation performance but has no effect in the 
matching estimation or the OLS estimation. This finding suggests that managers do 
not anticipate the effect of knowledge breadth on merger, and the OLS estimate of the 
effect of knowledge breadth is biased due to matching induced endogeneity. Similar 
results hold with respect to the nation matching between acquirer and target firm. 
Managers prefer foreign firms to domestic partners, yet the domestic partners generate 
better results according to post merger performance measures.  
Synergies in a merger can be generated in two stages. The first stage is the 
matching process, wherein the two firms find each other as ideal partner for synergy 
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generation. The second stage is the integration process, during which the two firms 
work together to realize the potential synergy. Since the factors that affect matching 
and the factors that influence the integration process may overlap, it is important to 
empirically separate the two effects and measure their relative importance. The extant 
literature is not able to differentiate between these two contributors to synergy in the 
same model. In contrast, I separate these two effects through a two-part modeling 
framework which captures the choice of merger partner in the first part and estimate 
the merger outcome in the other.  
When two firms choose to merge, they might aim at potential synergies which 
can be realized if the integration process runs smoothly. However, problems in the 
integration process often prohibit the realization of all the potential synergies. 
Therefore, the expected synergies from a merger must be equal to the potential 
synergies from that merger minus the expected synergy lost through the integration 
process. It is reasonable to expect that firms choose a merger partner based on 
expected synergies as evaluated by managers. However, managers’ expectations of 
integration success may be biased either due to incomplete information or due to 
overconfidence. Therefore managers’ expected synergies may be higher than the true 
expected synergies and the difference between these two expectations represents 
expected integration problems not anticipated by the managers. Since merger 
matching is based on managers’ expected synergies whereas realized synergies are 
distributed around the true expected synergies, the matching part of my model 
estimates the drivers of managers’ expected synergies whereas the outcome part of my 
model estimates the drivers of true expected synergies. Subtracting these two 
estimations gives the drivers of integration problems that should have been anticipated 
by managers if they had complete information and were perfectly rational.  
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Besides estimating the effects of drivers of integration process, my model also 
corrects for matching induced endogeneity in estimating the true drivers of innovation 
output. In a merger, the matching process becomes endogenous when an acquirer and 
a target match not only on observable innovation characteristics but also along 
dimensions that are unobserved in the data. The error term in the matching model for 
the merged pairs, which captures the merger fit on unobservable dimensions, becomes 
correlated with the observable innovation characteristics16. If the unobservable 
characteristics also affect the innovation output, the estimated coefficients from a 
direct regression of observed characteristics on innovation output (which is used in the 
extant M&A literature) are biased relative to the actual influence of the observable 
characteristics on innovation output.  
One interpretation of the unobserved characteristics for matching is that it 
represents unobserved or idiosyncratic strategic fit. According to Porter (1996), 
competitive advantage comes from coordinating all the activities in a firm to achieve 
strategic fit. Therefore when firms merge with others, they will seek partners that can 
strengthen and deepen their strategic fit (Porter 1987). Strategic fit defined in terms of 
observable characteristics such as product-market relatedness (Porter 1987), resource 
allocation patterns (Harrison et al. 1991), management philosophy (Datta, Grant, and 
Rajagopalan 1991) and organizational culture (Chatterjee et al. 1992) has been used to 
explain post-merger outcomes (Ramaswamy 1997). However, some of the factors that 
affect strategic fit, such as supply channels, sales force distribution, research 
personnel, and technical expertise are either not publicly available or hard to collect. 
Matching on such unobservable characteristics may represent unobserved strategic 
                                                 
16 If the observed and unobserved characteristics are correlated to begin with, the matching process 
increases the correlation between the observed and unobserved variables for the matched pairs. 
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fit17. Moreover, factors such as the leadership style and corporate culture are firm 
specific and cannot be compared across mergers. Matching on such idiosyncratic 
characteristics may represent idiosyncratic strategic fit. The matching of firms on 
unobservable dimensions has also been referred to as private synergy (Hitt et al. 
1991).  
One solution to the endogeneity problem is to estimate the model using 
instrumental variables. For each merger, the instrument must be independent of the 
merger outcome but related to the fit of the merging firms. Unfortunately, any of the 
merging firms’ characteristics that are related to the merger decision also have an 
impact on the merger outcome and hence are not valid instruments.  
Since instruments are hard to find in this case, I develop a structural model to 
separate the effect of factors that determine matching from those that influence 
integration. Matching in the merger market implies that a firm chooses a partner with 
the best fit subject to the partner not wanting to merge with some other firm. Hence 
the merger decision depends on the characteristics of other firms in the merger market. 
However, the outcome of the merger is independent of the characteristics of the 
alternative firms. Therefore, the characteristics of the alternative firms in the merger 
market present a source of exogenous variation in the model18. This exogenous 
variation is similar to an instrumental variable, and the structural model uses it to 
identify the two sources of synergy. Researchers have introduced such exogenous 
variation to overcome endogeity in other economic settings (e.g. Bresnahan 1987, 
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995). Sorensen (2007) uses a similar model to 
                                                 
17 A researcher could use proxies or managerial inputs to control for these unobserved factors, but these 
controls tend to be imprecise and subjective.  
18 Obviously this model does not apply to situations where mergers trigger or result from industry wide 
consolidation or major landscape change. To study the mega mergers and their consequences on the 
entire industry, a different game theory model with fewer players will be more appropriate. In my study 
I excluded the top 1% of the firms (by size) from my sample, so this concern is alleviated to some 
extent.   
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overcome endogeneity in the matching of venture capitalists and start-up companies, 
although the sources of endogeneity in Sorensen’s and mine model are quite different.  
My structural model consists of two parts. The second part specifies the outcome 
of each merger deal. Due to matching-induced endogeneity, estimation of this 
equation alone yields inconsistent estimates. The first part of the model specifies a 
merger matching game, which is based on a one-sided matching model called 
roommates model (Gale and Shapley 1962)19. Angelov (2006) adapts the roommate 
model to the merger situation under the assumption of extreme value distribution, 
which simplifies the derivation of equilibrium but restricts the application of the 
model to few participants in each market. I adapt the roommate model under the 
assumption of normal distribution, which allows any number of participants in each 
market but requires a more sophisticated estimation procedure. The empirical 
matching model is a discrete choice model that allows for interactions among the 
choices made by different agents. Together, the two parts of the model are analogous 
to the two stages of the two-stage estimator in the Heckman selection model 
(Heckman 1976, 1979). Since the estimation is numerically intensive, I use Bayesian 
estimation based on MCMC simulation called Gibbs sampling (Gelfand and Smith 
1990, Geweke 1999). This estimation procedure is similar to the procedure used by 
Sorensen (2007), who estimates a college admissions model. The difference in this 
case is that my model a roommate matching model.  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it identifies the 
exact contribution of various drivers of innovation output in an acquisition. While the 
existing literature has identified such drivers (e.g. Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis, 2005; 
                                                 
19 Since merging firms cannot always be naturally divided into two subgroups beforehand and because 
the motivations of merging firms in pursuing a merger may be similar, two-sided matching models such 
as marriage model or college admissions model (Roth and Sotomayer 1990) are not suitable for 
analyzing the merger game. 
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Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu, 2007; Cassiman et al. 2005), these studies do not 
identify which of those variables affect merger matching and which affect the 
integration process. Moreover, the results from existing studies are biased due to 
matching induced endogeneity. After correcting for these problems, I find that 
unobserved strategic fit in a merger has a strong effect on post merger firm innovative 
abilities. Merging firm managers wisely chose partners that will deepen their technical 
knowledge, but are underestimating the integration challenges brought by foreign 
partners and partners with similar technology as theirs. I also find that the estimation 
of breadth of knowledge in the existing literature is biased due to matching induced 
endogeneity.  
Second, this paper pioneers the method for quantifying and estimating the 
empirical determinants of merger integration process. The existing empirical M&A 
literature studies the determinants of merger outcome (e.g. Loughran and Vijh 1997; 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001; Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis, 2005) but not the 
drivers of the integration process. The research on integration process has relied on 
case studies and manager surveys rather than objective empirical analysis20. By 
developing a structural model that links merger matching and merger outcome, this 
paper quantifies the drivers of integration process. The findings can be used by 
managers and academics alike. 
Third, this paper develops a new method for studying unbiased determinants of 
merger outcomes such as innovation output, stock returns and operating performance. 
Merger involves endogenous matching of firms which, unless controlled for, biases 
the impact of relevant variables on merger outcome. This paper develops a game 
theoretic model to endogenize the merger partner choice and estimate the unbiased 
                                                 
20 There exists a large literature on the determinants of merger integration process (e.g. Homburg and 
Bucerius 2005), but these papers are based on subjective case studies and manager surveys rather than 
objective empirical data. 
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impact of relevant variables on the merger outcome. To my knowledge this is the first 
study to identify and correct matching induced endogenity in a merger setting. M&A 
literature which evaluates long-term merger performance can use this model to obtain 
unbiased estimates of merger outcome. Marketing, finance and strategy literature 
which evaluates long-term merger performance (e.g. Loughran and Vijh 1997; 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001) can use this model to understand how 
integration process affects merger performance.   
Fourth, this paper generalizes the existing literature on M&A target selection. 
The existing studies on merger partner choice (e.g. Silhan and Thomas 1986; Rao, 
Mahanjan and Varaiya 1991; Yu and Rao 2009) consider the merger process solely 
from the perspective of acquirers, as if target firms have no say. In reality, majority of 
mergers happen with the consent of both participants. Often times there are more than 
one interested acquirers and target firm have to make a choice. This paper uses a 
matching model to specify the target selection process, and therefore improves upon 
these studies. Moreover, these studies do not evaluate the impact of merger matching 
on merger outcome as this paper does. 
Fifth, the model developed in this paper can be adapted to many marketing 
situations which involve matching and performance evaluation. Some examples 
include firm’s selection and evaluation of advertising agencies, firm’s selection and 
evaluation of wholesale distributors, firm’s selection and evaluation of suppliers etc. 
Direct evaluation of performance in these cases without controlling for matching will 
lead to biased estimates. Using a matching model to control for matching induced 
endogeneity will lead to unbiased evaluation of performance in these settings. The 
Bayesian estimation of roommate model introduced in this paper can be adapted for 
estimating such models.  
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2.3 THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.3.1 Theory 
With the rise of the competence based perspective to corporate strategy (e.g. 
Hamel and Prahalad 1990, 1994, Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994) and a more 
elaborate understanding of the need for strategic and organizational fit (e.g. Porter 
1996), the relatedness of activities has received extensive and increasing attention 
(Parvinen 2003).  
According to Porter (1996), competitive advantage comes from strategic 
positioning, and coordinating all the activities in a firm to achieve strategic fit. 
Similarly, when firms merge with other firms, they will seek partners that can 
strengthen and deepen their strategic fit, and therefore create synergy in the process 
(Porter 1987). Although some fit among activities is generic and applies to many 
companies, the most valuable fit is strategy-specific because it enhances the 
uniqueness of a firm’s strategic position and amplifies trade-offs among its activities21. 
Therefore, the strategic fit sought in merger is also unique to each case and cannot be 
simply lumped into several large categories. Otherwise the strategies become similar 
within the categories and the firms who own them would not have unique positioning 
or advantage among the peers.  
Because competitive advantage grows out of the entire system of activities of a 
firm, it is misleading to explain success by specifying individual strengths, core 
competencies, or critical resources without considering the consistency of the entire 
collection of the company activities. This further reinforces my earlier point that 
controlling for the characteristics of acquirer or target alone cannot explain the 
                                                 
21 Firms that want to hold a specific strategic position in the market have to make trade-offs in the 
activities they pursue. For example, a firm that wants to focus on business customers rather than retail 
customers may restructure its business process so that it serves the former customers better at the 
expense of the latter customers. 
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potential synergy between acquirer and target, or why two firms merge with each 
other. The fit between two firms may be unique to each merger and cannot be 
replicated or grouped easily with other mergers. In other words, mergers could be 
driven by idiosyncratic strategic fit between the activities of the two firms. Such 
idiosyncratic fit may not even be disclosed to outsiders due to competitive reasons, 
resulting in private synergies (Hitt et al. 1991). 
With the theory of strategic fit, I move on to the measurement of strategic fit. 
Since the early development of the strategy school, scholars have paid attention to the 
relationship between related activities and merger synergy. In general, the findings 
show that related mergers outperform the diversifying ones (Kitching, 1974; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Porter, 1987). Besides the product 
based definition of relatedness, later studies from the strategy school also encompass 
critical organizational and strategic factors such as resource allocation patterns22  
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland 1991), management philosophy (Datta, Grant, 
and Rajagopalan, 1991) and organizational culture (Chatterjee et al. 1992; Jemison 
and Sitkin 1986; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1993) in explain post-merger outcomes 
(Ramaswamy 1997). These empirical studies provide evidence for specific 
components of strategic fit. For example, Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland (2008) 
prove the effect of strategic emphasis alignment on post-merger outcomes. Chatterjee 
et al. (1992) find that “cultural fit” between the target and competing acquirers on 
dimensions such as risk-taking attitude, reward orientation, innovation orientation, and 
autonomy orientation results in superior gains for the stockholder. They find that 
cultural mismatches harm the performance of the mergers. Along similar lines, Datta 
et al (1991) find that inconsistency between the acquirer’s and target’s management 
                                                 
22 The argument for strategic alliance is that if two firms exhibit very similar resource allocation 
patterns as measured across a variety of strategically relevant characteristics (e.g. , risk propensity, 
marketing efficiency), they can be considered to be strategically similar. 
  71
styles was negatively related to post-merger performance. They reason that when 
mergers require an amalgamation of dissimilar management styles, a firm loses its 
ability to act in unison to realize the potential synergies arising from the merger, 
leading to poor performance. Ramaswamy (1997) measures relative size, pre-merger 
performance, market coverage, overhead/revenues, marketing expenditures/revenues, 
client mix and risk propensity on a group of bank mergers and finds that everything 
except relative size and market coverage are negatively correlated to the post merger 
performance of the acquirer firm.    
From the above theoretical and empirical evidence, I can draw the conclusion 
that strategic fit between the acquirer and the target plays an important role in post-
merger performance. There might be other factors that affect strategic fit such as 
complementary business offerings, supply channels, sales force distribution, etc. (Rao 
et al. 1991) that are important in practice but are difficult to measure or obtain data on. 
Even if the data on these factors can be collected on a small scale, they are difficult to 
obtain on a large scale which is often desired for robust and generalizable empirical 
analysis. Besides, as discussed earlier, strategic fit is often either idiosyncratic and 
therefore can not be pooled for many firms, or is privately observed and hence cannot 
be included in the analysis. To sum, the existing measures of strategic fit do not 
capture the true synergies in a merger. 
Moreover, the method of measuring the influence of acquirer and target 
relationship on post-merger performances is flawed. According to the process theory 
of M&A (Hunt 1990, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Pablo 1994, Larsson and 
Finkelstein 1999), merger performance not only depends on the planning and partner 
selection process, but also on the post-merger integration effort, which is often 
overlooked by researchers and practitioners. 
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According to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), during the merger planning 
stage, due to the time pressure and managers’ incentive to justify the deal, the quality 
of the target selection process is often compromised. Therefore, following the decision 
to merge, costly mechanisms and the adjustment of information flows governing the 
use of the resources are needed (Ranft 1997, Zollo 1998, Zollo and Singh 2000). “The 
value to be derived from an acquisition depends largely upon the skill with which the 
administrative problems of integration are handled. Many valuable acquired corporate 
assets have been lost by neglect and by poor handling during the integration process” 
(Mace and Montgomery 1962, p.230, in Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p.307).   
 
Table 2-1: A Classification of the M&A Process into Three Phases According to 
Emerging Process Problems (Marks and Mirvis 1998) 
 
Table 2-1 above summarizes the issues at each stage of the merger process. As 
this table from Marks and Marvis (1998) suggests, the linkages between acquirer and 
target measured by the strategy literature does not account for all the interactions 
between the two firms after they tie the knot. And there is a need to separate the effect 
of integration process in empirical analysis. However, data on integration process is 
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notoriously difficult to collect due to the asymmetry of inside and outside information, 
and uniqueness of each merger. In this paper, I use a structural model to separate the 
effect of these two stages, namely the strategic fit seeking partner selection (matching) 
stage, and the post-merger integration stage. Admittedly there is carry-over effect from 
the matching stage, since good managers always try to foresee the difficulties and 
opportunities of integration and take those into account while choosing their merger 
partner. Therefore the effect of second stage measured by my model will be the 
residual influence of integration after the effect of first stage matching is taken into 
account.  
An alternate way to view the above issue is that managers enter into a merger 
based on expected synergies from the deal. These expectations take into account 
integration problems to the extent that managers can anticipate those problems. If the 
managers had complete information and were perfectly rational and act to maximize 
the shareholder value, the realized synergies from the merger should be evenly 
distributed around their expected synergies. Otherwise, their expectations may be 
biased as compared to average realized synergies. The source of this bias can either be 
incomplete information, misjudgment, or agency problems. The structural model in 
this paper jointly specifies the expected synergies in the merger matching stage and 
the realized synergies in the merger outcome stage. The differences in the parameter 
estimates for these two stages capture the merger integration issues that were not 
reflected by managers’ expectations.   
One aspect of the merger performance, which is of special importance to 
marketing scholars, is innovation abilities. As stated by Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 
(2005), many firms consider the acquisition of other firms as a way to co-opt and build 
on ideas from outside. Acquisitions are especially prevalent in high-tech industries, in 
which the level of market and technological uncertainty is high and the need to absorb 
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new ideas through acquisition is high (John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999; Rindfleisch and 
Moorman 2001; Wind and Mahajan 1997). A strategy based solely on internally built 
knowledge is likely to delay or inhibit access to these ideas—sometimes with fatal 
consequences. For these and other reasons, marketing scholars have highlighted the 
potential for innovation through acquisitions (Wind and Mahajan 1997).  
On the other hand, some strategy researchers have argued that acquisitions 
tend to hurt, not help, innovation (Ernst and Vitt 2000; Hitt et al, 1991; Miller 1990). 
They argue that the activities involved in trying to consummate and integrate 
acquisitions can distract managers from the task of innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson, and 
Ireland 1990). Others note that key employees, including scientists and champions of 
innovation, may leave the firm after acquisition (Ernst and Vitt 2000). Researchers 
also point out that firms may take on considerable debt to finance acquisitions; the 
interest expenses and repayments associated with this debt may choke off much-
needed funds from innovation (Hitt et al. 1991b).  
Therefore, the effect of acquisition on innovation is an open question and can 
be answered with sound empirical analysis. The mixed empirical evidence on this 
issue is discussed in the next section. This paper adds to this literature by attempting to 
reduce the matching-induced bias in the estimates of effects of the drivers of 
innovation output and determining whether such influence comes from the strategic 
planning reflected in partner selection, or from the post-merger integration. Such 
distinction has significant implications on the understanding of M&A researchers, as 
well as the managers and consultants who plan or give advice on M&A deals.  
2.3.2 Literature Review 
As a phenomenon with large economic and managerial implications, merger 
and acquisition has been the focus of attention in many academic fields. Parvinen 
(2003) provides a comprehensive review on the theoretical background of mergers and 
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acquisitions. Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin (2003) provide a comprehensive review 
of the empirical findings on mergers and acquisitions.  
Almost all the empirical research in this area focuses on merger outcome. 
These studies differ in how they measure merger performance. The most popular 
method to measure merger outcome is the “event study” method, which uses stock 
market values in an “event window” of 1-5 days. This stream of literature finds that 
the combined returns of acquirer and target are positive around the event window, 
indicating that mergers are synergy generating in general (Bradley, Desai, and Kimi 
1988; Kaplan and Weisbach 1992; Servaes 1991; Mulherin and Boone 2000; Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford 2001). This result provides support for the positive correlation23 
between the matching and outcome function in my model design. Another stream of 
literature has measured merger outcome using long-term stock price performance and 
has found contradictory results. Some of these studies find the post-merger long-term 
price performance to be negative (Loughran and Vijh 1997), which is argued to be 
consistent with managerial hubris (Roll 1986). On the other hand, other studies find 
that the post-merger long-run price performance is insignificantly different from zero 
(Rau and Vermaelen 1998), which is argued to be consistent with the efficient market 
theory (Mitchell and Stafford 2000). The last stream of research measures merger 
performance using post-merger operating performance. Healy, Palepu and Ruback 
(1992) and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) show that operating cash flow of a 
merged firm increases relative to industry benchmarks. This paper follows the last 
stream of research, because real business growth, profitability and innovation are of 
greater interest to marketing strategy researchers. While the stock market prices also 
depend on these measures of operational performance, but at the same time there are 
                                                 
23 In the main specification I restrict the correlation between matching and outcome model to be 
between 0 and 1. I also estimated an alternative model without any restriction on the error correlation. 
The parameter estimate still turned out to be within (0,1) range.  
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many other factors that affect stock price that are beyond my ability to measure and 
control for. 
While most of research on M&A has focused on merger outcome, several 
studies have explored target choice in acquisition setting (Silhan and Thomas 1986, 
Kroll and Caples 1987, Schniederjans and Fowler 1989, Rao, Mahanjan and Varaiya 
1991; Yu and Rao 2009). Except for Yu and Rao (2009) which is an empirical study, 
the remaining are either simulation studies or survey-based researches which lack 
objective empirical validation. Moreover, all these papers consider the merger process 
solely from the perspective of acquirers, as if target firms have no say. In reality, 
majority of mergers happen with the consent of both participants. Often times there 
are more than one interested acquirers, and target firm have to make a choice. This 
paper uses a matching model to specify the target selection process to incorporate 
these situations.  
 In the empirical M&A literature, merger integration has received little attention. 
While there exists a large literature on the determinants of merger integration process (e.g. 
Homburg and Bucerius 2005), these studies are based on subjective case studies and manager 
surveys rather than objective empirical data. This is mainly because of the difficulty in 
obtaining data such as cultural differences, communication strategy, and employee motivation 
which affect the integration process. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to use empirical 
methods to estimate some of the factors affecting the merger integration process.  
Since innovation is an important topic in the marketing and strategy, many 
studies have looked at the effect of acquisition on innovation. The empirical evidence 
has been split. Initial research in the strategy literature find that acquisitions tend to 
hurt innovation (Ernst and Vitt 2000; Miller 1990). They argue this may be due to 
integration distractions, employee turnover, or lower R&D spending to finance the 
acquisition (Hitt et al, 1990; Hitt et al, 1991). Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis (2005), 
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however, find that acquisition can assist innovation under certain conditions. They 
find that acquisitions can improve an acquiring firm’s innovation potential, especially 
when the acquiring firm has deep and broad knowledge in the relevant area to begin 
with. Based on their findings, I use depth, breadth and similarity of knowledge to 
measure the knowledge base of acquirers and targets. I not only use these measures to 
study the effect of acquisition on innovation as Prabhu et al. (2005) did, but also use 
these measures in my matching stage since firms may chose partners based on these 
variables.  
Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu (2007) approach this question from a different 
angle and find that firms with better product capital are better at selecting target with 
innovation potential and deploying the target’s innovation potential to gain 
competitive advantage. They focus on identifying the type of firms which are better at 
selecting and deploying innovation potential in an acquisition, not on studying the 
factors that affect the choice of target, integration process, or innovation outcome as I 
do. Sorescu et al. (2007) provide support for my assumption that firms differ in their 
ability to find a good partner, and such difference will carry on to the integration 
process. However, this may be just one aspect of the story. There are other things such 
as management styles, distribution channels, corporate culture that can also affect the 
strategic fit between two firms, beyond product capital. This paper does not try to 
exhaust all potential factors that influence the matching and outcome of merger, but 
tries to measure and differentiate the effects of sorting and integration. This paper also 
goes beyond pharmaceutical industry, which is the testing ground of the two papers 
above, and includes firms in five broad high tech industries which have an above 
average interest in innovation.  
Besides the above mentioned empirical studies, some papers have employed a 
combination of survey and empirical methods to study the effect of acquisition on 
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innovation. Using in-depth surveys, Cassiman et al. (2005) find positive effect on 
R&D activities and efficiency from acquisition between technical complementary 
partners, and detrimental effect on R&D level and efficiency between technical 
substitutive partners. They also found that non-rival firms before merger benefit more 
in R&D efficiency than rival firms. They find that when merged firms are 
technologically substitutive, key employees tend to leave more often, the R&D 
portfolio becomes more focused, the R&D horizon becomes shorter and internal funds 
available to R&D decrease. Because of their survey method, their variables are more 
comprehensive than those used in this paper, but lack support from empirical data 
since those are based on managers’ replies to hypothetical situations. 
2.4: MODEL 
2.4.1 The Merger Game 
The theoretical model in this paper is inspired by works of Angelov (2006) and 
Sorensen (2005, 2007). Angelov (2006) introduces firm merger as a roommate 
problem in the matching model literature, and Sorensen (2005) provides an empirical 
application of the college admission model in the same literature.  
I specify firm merger as a roommate matching problem. Alternative models 
have been attempted for the merger and acquisition problem, such as Yu and Rao 
(2009) who use a multinomial logit model. In their model only the acquirer’s choice is 
considered, and the target firm is assumed to accept any request of merger that the 
acquiring firm makes. Such set up works when there is no other contender for the 
same target, and the offer made by the acquirer is reasonable. When the target faces 
several bidders and can only choose one acquirer, the multinomial logit model cannot 
explain well. In comparison this paper uses a matching game, which depends on the 
decisions of both sides of the merger deal.  
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The main stream matching models involve two-sided matching, a typical 
example of which is the marriage model. Marriage model studies the marriage 
decision of a group of men and women, according to their preference rankings. 
However, two sided matching is not suitable for analyzing firm mergers, because 
merger participants cannot always be naturally divided into two subgroups 
beforehand. Instead, the decision for a firm to be acquirer or target is endogenous to 
the game24 (Angelov 2009).   
The roommate game is well-studied in the game-theoretic literature. It is 
considered a subset of matching models. An early account of the roommate model can 
be found in Gale and Shapley (1962), in which an even number, say k, of persons wish 
to be divided up into pairs of roommates to share  rooms. Each person ranks the 
remaining people in descending order, beginning with the person most preferred to 
share room with. A set of pairings (also called a matching) is considered stable if there 
are no two persons, currently not sharing room, who prefer each other to their actual 
roommates. In contrast to the two-sided matching games, roommate games do not 
always have stable matching.  
While I adapt the frameworks of Angelov and Sorensen, my model has 
features that differentiate it from their models. As compared to Angelov (2006), my 
model is a true empirical model with real data, whereas his model is a theoretical one 
supplemented with some simulation results. Moreover, I generalize his model by 
assuming error terms to have normal distribution rather than extreme value 
                                                 
24 For example, firm A might be considering to acquire firm B, but if firm C approaches firm A with an 
acquisition proposal, then the owners of A might choose to sell their shares to C, thus ending up being a 
target. For example Wyeth had been acquiring many drug companies until 2008, but was acquired by 
Pfizer in 2009. Another possibility is that A attempts to acquire B, but B attempts to acquire C to avoid 
being acquired by A, as was the case in the Arcelor- Mittal Steel takeover battle (see prior footnote). 
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distribution, thus being able to accommodate any number of game participants 
whereas his model is difficult to solve for more than three participants.  
Likewise, this paper has several important differences from Sorensen (2005, 
2007). First, the methodological and substantive issues answered in this paper are 
different. Sorensen (2007) corrects for matching induced endogeneity to identify the 
true influence of venture capitalist (VC) experience on IPO outcomes of startup firms. 
This paper not only corrects for matching induced endogoneity in estimating the 
drivers of merger outcome, but also identifies the drivers of integration process. 
Second, the matching games employed in these two studies are different. Sorensen 
uses a two-sided college admission model, while this paper, for reasons mentioned 
above, uses a one-sided roommate model. Third, due to differences in game set up and 
preference structures, the sources of endogeneity in the two papers are quite different. 
In Sorensen’s case the source of endogeneity is the unobservable firm ability (by 
econometricians) which matches with experience of venture capitalists. In my essay 
the source of endogeneity is the unobservable features of the firms involved in merger 
(by econometrician) which match with each other.  
2.4.1.1 Game Set-up:  
There is a set of firms, denoted by )3}(,...,,...,2,1{  nniN . Each firm has a 
preference towards merging with the remaining n-1firms, or stay on its own.  Firm i’s 
preference ordering can be denoted by iW which might take the form of, for example  
},...,6,,1,2{ niWi                                                            (2-1) 
This expression implies that firm i’s first choice is to merge with firm 2. If that 
is impossible, its second choice is to merge with firm 1, and if that also is unattainable, 
the firm prefers to continue operating on its own. I use mk i to denote that i strictly 
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prefers merging with k to merging with m. These preferences are assumed to be 
complete, transitive, and strict25.  
I assume that no firm can be forced into a merger, thereby excluding the 
possibility of hostile takeovers. This assumption implies that the only part of the 
preference that matters in the above example is },1,2{ iWi  , because none of the firms 
in {6,…n} is acceptable to i. The collected preference orderings of all firms are called 
the preference profile and denoted by }.,...,,{ 21 nWWWW    
At the onset of the game, all n firms operate on their own, and their preference 
orderings are known. Any two firms i and j (or one firm if i=j), can potentially form a 
merger ij ( nji  ,0 )  The set of potential matches is denoted by M ( Mij  ), which 
can be considered as the upper half of n matrix (with 1,…,n arranged along both 
dimensions) including cells along the diagonal. There are a total of n(n+1)/2 unique 
cells in M. The preferences of firms are assumed to be “aligned”, which means that 
there exist distinct values jiV ,  for preferences i and j  for all ij M  such that 
jijij VVii ,,   and jijii VVjj ,,   . Here,   jiV ,  can be interpreted as the 
synergy that the two parties expect to realize beyond the value they will get by 
operating separately.  
The model assumes that each merger participant will receive one-half of the 
synergies, which can take the form of expected net present value (NPV) (Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe 2006) at the time of merger announcement. This assumption is 
not as outrageous as it appears at a first glance. Most mergers are conducted with the 
mutual consent of the two firms. If the synergy is not fairly split, the party with the 
smaller share can choose another firm or stay alone. Also, the split need not be 
                                                 
25 A totally ordered set is said to be complete if every nonempty subset that has an upper bound, has a 
least upper bound. For example, the set of real numbers R is complete but the set of rational numbers Q 
is not. Transitivity means if a ≤ b and b ≤ c then a ≤ c.. < and > indicate strictness and <= and >= are 
not.  
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proportional to the participant’s size or profitability, because what is at stake is not the 
total value or control power of the joint firm, but the synergy created through the joint 
activities of the two firms. After the merger takes place, the acquiring firm managers 
will most likely gain control over the new firm and receive cash flow from the new 
firm, but target stockholders will get compensated through the premium acquirer pays 
at the time of acquisition. 
The equilibrium for matching models is defined by a stable matching where 
all matches are individually acceptable (i.e., none of the matched firms prefers to be 
self-matched rather than its current matching), and in addition, no pair of firms prefer 
to be matched with each other rather than with their prevailing partner. The existence 
and uniqueness of the roommate game is proved in Roommate Game using a top-
down sorting algorithm similar to the one in Sorensen (2005), which in turn is a 
simplification of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962; Roth 
and Sotomayor 1990).  
The unique equilibrium for the roommate game is characterized by  
(i) for all ij , it holds that ];,max[ )(,),(, iijjji VVV    
(ii) for all ij  it holds that ]max,max[max ,)(,)(, jiiSjjijSiji VVV   
where S(i) and S(j) are feasible deviations of i and j. For i, S(i) consists of all the firms 
that are willing to abandon their current match for i and operating alone: 
S(i)={j }{}| ),(, iVVJ jjji   .  The expression for S(j) is similar. More details on 
these results and the proof of existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium can be 
found in Roommate Game.  
2.4.2 Roommate Game 
2.4.2.1 Main Assumptions:  
The model imposes restrictions on firms’ preferences. Each potential match 
has a valuation, which can be interpreted as the synergy that two parties can obtain 
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beyond what they will get by operating separately. It can take the form of expected net 
present value (NPV) at the time of merger announcement. Due to reasons mentioned 
in the main body of the paper, the model assumes that each merger participant will 
receive half of the valuation  
Definition 1 (Matching): A matching  is a subset of M. It implies that each firm is 
either self-matched (i.e., continues to operate on its own), or is matched to one merge 
partner. A stable matching is one where all matches are individually acceptable (i.e., 
none of the matched firms prefers to be self-matched rather than its current matching), 
and in addition, no pair of firms prefer to be matched to each other rather than 
according to the prevailing matching.  
Let the firm that merge with firm i be denoted by }|{)(   ijNij . With 
this notation ij is equivalent to )(ij  which is again equivalent to )( ji  . 
These notations will be useful in later proofs. 
Definition 2 (Blocking): A match   is blocked by a pair of firms Mij , if i and j 
both prefer each other to the firms they are matched to in  . This is valid also for i=j, 
i.e., an individual firm i can block  if it does not accept its current merging partner.  
It has been shown by Gale and Shapley (1962) that a stable matching does not 
always exist. Irving (1985) designed an algorithm to determine whether there exists a 
stable matching, and if so, finds such a matching. Later, Tan (1991) and Chung (2000) 
find the conditions for strong and weak preferences under which stable matching(s) do 
exist. However, these conditions are too complicated to use in empirical estimation, 
and they do not guarantee uniqueness of the stable matching. Therefore, I turn to the 
empirical two-sided matching literature and adopt the preference assumptions in 
Sorensen (2005), which is designed for college admission models and applies to 
roommate model quite well. 
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Definition 3 (Aligned Preference): The preferences i and j are aligned when there 
exist distinct values jiV , for all Mij such that jijij VVii ,,   and 
jijii VVjj ,,   . 
Alignment implies that each match has a value jiV , . This value is called the 
valuation of the match. When i=j, iiV , would be the valuation of firm i operating 
independently. Matches with higher valuations are more attractive for firms, and the 
valuations provide an ordinal representation of their preferences. Alignment imposes a 
restriction on the preferences, because the same valuations represent the preferences 
for both sides of the merger.  It is often natural to interpret the valuations as the 
monetary value generated by the match26. However, the valuations implied by aligned 
preferences are ordinal. A positive monotone transformation of the valuations will 
leave the preferences unchanged.  
2.4.2.2 The Top-Down Sorting Algorithm 
This top-down sorting algorithm is used to determine the equilibrium matching 
in the merger game defined above. It is also adapted from Sorensen (2005). I will first 
describe the algorithm, and then prove that the matching generated through this 
algorithm is a stable and unique matching to the game. The intuition of the algorithm 
is the following. I start with the match with the highest valuation, and determine which 
matches became infeasible and which matches are still feasible. Then I locate the 
remaining feasible match with the highest valuation, and form this match, and 
continue in this fashion until there are no more feasible matches left.  
The top-down sorting algorithm proceeds as follows. 
                                                 
26 In this case, aligned preferences imply that the monetary value is assumed to be nontransferable between the firms. If the value 
were transferable, a firm could prefer a match with a lower valuation, if the match came with a sufficient compensating transfer. 
Alternatively, an agent could prefer a match with a lower valuation, if the agent received a larger fraction of the surplus from this 
match. Both of these cases are ruled out by the assumption of alignment. According to this assumption, firms always prefer 
matches with higher valuations, and there can be no compensating transfers. A model with transfers can be future extensions of 
this paper. 
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Start I use t to denote the iteration number. The current iteration is iteration 1, 
t=1. The set of feasible matches is MM 1 . The set of previously formed matches is 
the empty set,  0 . 
Step 1 Let tt ji be the match with the highest valuation among the feasible 
matches. This match is determined as jiMij
tt Vji t ,maxarg  , and this match is unique 
by the assumption that jiV ,  values are all distinct.  
Step 2 Append this match to the set of formed matches, tttt ji 1 , and 
let the valuation of the iteration be given by the valuation of this match, tt ji
t V , . 
Step 3 The set of matches that become infeasible as a result of the match tt ji is 
tR . There are two mutually exclusive cases: 
Case 3.1 If tt ji  , then firm ti prefers to remain unmatched to entering any of 
the remaining feasible mergers, and }.|{ ttt iiijMR    
Case 3.2 If tt ji  , then the matches that are no longer feasible are given by 
}or  |{ tttt jjiiijMR  . 
Step 4 The feasible matches in the next iteration are given by 
ttRt MM 1 . 
Step 5 If 1tM , then reiterate from step 1.  
Let t ~ denote the final matching when the algorithm ends. Since the 
maximization in step 1 is over a strictly decreasing sequence of sets, t is a strictly 
decreasing sequence.  
2.4.2.3 Stability and Uniqueness of the Matching formed by Top-Down Sorting 
Algorithm 
I present and prove here that the matching formed as above is a stable and 
unique matching.  
Theorem 1 ~ is a stable matching.  
Proof.  Assume for contradiction that ji  is a blocking pair, and thus is a pair that is 
not matched in ~ . Let tbe the first iteration in which firm j or firm i is matched 
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with their corresponding partner in  . In this iteration ji  must also be in the set of 
feasible matches, i.e. tMji  . Since the valuation of the iteration is decreasing, this 
implies that jiji VV   ,, for all )(~ ij   , or jiji VV   ,, for all )(~ ji   . But this 
contradicts the assumption that ji  is a blocking pair. This shows that ~  contains no 
blocking pairs. Assuming that either i or j is a blocking firm leads to contradictions 
by similar arguments.  This shows that ~ is a stable matching.  
Theorem 2 The equilibrium is unique.  
Proof.  Let be a matching that differs from ~ , and ~ thus contains a match 
(including a self-match) which is not contained in  . In other words, there exists 
~ij  such that ij . Consider the first iteration where the Top-Down Sorting 
Algorithm forms a match that is not contained in  . Let this iteration be t , and let 
this match be denoted ji  . First, assume that ji  , and let two of the firms that 
j and imatch with in be given by )( ji   and )(ij   . Since t is the first 
iteration where the algorithm forms a match that is not formed in  , the matches 
ji  and ji  must also have been feasible in this iteration. This implies that  
jiji VV   ,, and jiji VV   ,, , and thus ji  form a blocking pair for  . Second, when 
ji  , it follows by a similar argument that either i or j is a blocking firm for  . In 
either case,  is not stable. Therefore the equilibrium is unique.  
2.4.2.4 Equilibrium Characterization 
With aligned preferences, the equilibrium condition can be stated as a set of 
inequalities.  
Theorem 3 The matching  is stable if and only if for all ij it holds that 
],max[ )(,),(, iijjji VVV   .  
Proof.  The proof is a direct consequence of the definition of stable matching. To 
show the if direction, assume for contradiction that ij  is a blocking pair for  . 
The definition of a blocking pair states that )( ji j  and )(ij i  . The first 
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condition implies that jjji VV ),(,  , and the second condition implies that  )(,, iiji VV  . 
Together this implies that ],max[ )(,),(, iijjji VVV  , which contradicts the assumption 
in the theorem. Assuming that i or j is a blocking firm leads to a contradiction by an 
analogous argument. For the only if direction, assume that  is a stable matching, and 
choose a pair ij . Since, by assumption of stability, this is neither a blocking pair 
nor a blocking individual firm, it must be that either ij j)( or ji i)( . In the first 
case, jijj VV ,),(  , and in the second case, jiii VV ,)(,  .  
This theorem imposes upper bounds on the valuations of the matches that are 
not formed in the stable matching  . A matching is stable when deviating is 
unattractive, and since the matches that are not formed represent the potential 
deviations, this condition naturally leads to upper bounds on the valuations of these 
matches. The bounds are increasing functions of the valuations of the matches that are 
formed in  .  It is possible to invert the inequalities and express them as lower 
bounds on the valuations of the matches in  . To express the inequalities in this way, 
it is necessary to explicitly consider the sets of feasible deviations for each firm. For 
firm j the feasible deviations are the firms that prefer this firm to their current merger 
partners (together with the deviation to become self-matched). This set is given by  
}|{)( )(,, iiji VVNijS      (2-2) 
Similarly, firm i’s set of feasible deviations contain firms that prefer this firm to their 
current match 
}|{)( ),(, jjji VVNjiS         (2-3) 
Theorem 4 The matching  is a stable matching if and only if for all ij it holds 
that }max,max{max ,)(,)(, jiiSjjijSiji VVV  . 
Proof. Again the proof is a direct consequence of the definition of stable matching. 
For the only if direction, let  be a stable match, and let ij be a given match in  . 
Since  is a stable match neither firm j nor firm i can benefit from deviating. For firm 
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j, this implies that jiji VV ,,  for all )( jSi  . For firm i, it implies that jiji VV ,,  for all 
)(iSj  . Together this implies that inequality in the theorem. For the if direction, 
assume that the valuations satisfy the inequalities in the theorem. Let ij be a given 
match in , and it follows directly from the inequalities in the theorem that neither i 
nor j can be a blocking firm or part of a blocking pair.  
The above results show that in equilibrium jiV , and jiV , provide upper and lower 
bounds for the valuations, where 
],max[ )(,),(, iijjji VVV       (2-4) 
]max,maxmax[ ,)(,)(, jiiSjjijSiji VVV      (2-5) 
The characterization results can now be stated as 
 is a stable matching   ijVVijVV ijijijij  allfor   allfor       (2-6) 
2.4.3 Structural Empirical Model 
Based on the general roommate game setup, I further specify the expected 
values of the matching and outcome of the merger in empirical model. The structural 
empirical model comprises two parts. The first part of the model is the matching 
function given by 
ijijij WV   '       (2-7) 
where ijV  is the valuation of each potential match Mij  , 
k
ij RW  is a vector of 
observed characteristics for firm i and firm j, and kR contains the parameters to be 
estimated. The error term ij  contains factors affecting merger fit that are unobserved 
in the data.  
The specification of the matching function reflects the merger synergies that 
the two firms expect to gain from the deal. These synergies are unobserved in the data, 
and in the empirical model these are latent variables. These synergies represent the 
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evaluations on net present value (NPV) that firms have towards the potential joint 
entity with the partner firm at the time of merger. 
Let the set of valuations for which  is the equilibrium be given by  . 
Substituting the valuation equation into the equilibrium condition gives the 
equilibrium condition 
  W stable is     (2-8) 
where ||MR are the error terms and W kMR  || are the observed characteristics for 
the entire market. The term ||MRW  denotes matrix multiplication of ijW with  for 
each potential match (so ),( MijWW ij   ) Let 1 ][  be the indicator function. Then 
the likelihood function of the matching model is given by 
  )(][1)Pr();(   dFWWL    (2-9) 
When several independent matching markets are observed, the likelihood 
function is the product over these markets, and, at least in principle,   can be 
estimated directly by maximizing this function.  
The empirical matching model is a discrete choice model, and its parameters 
are only identified up to scale and level. This is natural, since the valuations represent 
preferences and these are unaffected by a change in the level or scale of the valuations. 
This means that the constant term (and other characteristics that are constant within 
each market, such as industry specific dummies) is excluded from W, since the 
corresponding coefficient is unidentified. This normalizes the level of the parameters. 
The scale is normalized by setting the variance of the error term equal to one.  
The second part of the structural model is the outcome equation. For each 
,Mij  let  
ijijij XY   ' ,     (2-10) 
where ijX  contains observed characteristics and   contains the parameters to be 
estimated. The error term contains factors that are unobserved in the data. Some of 
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these factors may be observed by the firms involved at the time of the merger 
decision. ijY does not have to be scalar, but can be a vector, which represents different 
measurements of merger performance such as changes in innovational potential, sales, 
profit, R&D spending, etc. The vector regression can be estimated as system of 
equations. For simplicity, I focus on the singular ijY  case, and will extend the model to 
multiple regression equations in the future.  
2.4.3.1 Error Distribution 
The error terms are assumed to be independent of X and W, and this 
assumption identifies the parameters of the model. Since the outcome equation is 
defined for all Mij  , the estimated parameters predict the outcomes of all potential 
matches, not just the observed ones. The estimated coefficient on the outcome 
function reflects the influence of the two firms’ attributes on the merger outcome, after 
controlling for the unobserved sorting in the market.  
The coefficients in the matching equation capture preferences over matches. 
When the coefficient on the firms’ attributes (and their interactions) are significant, it 
means the firms participating in the merger use these attributes as criteria to select 
their partners. If the coefficients are close to zero and insignificant, then either the 
matching is random or it depends on characteristics not included in the matching 
equation.  
For tractability, the joint distribution of ( ijij  , ) is assumed to be independent 
for different matches and to follow the bivariate normal distribution  

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ij      (2-11) 
With a normal prior distribution (conjugate prior), the posterior distributions 
are also normal or truncated normal. However, normality is not essential for the 
estimation or identification of the model, and it could be relaxed. The variances of the 
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two error terms normalize the scales of the two equations. The variance of ij is set to 
one, and the variance of ij is set to 1+ 2 . This normalization is convenient for the 
estimation and is without loss of generality.   
The covariance between the error terms captures unobserved factors that affect 
both the outcome and the valuation of a match. For example, a target company may 
have pipeline projects that fit the acquiring firm’s strategic goal. This is unobserved in 
the data, but it is partly observed by the acquirer before finalizing the deal and is 
important for the outcome. To the extent that an unobserved variable affects both the 
expected synergies at time of merger as well as the realization of actual synergies after 
merger, it enters the error terms in both the outcome and the matching equations, 
inducing a positive correlation between these two error terms. The covariance 
therefore reflects factors that are unobserved in the data, but affect the outcome and 
are taken into account in the initial valuation. This captures sorting over characteristics 
that are unobserved in the data. 
If I assume that the factors used by managers for matching are the same as the 
ones that affect outcome (except the factors influencing the integration process, which 
are usually not quantifiable), I will have a same set of X and W. By comparing the 
parameter estimates for the matching and outcome functions, I can tell whether the 
managers’ underestimated integration problems in the merger. This is because the 
difference between expected synergies and average realized synergies must be due to 
factors that were unanticipated by managers but could have been anticipated if they 
had complete information.  
2.4.3.2 Interaction, Estimation and Identification 
The matching model allows merger decisions to interact. When an acquirer 
merges with a target, other acquirers cannot merge with this same target and their 
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merger decisions interact. Interaction leads to sorting27 in the market, and interaction 
and sorting are two fundamental properties of the model that have implications for 
both the estimation and the identification. 
For the estimation, interaction means that each agent’s merger decision cannot 
be analyzed in isolation. Unlike, for example, the Probit model, the likelihood function 
does not factor into a product over the likelihood of each agent’s action (matching 
decision). To evaluate the likelihood function, all error terms must be integrated 
simultaneously. The dimensionality of this integral runs into thousands, and currently 
it is not possible to evaluate such high-dimensional integrals with the speed and 
precision required for Maximum Likelihood estimation (Judd 1998). However, 
Bayesian estimation using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) circumvents this 
integration problem, and the model is estimated from iterated simulations of the 
posterior distribution. Berger (1993), Tanner (1998), and Robert and Casella (2004) 
are introductions to this estimation method.  
While interaction and sorting complicate the estimation, they also provide the 
solution to the endogeneity problem. As illustrated in the initial example, the 
endogeneity problem arises from unobserved company characteristics, which are 
captured by the error term in the matching model. Because of sorting and interaction, 
the presence of other agents (and their characteristics more generally) affects merger 
decisions, and leads firms with differing strategic goals to find partners with different 
unobserved characteristics to reinforce their goals. Implicitly, this facilitates the direct 
comparison of different markets and it identifies the parameters of the model. Thus the 
identifying assumption is that the presence and characteristics of the agents in each 
market are exogenously given and independent of the error terms of the model. 
                                                 
27 Sorting here refers to the process that firms on the market find each other according to their own 
merger preferences and finally the entire market reaches equilibrium when no firm want to or is able to 
deviate.   
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2.4.3.3 Estimation Method 
The model is estimated using Bayesian estimation based on MCMC 
simulation, which has attractive properties for estimating discrete choice models 
(Geweke, Keane, and Runkle 1994). Albert and Chib (1993) and Tanner and Wong 
(1987) show that treating latent variables as parameters significantly simplifies 
simulation of the resulting augmented posterior distribution, and the MCMC 
procedure known as Gibbs sampling (Gelfand and Smith 1990, Geweke 1999) can 
simulate this distribution. The procedure is iterative. Each iteration produces a draw 
from a Markov Chain, and under weak regularity conditions that are satisfied here 
(Roberts and Smith 1994), the simulated distribution converges to the augmented 
posterior distribution. The Markov chain is generated by drawing each individual 
dimension of the joint target distribution conditional on the draws of the other 
dimensions, and the simulated univariate conditional distributions are derived in next 
paragraph. The estimation method used here adapts the estimation procedure for 
college admissions model used by Sorensen (2007) to estimate my roommate 
matching model.  
For notation, let the markets be indexed by m=1,...,N. Let Vm≡{Vij, ji ∈Mm} 
and },{ mijm ijYY   be the latent valuation and outcome variables in market m, and 
let V and Y contain these variables in all markets. Let ijY  contain all outcome 
variables except ijY , and define ijV  similarly. Let ijW  denote the vector of exogenous 
variables in the valuation equation for the match between firm i and firm j. Let 
},{ mijm MijWW  contain these variables in all markets. Let },{ mijm MijXX   be 
the exogenous variables in the outcome equation for all markets. Similarly, define the 
variables containing the matching, ,, mij  and  (here, ij is a binary variable that 
equals one when the match is formed, and m is a subset of mM ). Let 
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),,(   contain the parameters of the model. Finally, the densities defined by the 
model are denoted  and the densities derived for the simulation are denoted  .  
The prior distribution is a normal distribution. Let the prior density be denoted 
)(0   . This density is given by  
 )()(5.0exp)( 01'00    C     (2-12) 
where C is a generic normalizing constant (here and below) that ensures densities 
integrate to one. The matrix  is the covariance matrix of the prior distribution, and 
is specified as 10 times the identity matrix. Further increases in the prior variance 
leave estimated parameters largely unchanged. Corresponding to the parameters, the 
covariance matrix is decomposed into   , , and  .  
The error term in the outcome equation can be decomposed into orthogonal 
terms as ijijij   , where the joint distribution of ij  and ij is  
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This is without loss of generality, as the joint distribution of ),( ijij  is still 
given by equation (11). Let ),,|,( mmmmm WXYV   be the density of the latent 
variables defined by the matching and outcome equations. The matching equation 
implies  '' ijijij WV   and the density of the latent variables in market m is 

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(2-14) 
The augmented posterior density is proportional to the product of the prior density, 
some appropriate indicator functions, and the density of the latent variables given above. It 
is given by 


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m
m
m
mmmmmm WXYVVCWXYV
1
0 )),,,|,(][1()0[1)(),,|,,(            
 (2-15) 
The densities derived below are all proportional to selected factors in the density in 
equation (2-15). 
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A. Conditional Distributions of Outcome Variables 
The conditional augmented posterior density for each outcome variable is 
proportional to the term this variable enters in   in equation (2-15), the corresponding 
term in m from equation (14). The density of the conditional distribution of each 
outcome variable is  
),))((5.0exp(),,,,,|( 2''  ijijijijijij WVXYCXWYVY    (2-16) 
This is the normal distribution )1,)(( ''  ijijij WVXN  .  
B. Conditional Distributions of Matching Variables 
The conditional augmented posterior distribution of ijV  depends on whether 
firm i and firm j are matched or not. When mij  , the density is simply 
).)(5.0exp(][1),,,,,|( 2' ijijijijijij WVVVCWXYVV   (2-17) 
When ij m , the outcome of the match is observed. Correlation between the 
error terms means that the outcome contains additional information about the 
matching, and the conditional density is given by 
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(2-18) 
Both the distributions shown in (2-17) and (2-18) are truncated normal 
distributions. The first is )1,( 'ijWN truncated from above at ijV . The second is 
))1/(1),1/()(( 22''   ijijij XYWN truncated from below at ijV . The 
expressions for ijV and ijV  are given in equations (2-4) and (2-5) on page 89.  
C. Conditional Distributions of Parameters 
The conditional distributions of the parameters are normal distributions. The 
distributions of   and   are not truncated. The distribution of  is truncated from 
below at zero to normalize the sign of the matching equation. Each parameter enters 
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all the terms in  , and the derivation of the distributions requires “completing the 
square” in a product of normal densities. To illustrate, let   be a random vector with 
density 
)).2(5.0exp()( 2
''
1 CNMC        (2-
19) 
Here, M is a corresponding matrix and N is a corresponding vector 
(naturally, 1C  and 2C could be combined into the single normalizing constant 
)).5.0exp( 21 CCC  Completing the square in this expression shows that the 
distribution of  is the normal distribution ).,( 11   MNMN  
Collecting terms in  involving  gives ).,,,,,,|( WXYV  This 
distribution is determined by aM and aN as follows:  
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Similarly, collecting terms in   involving   gives  
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Finally, for  , collecting terms gives 
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The conditional distribution of  is ),/1,/(  MMNN  truncated from below 
at zero. 
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2.5: SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, I use simulation to demonstrate the efficacy of my estimation 
procedure in recovering parameters. The simulation is based on the following 
specification.  
Matching function is assumed to be given by the balance model28 design (Rao, 
Mahajan and Varaiya 1991): 
ijjijijiij  )-X(X c )-X(Xb )X(XaS  23322211       (2-26) 
and the outcome equation is assumed to be given by  
ijijjijiij   )-X(Xb )X(XaY   222'11'             (2-27) 
where I assume that 
4.0,5.0,5.01 ''  cb, baa                         (2-28) 
),,0( ,obsiij NX  ),0( unobsij N                             (2-29) 
The results of the outcome estimation are compared against the following OLS 
estimation 
ijjijiij  e )-X(X )X(XY  22211                     (2-30) 
For the case where 2,1  unobsobs   and 1,2 obs , the results of the joint 
estimation and the OLS are included in Table 2-2. As shown in the panel 3A of this 
table, the joint estimation recovers most of the parameters well, and the bias in 
parameter estimation is considerably reduced as compared to the OLS regression. The 
model does not fully recover the second parameter in the outcome equation (although 
it is less biased than the OLS). This is because the standard deviation of the outcome is 
                                                 
28 The balance model postulates that in describing a decision-maker's preferences for subsets, essential 
attributes (attributes that have nonzero influence on preferences for subsets) can be grouped into two 
classes-nonbalancing and balancing. The nonbalancing attributes are those for which the decision-
maker wishes to optimize the mean of the items in the subset for these attributes. In contrast to the 
nonbalancing attributes, the balancing attributes are those for which the decision-maker wishes to 
optimize the dispersion of the items in the subset for these attributes. The attributes with a lower 
preferred dispersion are called "equibalancing" and those with a higher preferred dispersion are called 
"counterbalancing." 
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high (4) as compared to the standard deviation of 222 )( ji XX  . Therefore the noise is 
too large to fully recover the true parameter. Moreover, the marginal log likelihood of 
the joint estimation is significantly higher as compared to that of OLS, and the Bayes 
factor K>>100, suggests that the joint model is decisively better than the linear 
regression model.  
Figure 2-1 shows how the bias in estimation depends on the ratio of the 
standard deviation of 1X  and the unobserved variables. As the variance of unobserved 
variables increases, the bias in estimation increases. Nonetheless, in each case, the 
joint estimations perform better than OLS.  
  
Figure 2-1: Estimation Bias as a Function of the Ratio of Standard 
Deviation of Observed and Unobserved Variables 
The results in this section show that my estimation procedure for the structural 
model recovers the model parameters in the case where the observed variables explain 
a significant part of the variation in the matching function, thus eliminating matching 
induced bias and performing significantly better than OLS.  On the other hand, when 
the observed variables explain a small part of the variation in the matching function, 
the model cannot eliminate the matching induced bias but performs significantly better 
than OLS.  
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2.6: EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
As discussed earlier, I estimate the following matching and outcome 
expressions: 
ijijij WV   '                 (2-31) 
ijijij XY   ' ,    (2-32) 
subject to the following error correlations: 






 




1
,0~
22




N
ij
ij
 
If the managers have complete information and are fully rational, ijX will be 
the same as ijW  , and   will be equal to  . This is because in such a case managers 
would have rational expectations and the realized synergies would be distributed 
evenly around their expectations of synergy. However, it is arguable whether 
managers have complete information given the uniqueness of each merger and the 
rarity and complexity of the merger event. There is sufficient anecdotal evidence that 
suggests managers do not fully anticipate integration problems, implying that expected 
synergies are biased on average as compared to the realized synergies. Since this is the 
first paper to attempt to empirically estimate the integration effect, I will not impose 
structure on  and  , but leave it to be recovered from the data. With the foundation 
laid by this paper, future research can choose to impose more structure into the 
relationship. 
I do impose ijij XW   because there is no basis to decide which variables 
affect matching and which affect outcome. Since it is difficult to identify universal 
variables across five broad industries, I only use financial and knowledge variables as 
independent variables in these two equations. The model’s design takes into account 
the possibility of missing variables in the matching model, since the effect of 
unobserved variable is carried over to the outcome model where the model adjusts the 
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bias introduced by these variables. The explanations of the dependent variable ijY  and 
the independent variables in ijW  and ijX  are included in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-2: Explanation of Dependent and Independent Variables in Matching 
and Outcome Equations 
Dependent Variable Explanation 
change_in_new_patent_n Log (new patents n year after merger - combined new patents 1 year prior 
to merger + 5) 
change_in_sale_n Log (sales in year n after merger / combined sales 1 year prior to merger) 
change_in_roa_n ROA in year n after merger - average ROA 1 year prior to merger 
change_in_R&D_n Log(R&D spending in year n after merger - combined R&D spending 1 
year prior to merger) 
Independent 
Variable Explanation 
nation_match 1 if the nation of the two firms match, 0 otherwise  
industry_match 1 if the industry of the two firms match, 0 otherwise  
Sum_logassets Sum of the log of assets of the two firms 1 year prior to merger 
Sum_roa Average of the return on assets of the two firms 1 year prior to merger 
Sum_book_leverage Average of the book leverage of the two firms 1 year prior to merger 
Diff_logassets Absolute difference of the log assets of the two firms 1 year prior to merger
Diff_roa Absolute difference of the return on assets of the two firms 1 year prior to 
merger 
Diff_book_leverage Absolute difference of the book leverage of the two firms 1 year prior to 
merger 
breadth_of_knowledge Number of patent groups where the combined firm has patents 1 year prior 
to merger 
depth_of_knowledge Total number of patents of the combined firm 1 year prior to merger / 
Breadth_of_knowledge 
similarity_of_knowledge Number of patent groups where both firms have patent 1 year prior to 
merger 
square_similarity Square of similarity_of_knowledge 
square_depth Square of depth_of_knowledge 
square_breadth Square of breadth_of_knowledge 
2.6.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable ijV  in the matching equation is latent and need not be 
specified. For the outcome equation, I employ multiple measures of innovation output 
ijY . I look at the change in patents, sales, return on assets, and R&D spending in the 
first, second and third year after the merger as compared to the corresponding values 
in the year prior to merger. I employ these measures across multiple years because the 
horizon over which to measure merger performance is not clear. I employ multiple 
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variables in a given year because changes in innovation output resulting from a merger 
could get reflected in the number of issued patents, sales, profitability and R&D 
spending of the combined firm.  
Patent data has been used by many studies as a measure of innovation output 
(Hall, 1990, 1999; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Lichtenberg, 1992; Hitt et al. 1991, 
1996; Blonigen and Taylor, 2000). Several marketing studies on innovation also favor 
patent as a measure of innovation potential (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005; Chandy 
et al. 2006; Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu, 2007).  
Patent data has both significant strengths and weaknesses as measure of 
innovation output. First, patents are directly related to inventiveness: they are granted 
only for ‘non-obvious’ improvements or solutions with discernible utility (Walker, 
1995). Second, they represent an externally validated measure of technological 
novelty (Griliches, 1990). Third, they confer property rights upon the assignee and 
therefore have economic significance (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982: 49; Scherer and 
Ross, 1990:621). Patents also correlate well with other measures of innovative output. 
Empirical studies find that patents are closely related to measures such as new 
products (Comanor and Scherer 1969), innovation and invention counts (Achilladelis, 
Schwarzkopf and Cines, 1987), and sales growth (Scherer, 1965). Expert ratings of 
corporate technological strength are also highly correlated with the number of patents 
held by corporations (Narin, Noma, and Perry, 1987). Furthermore, surveys of patent 
holders indicate that the rate of utilization of patents is reasonably high, with estimates 
indicating that between 41 percent and 55 percent of all patents granted are put to 
commercial use for at least a limited time (Griliches, 1990). Similarly, about 50 
percent of all patents granted are still being renewed and a renewal fee is being paid 
10 years after the patents had originally been applied for (Griliches, 1990; 
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Schankerman and Pakes, 1986). Given a non-negligible renewal fee, this indicates a 
significant usefulness for the majority of patents for a significant time period.  
However, the use of patents as a measure of innovative output also has 
limitations. Some inventions are not patentable, others are not patented, and the 
inventions that are patented differ greatly in economic value (Cohen and Levin, 1989; 
Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990). Research and the logic of appropriability indicate 
that the degree to which the first two of these factors is a problem varies significantly 
across industries (Cohen and Levin 1989; Levin et al., 1987). Limiting the study to a 
single industrial sector or a few closely related sectors minimizes such problems as the 
factors that affect patenting propensity are likely to be stable within such a context 
(Basberg, 1987; Cohen and Levin, 1989; Griliches, 1990).  
To supplement the information provided by patents, I also use growth in sales 
and profitability to measure the economic benefit brought in by patents. Since patent is 
an early stage of innovation outcome, counting the number of patents cannot capture 
the different economic value of those patents. However, when patents get developed 
into products, they generate revenue which is reflected in sales and profitability. I also 
include R&D spending as one of the dependent variables to study the effect of merger 
on innovation input. 
2.6.2 Independent Variables 
The specification of independent variables ijW  and ijX is partly inspired by the 
balance model used in the literature on target selection (Rao, Mahajan and Varaiya 
1991; Yu and Rao 2009). In the balance model, the utility function comprises sums 
and squared differences of the features of acquirer and target. I include sum and 
absolute differences of acquirer and target total assets, return on assets, and book 
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leverage which are roughly29 the same financial variables as those used by Rao et al. 
(1991). While Rao et al. (1991) also include non-financial data such as brand and 
distribution variables in this framework; I do not do so because such data is not readily 
available. Instead, as discussed below, I include knowledge data in the framework of 
Prabhu et al. (2005).  
Amongst these financial variables, the relative size of the two firms (difference 
in log assets) has received the most attention in the literature. Kitching’s (1967) early 
study indicated a strong positive relationship between the size of a target firm relative 
to an acquiring firm and organizational performance. Later interviews by Kitching 
(1974) with CEOs involved in acquisitions supported this finding. The executives 
suggested that prospects for success are improved if a target firm is larger (rather than 
smaller) relative to an acquiring firm. Other studies support these contentions. 
Waldman (1983) reported that the larger an acquiring firm relative to the size of a 
target, the more managerial diseconomies. Biggadike (1979) found that large-scale 
entries into new ventures resulted in better performance than small-scale entries. 
These results are inconsistent with the belief that it is desirable to enter a new area in a 
small way, learn, and expand (Lubatkin, 1983). In contrast, Kuehn (1975) suggested 
that acquiring a large firm requires more integration effort and, additionally, may 
strain the financial position of a purchaser. Newbould, Stray and Wilson (1976) found 
no relationship between relative size in acquisitions and return to shareholders. More 
recently, Kusewitt (1985) found significant negative relationships between relative 
size of acquirer to target and two performance measures, but some evidence that a 
                                                 
29 Rao et al (1991) use sales whereas I use total assets because the former has extreme values which do 
not fit the distributional assumptions in my model. Moreover, my use of absolute differences is 
equivalent to their use of squared differences. Finally, they use market-to-book ratio and insider share 
ownership in the balance model, but I ignore these variables because these variables can be calculated 
only if the firm’s stock trades in the market which is not the case for most firms in my sample.  
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peaked (quadratic) relationship exists. Kusewitt concluded that excessively small or 
large acquisitions should be avoided.  
As for knowledge variables, Prabhu et al. (2005) find evidence that firms with 
high depth of knowledge produce more innovations from acquisitions than do firms 
with low depth of knowledge. Such a result is not significant for firms with high 
breadth of knowledge. Finally, they find that firms with moderate similarity of 
knowledge produce more innovations from acquisitions than do firms with very high 
or very low similarity of knowledge. However, their study only looks at depth, breadth 
and knowledge of acquiring firm rather than those of the combined firm. I extend their 
measures of depth, breadth and similarity of knowledge to include not only acquirer 
knowledge but also target knowledge. Moreover, to capture the non-linear (potentially 
non-monotonic) effects of acquirer and target knowledge, I include square terms of 
depth, breadth and similarity of knowledge. Breadth of knowledge for a pair of firms 
is measured as the number of patents groups in which the combined firm has patents. 
It is the union of acquirer’s and target’s breadth of knowledge. Henderson and 
Cockburn (1996) found evidences for both scale and scope economies in 
pharmaceutical companies’ research productivity. Similarity of knowledge for a pair 
of firms is measured as the proportion of patent groups of the combined firm in which 
each firm has patents. It is the ratio of the intersection of the two firm’s breadth of 
knowledge and the combined firm’s breadth of knowledge. Depth of knowledge is 
measured as the average number of patents per patent group for each patent group in 
which the combined firm has a patent. It is the ratio of total number of patents of the 
combined firm and the breadth of knowledge of the combined firm. 
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Table 2-3: Industry Sub-classes 
All Biotechnology  code All Computer Equipment  code
In-Vivo Diagnostic Products 111 Mainframes & Super 211
In-Vitro Diagnostic Products 112 Workstations 212
Genetically Eng. Prod(Human) 113 Micro-Computers(PCs) 213
Genetically Eng. Prod(Animal) 114 Portable Computers 214
Vaccines/Specialty Drugs 115 Turnkey Systems 215
General Pharmaceuticals 116 CAD/CAM/CAE/Graphics 216
Over-The Counter Drugs 117 Other Computer Systems 219
Nuclear Medicines 118 Printers 221
Medical Chemicals 119 Disk Drives 222
Drug Delivery Sys(Not IV Sys) 120 CD Rom Drives 223
Blood Derivatives 121 Networking Systems 224
Research & Development Firm 122 Monitors/Terminals 225
Other Biotechnology 129 Scanning Devices 226
Medical Lasers 131 Modems 227
Medical Imaging Systems 132 Other Peripherals 229
Surgical Instruments/Equipment 133 Database 231
Lab Equipment 134 Operating Systems 232
Rehabilitation Equipment 135 Applications 233
Artificial Organs/Limbs 136 Application Software(Home) 234
Medical Monitoring Sytems 137 Desktop Publishing 235
General Med. Instruments/Supp. 138 Communication/Network 236
Healthcare Services 140 Utilities/File Mgmt Software 237
Semiconductors 311 Other Software(inq. Games) 239
Superconductors 312 Programming Services 241
Printed Circuit Boards 313 Computer Consulting 242
Process Control Systems 314 Data Processing Services 243
Precision/Measuring Test Equip 315 Other Computer Related 249
Search, Detection, Navigation 316 All Communications 
Other Electronics 319 Telecommunications 401
All Others  Telephone Interconnect 411
Robotics 511 Messaging Systems 412
Lasers(Excluding Medical) 512 Cellular Communications 413
Nuclear (Excluding Medical) 513 Satellite Communications 414
Propulsion Systems 514 Microwave Communications 415
Satellites (Non-Communications) 515 Alarm Systems 416
Advanced Materials 516 Facsimile Equipment 417
Defense Related 517 Data Commun(Exclude 418
Advanced Manufacturing 518 Other Telecommunications 419
Other 519 Internet Services & Software 420
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One potential criticism of the specification of the expected synergy function is 
that it does not capture all possible motivations of M&A. Different deals may also 
have different motivations. Aggregating these deals together in one model mitigates 
the effect of individual motivation. However, there are obvious practical difficulties in 
controlling for all possible factors. Under my current construction, the uncontrolled 
variables will enter the error term. If the effect of the error term is overwhelming, the 
variables included will become insignificant. Any effects that are still significant in 
spite of the “noise” in the error term are probably more salient in reality.     
I also control for cases where the two firms are from the same country, or 
belong to the same sub-industry group30  (see Table 2-4). Cross-country businesses 
involve multiple accounting, tax, and business regulations, which may impose extra 
barrier for cross-border mergers. On the other hand, such mergers can also provide 
opportunity to enter a new market. Since firms in the same sub-industry group operate 
in closely related businesses, according to the strategic fit theory, they are more likely 
to find each other in line with their own strategic positioning. On the other hand, firms 
in too close markets may cause cannibalization and reduce room for learning (in case 
of technique oriented mergers). To sum, these two dummy variables may have either 
positive or negative effect and are important factors to control for.  
The commonality of industry has received lot of attention in the literature. A 
number of studies look at performance differences associated with various forms of 
diversification (Channon 1973; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Dyas, 1972; 
Horovitz and Thietart, 1982; Pavan, 1972; Rumelt, 1974, 1982). Rumelt (1974, 1982) 
and Bettis (1981) provide research findings suggesting that firms that engaged in 
related diversification experience greater performance gains. Holzmann, Copeland and 
                                                 
30 If the industry codes match at the two digits level, the two firms belong to the same general area but 
not the same niche market. In my analysis I use both refined classification matching and higher level 
matching.. 
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Hayya (1975) also report significantly lower rates of return for unrelated 
diversification efforts. Rumelt (1982) clearly indicates a need for future research on 
the relationships among diversification type, industry and performance. He points out 
a need for further understanding of why firms diversify in an unrelated manner, and 
the management patterns associated with such diversification.  
2.7: DATA 
The data on merger and acquisition deals is collected from SDC Platinum. This 
database is comprehensive and has been used by a number of M&A researchers in 
marketing, such as Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu (2007), Swaminathan, Murshed and 
Hulland (2008) and Sorensen (2007).  I obtain all the M&A deals from January 1992 
to December 2008 in high tech industries, which fall into five large categories, as 
shown in Table 2-4. I impose the requirement that both firms participating in the 
merger belong to a high tech industry. 
In order to make the sample representative, I did not impose the requirement 
that all the firms be public. Instead, I only require sales information to be available for 
both parties in a merger. Therefore I cover a broader range of firms than other research 
on this topic, which usually employs only large public firms. This is especially 
meaningful consider that the innovative industries are high tech industries, where most 
of the deals involve small private firms. I do require the merged firm to be a public 
firm, so that I can track the post merger performance of the joint firm. Some deals 
drop out when financial data is missing on the deal date or one year after the deal date. 
Filtering based on these criteria results in 1895 deals in my sample. The classification 
of these deals by industry is provided in Table 2-5.  
I divide the deals into separate markets based on industry and time so that 
firms within a market can match with each other but not across markets. The 
separation by industry is done because firms do not usually consider firms across 
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industries for merger and the separation by time is needed because the matching 
algorithm works well when the number of participants is not very large. The 
separation of markets by industry is done based on the high tech code from SDC 
platinum. This allows the occurrence of cross industry deals, although their numbers 
are small. Separation of markets by time is done by year. After the separation, I obtain 
72 different markets with 3 to 69 pairs of firms in each market. This separation implies 
that there are 155,287 potential matches. 
Table 2-4: Deal Frequency by Industry 
 
Industry Frequency 
Biotech 454 
Computer 753 
Electronics 219 
Communication 445 
Others 24 
Total  1,895 
It is arguable whether these “markets” are representative of the real 
consideration set of the firms involved. However, very little is known about the 
alternative firms that are considered before a merger. Although in a few cases there is 
open bidding for certain firms, in most cases alternatives partners are never revealed to 
the public. Therefore any researcher studying partner choice in M&A has to recover 
the choice set with some assumptions. Since one cannot know the real consideration 
set, at the very least, any firm that merged in the same period and in the same industry 
as the firm under consideration can be included. In a sense, merger is similar to a 
marriage: although best fit matters, timing is also a factor. For example, for a company 
with pressure to meet earnings targets, finding a partner at the right time is essential. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to pool merger participants close in time and industry 
together in a market.    
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Financial information is obtained from Compustat database, and patent data is 
obtained from the World Intellectual Property Organization (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 
2005). 
2.7.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2-5: Summary Statistics for All Potential and Real Matches 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median
nation_match 0.52 0.50 1.00
Industry match 0.13 0.34 0.00
Sum_return_on_assets -0.26 0.72 -0.02
Sum_book_leverage 1.07 0.78 0.91
Sum_logassets 9.77 3.51 9.61
Diff_return_on_assets 0.38 0.58 0.17
Diff_book_leverage 0.43 0.64 0.27
Diff_logassets 2.72 2.06 2.28
Depth of knowledge 3.51 8.23 1.00
Breadth of knowledge 4.82 11.99 1.00
Similarity of knowledge 0.02 0.08 0.00
Depth of knowledge^2 80.03 525.56 1.00
Breadth of knowledge^2 166.96 1219.30 1.00
Similarity of knowledge^2 0.01 0.06 0.00
N: 155287     
The summary statistics on all potential pairs is in Table 2-6 and on all real 
pairs is in Table 2-7. Comparing the independent variables in these two tables, I can 
see that in my sample, firms are on average better off after merger, reflected in more 
new patents, higher sales, improved ROA, and more R&D investments31. However, 
due to the joint effect of many variables, uni-variate analysis can be misleading 
because I can not directly predict the effect of a single variable by looking at the 
summary statistics. One example is nation match: the real data set has higher 
percentage of pairs from the same country, but it does not take into account the effect 
                                                 
31 The sample size for some financial information such as R&D is significantly smaller than the full 
sample. Therefore some self-selected reporting bias may exist in the sample. 
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of other variables such as similarity in size, knowledge space, etc. In a subsequent 
section, I show that firms in the same country are less likely to merge given everything 
else is the same. 
Table 2-6: Summary Statistics for Matched Pairs 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median
Dependent Variables     
change in new patents 1895 9.63 53.79 0.00
change in new patents2 1895 10.01 59.59 0.00
change in new patents3 1895 8.35 52.98 0.00
change_sales_1 1064 7.83 171.78 1.25
change_sales_2 886 2.99 11.38 1.33
change_sales_3 752 3.51 14.14 1.44
change_roa 954 -0.02 1.96 0.01
change_roa2 795 0.01 0.86 0.01
change_roa3 677 0.11 0.47 0.02
log_change_RnD 378 1.32 2.04 1.33
log_change_RnD2 324 1.38 2.17 1.42
log_change_RnD3 278 1.26 2.90 1.44
 
Table 2-7: Summary Statistics for Matched Pairs (continue) 
Independent Variables N Mean Std Dev Median
nation_match 1895 0.78 0.41 1.00
Industry match 1895 0.27 0.44 0.00
sum_return_on_assets 1895 -0.24 0.74 0.02
sum_book_leverage 1895 1.05 0.78 0.91
sum_logassets 1895 9.88 3.88 -0.27
diff_return_on_assets 1895 0.34 0.55 0.13
diff_book_leverage 1895 0.39 0.64 0.22
diff_logassets 1895 2.41 1.71 0.00
Depth of knowledge 1895 3.44 7.37 1.00
Breadth of knowledge 1895 5.25 13.23 1.00
Similarity of knowledge 1895 0.04 0.13 0.00
Depth of knowledge^2 1895 66.04 356.44 1.00
Breadth of knowledge^2 1895 202.42 1404.54 1.00
Similarity of knowledge^2 1895 0.02 0.09 0.00
The summary statistics shown in table 2-6 and 2-7 are of original scale. When I 
include them in the analysis, I drop extreme values (top and bottom 1% values) and 
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take monotonic transformation on the values to make them of similar scale and range 
and follow normal distribution (or close to normal distribution). 
2.8: RESULTS  
The model is applied to the data to jointly estimate the innovation outcome of 
the 1895 deals (in terms of change in new patents and sales one, two or three years 
after the merger date) and the matching function of the 1895 acquires and targets 
separated in 72 markets and capable of forming 155,287 potential matches on the 
merger date. The results of the matching estimation are included in included in Table 
2-8. 
Table 2-8: Parameter Estimates of Matching Model 
 
Variables posterior mean  
Nation Match -0.18 c 
Industry Match -0.09  
Sum_logassets -0.12 b 
diff_logassets -0.03  
sum_return_on_assets 0.00  
diff_return_on_assets -0.30 a 
sum_book_leverage -0.40 b 
diff_book_leverage 0.23 b 
depth of knowledge 0.15 c 
depth of knowledge^2 -0.03 c 
breadth of knowledge 0.03  
breadth of knowledge^2 -0.01  
Similarity of knowledge 0.61 b 
Similarity of knowledge^2 -0.94 a 
Note: 
Since not all the posterior distribution are normal, I will not report the standard deviation, but the percentage of 
the posterior fall in the opposite side of 0 from the mean.  
a. Less than 2.5% of the posterior fall into the other side of  0 from mean 
b.  Less than 5% of the posterior fall into the other side of 0 from mean 
c. Less than 10% of the posterior fall to the other side of 0 from mean 
d. The above boundaries are created using quantiles. For example, if mean<0, then a  is 97.5 percentile, if 
mean>0, then a is 2.5 percentile.  
Table 9 was created based on 50,000 draws (50,000 burn-in) 
Table 10 was created based on 2500 draws (2500 burn-in). 
*JE stands for Joint Estimation 
  112
Table 2-9: Parameter Estimates for Post Merger Changes in New Patents 
  N=one year  N=two years  = three years  
Variables JE* OLS JE OLS JE OLS 
Nation Match 0.29 c 0.44 a 0.31 c 0.46 a 0.31 c 0.46 a 
Industry Match 0.11 a 0.14 a 0.05  0.07  0.08  0.11 c 
sum_logassets 0.04 c 0.06 a 0.04 c 0.06 a 0.04 c 0.06 a 
diff_logassets 0.13 a 0.15 a 0.15 a 0.17 a 0.14 a 0.16 a 
sum_return_on_assets 0.06  0.08 c 0.11 c 0.12 b 0.12 c 0.13 b 
diff_return_on_assets 0.09  0.15 a 0.15 c 0.20 a 0.20 b 0.26 a 
sum_book_leverage 0.07  0.17 a 0.10  0.19 a 0.12  0.21 a 
diff_book_leverage -0.04  -0.08  -0.06  -0.10  -0.10  -0.13 c 
depth of knowledge 0.67 a 0.67 a 0.52 a 0.52 a 0.57 a 0.58 a 
depth of knowledge^2 -0.03 a -0.03 a -0.01  -0.01  -0.03 c -0.03 c 
breadth of knowledge 0.08 c 0.03  0.02  -0.02  0.02  -0.02  
breadth of knowledge^2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
similarity_of_knowledge -1.10 a -1.10 a -0.90 c -0.82 c -2.10 a -2.10 a 
similarity_of_knowledge^2 0.69  0.78  0.37  0.32  1.70 a 1.60 b 
Error Correlation 0.25 a   0.23 a   0.23 a   
Note:  Table 2-9 was created based on 50,000 draws (50,000 burn-in). Since not all the posterior 
distribution are normal, I will not report the standard deviation, but the percentage of the posterior fall in the 
opposite side of 0 from the mean.  
a. Less than 2.5% of the posterior fall into the other side of  0 from mean 
b.  Less than 5% of the posterior fall into the other side of 0 from mean 
c. Less than 10% of the posterior fall to the other side of 0 from mean 
d. The above boundaries are created using quantiles. For example, if mean<0, then a  is 97.5 percentile, if 
mean>0, then a is 2.5 percentile.  
The parameter estimates of the outcome equation in terms of changes in new 
patents one, two and three years from the merger date are included in Table 2-9. The 
estimations of the outcome equation in terms of changes in sales for the same period 
are included in Table 2-10. 
As mentioned in 2.5, Bayes Factor can be used for model comparison in the 
context of Bayesian estimation. Figure 2-2 shows the log(bayes factor) of the joint 
estimation vs. OLS estimation results for changes in new patents one, two, three years 
after merger effective dates32. Figure 2-3 depicts the same for growth in sales. Since 
                                                 
32 The ideal way to conduct the joint estimation is to use a system of equations in the outcome stage and 
iterate it with the matching stage estimation using Gibbs sampling. Here I took a shortcut by running 
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all the log(Bayes Factor) for patent function and first two years of log(Bayes Factor) 
for sales function are significantly positive, these figures provide preliminary proof for 
this paper’s assertion that the joint estimation of matching and outcome functions 
improves the fit as compared to estimating outcome function alone. 
Table 2-10: Parameter Estimates for Post Merger Changes in Sales 
 
  N=one year  N=two years  = three years  
Variables JE* OLS JE OLS JE OLS 
match_nation 0.24 a 0.29 a 0.25 a 0.29 a 0.27 a 0.32 a 
ind_mat_1 -0.11 c -0.11 c -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 
sum_logassets -0.02 a -0.01 c -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
diff_logassets 0.02 0.03 c 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
sum_return_on_assets -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 0.02 0.02 
diff_return_on_assets -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.11 
sum_book_leverage 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14 
diff_book_leverage -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 
depth of knowledge -0.01 -0.01 c 0.23 b 0.24 b 0.27 0.28 b 
depth of knowledge^2 -0.03 b -0.03 b -0.03 c -0.04 c -0.04 c -0.04 c 
breadth of knowledge -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 b -0.05 -0.07 
breadth of knowledge^2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
similarity_of_knowledge 0.02 b 0.02 b -0.49 -0.49 -0.67 -0.65 
similarity_of_knowledge^2 -0.09 -0.10 0.63 0.64 0.87 0.84 
correlation 0.09 a  0.07 a  0.08 a  
variance 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.20 1.40 1.40 
log marginal likelihood -588.68 -593.46 -514.50 -516.92 -497.12 -492.63 
Note: 
Since not all the posterior distribution are normal, I will not report the standard deviation, but the percentage of 
the posterior fall in the opposite side of 0 from the mean.  
a. Less than 2.5% of the posterior fall into the other side of  0 from mean 
b.  Less than 5% of the posterior fall into the other side of 0 from mean 
c. Less than 10% of the posterior fall to the other side of 0 from mean 
d. The above boundaries are created using quantiles. For example, if mean<0, then a is 97.5 percentile, if 
mean>0, then a is 2.5 percentile.  
Table 2-10 was created based on 2500 draws (2500 burn-in). 
*JE stands for Joint Estimation 
                                                                                                                                            
joint estimation using new patent outcome one year after merger, save the error terms in 1 of every 10 
iterations, and use these saved error terms as unobserved private synergy in the other outcome 
estimations. The implication of this method will be discussed shortly .   
  114
The unobserved strategic fit significantly improves the ability of the model to 
explain new patent generation by the merged firm from one to three years after the 
merger, although the effectiveness decreases over time. The error term also 
significantly improves the model fit for the post merger change in sales one and two 
years after merger, but is not useful in year three. I also apply this method on post 
merger change in return on assets and R&D investment levels from year 1 to 3, but 
none of these is significant, therefore the results are omitted here.  
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Figure 2-2 Bayes Factor for Patent Function 
 Log (Bayes Factor) for Sales Function
4.78
2.42
‐4.49‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
4
6
1 year 2 years 3 years
Joint Estimation Model/OLS Model
lo
g (
Ba
ye
s F
ac
to
r)
  
Figure 2-3 Bayes Factor for Sales Function 
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 The direct interpretation of the findings in Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3 is that the 
unobserved strategic fit33 strongly affect the innovative abilities of the firm, and the 
effect wanes over time. Similarly, the unobserved strategic fit affects the post merger 
sales, but the effect is smaller than its effect on patents, and the effect dies down faster 
(after two years). The strategic fit variable does not affect R&D spending or Return on 
Assets. Of course the concern here is that the error terms are generated from the joint 
estimation of one year post merger patent generation, so these errors might be 
influenced more by patent measures. That might explain why the effect of unobserved 
fit is so strong on new patent generation and much less on other variables. This will be 
corrected in the future by estimating a system of equations in the outcome stage. 
Nevertheless, the parameter estimates are fairly consistent over time and across 
measurements. In the subsequent paragraphs, I discuss the main results and 
observations from Table 2-8, 2-9 and 2-10. 
Nation matching (two firms belonging to the same country) decreases the 
probability of two firms forming a joint entity, after controlling for financial and 
knowledge based variables. However, in the patent and sales outcome functions, 
nation matching has a positive effect (around 0.30). From the integration perspective, 
this finding indicates that country related factors such as cultural similarity reduces 
integration frictions and increases the chance of achieving positive post merger results. 
Another interesting finding is that the effect of nation matching on patent outcome 
estimated by the structural model is much less than that estimated by OLS, indicating 
that there is significant matching induced bias in the OLS estimation of nation 
matching effect. 
                                                 
33 The “unobserved strategic fit” is just a suggestive name. The variable is an aggregate of all 
unobserved variables that influence the M&A decision, including internal and external factors. 
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Similarity of knowledge is positively evaluated in the merger partner selection 
criteria, but negatively affects the combined firm's ability to generate new patents in 
one, two and three years after the merger effective date. The effect of similarity of 
knowledge is not linear though, with a positive effect at low levels of similarity and a 
negative effect at high levels of similarity. This suggests that firms prefer partners 
with similar knowledge base as their own, but they also realize that too much 
similarity can prevent further learning and induce cannibalization. Therefore, they 
avoid potential partners that very closely resemble themselves.  
The fact that knowledge similarity negatively affects patent outcome and non-
monotonically affects matching estimation (in Table 2-9 and Table 2-10) suggests that 
managers do not fully anticipate the problems in integrating firms with similar 
knowledge base. Managers seem to prefer similar firms with the expectation of 
creating synergies, but they do not seem to materialize these synergies. This suggests 
that managers do not anticipate the difficulty in integrating similar firms. Similar 
knowledge base may result in overlapping and redundant research (Rindfleisch and 
Moorman 2001) and turnover of key scientists. Cassiman et al. (2005) use in-depth 
surveys and finds a detrimental effect on R&D level and efficiency between technical 
substitutive partners. They find that when merged firms are technologically 
substitutive, key employees tend to leave more often, the R&D portfolio becomes 
more focused, the R&D horizon becomes shorter and internal funds available to R&D 
decrease. This paper provides empirical support to their survey based findings. In 
contrast, Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis (2005) find a non-monotonic relationship between 
knowledge similarity and innovation outcome. This may be because they study deals 
in only one industry whereas Cassiman et al (2005) and this paper study deals in 
multiple industries. A related observation is that similarity of knowledge leads to 
increase in sales in the first year, which makes one suspect that related mergers are not 
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so much for innovation purpose, but for sales growth. However, this effect is not long 
lasting.  
One thing that the managers anticipate correctly is to pursue partners that 
deepen their knowledge base. This variable is positively significant in both matching 
(0.15) and patent outcome functions (around 0.60), suggesting that specialization is 
indeed effective in enhancing innovation. However, this effect is non-monotonic 
suggesting that firms with too much depth of knowledge are not preferred partners, 
and such matches do not end up being successful. Interestingly, the effect of depth of 
knowledge does not show up in sales until the second year after merger, and the effect 
of knowledge similarity dominates the knowledge related effects on sales in the first 
year. This suggests that merging with firms with similar technologies is a desirable 
objective in the short run, probably by enhancing market share and gaining market 
power. However, in the long run, the effect of new knowledge catches up, and 
reduction in new patents signals a potential problem that will eventually cause a 
decrease in sale (probably due to lack of cutting edge technology or new products 
compared with major rivals).  
Another interesting result relates to breadth of knowledge. I find that breadth 
of knowledge has a marginal positive significance on patent outcome in the first year 
(0.08) but has no effect in the matching estimates or the OLS estimates. The different 
estimates for knowledge breadth in matching and patent outcome equations suggests 
that managers do not merge to increase breadth of knowledge, but breadth of 
knowledge does have a positive effect on innovation outcome. On the other hand, the 
different estimates for knowledge breadth in the joint estimation and OLS estimation 
of patent outcome equation suggests that the OLS estimation of this variable is biased 
due to matching induced endogeneity. This suggests that the findings of breadth of 
knowledge not increase a firm’s ability to generate innovation from acquisition in 
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Prabhu et al. (2005) may be biased due to matching induced endogeneity as in my 
OLS estimation. The matching model controls for this bias and finds that breadth of 
knowledge marginally increases a firm’s ability to generate innovation from 
acquisition, though the effect is short lived.  
Other significant findings are that large mergers (measured by sum of log 
assets) are disliked by firms, which means that firms do not go after the largest 
partners they can find. Although such deals can make the headline of newspapers, they 
are not majority of the deals. More cautious and frequent approach of M&A is to find 
small or medium size partners and build up gradually. The patent outcome estimates 
suggest that if the size of the two firms differs greatly (measured by absolute 
difference of log assets), then the influence on innovation outcome is greater. This 
might be because the larger firm has deeper pocket to support the innovative ideas of 
the smaller firm, and the larger the size difference is, the easier the integration 
(because there is no struggle for control power, the larger one naturally dominates the 
new firm and can focus energy on supporting the new additions). Similarly, the 
parameter estimation on difference of return on assets in matching function shows that 
acquiring firms are cautious in picking target firms (usually acquiring firms are large 
established ones, which tend to have positive profits, and the target firms are smaller 
and more innovative with negative profits). Because of this cautious approach, the 
better performers among target firms get picked by better acquirers, leaving the not so 
good targets (in terms of profit generating abilities) to lesser acquirers. Looking at the 
patent outcome though, difference in profit levels are positively correlated with new 
patent generating abilities of the firm, which suggests that profitable acquirers can 
finance the research ideas of the smaller target better than a struggling acquirer. 
Therefore financially solid acquirers might consider taking more risks when selecting 
merger partners.  
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2.9: SUMMARY 
In this paper I control for the endogenous matching of merging firms to 
estimate the influence of various drivers of innovation output in a merger. I use a 
structural matching model to explain the sorting of firms into merging pairs. Then I 
evaluate the innovation outcome of the merger based on the matching process. The 
matching function and the innovation outcome function are linked through error 
correlation. This joint specification reduces the bias in estimation of innovation 
outcome by endognenizing the sorting of firms and helps determine the drivers of 
integration process. A Bayesian method is developed to estimate the model and 
simulation is used to prove the ability of the estimation method to recover the 
parameters. The model is estimated on 1895 deals in five high-tech industries. 
Based on preliminary analysis, I find that unobserved strategic fit in a merger 
has a strong effect on post merger firm innovative abilities, measured by number of 
new patents one, two and three years after the merger. The unobserved strategic fit 
also influences the sales of the joint firm after merger. However the effect wanes in 
two years time. The likely reason is that innovation research is more long term than 
sales, therefore is affected by the firm’s long term strategic goal and the resource 
allocation accordingly. In comparison, sales is a more immediate and visible goal of 
the firm, and get influenced by firm’s internal, external, competition factors more 
easily. Therefore the effect on sales growth is less sustainable. 
 In terms of the managerial decisions regarding merger partner selection, I find 
that firms have been doing well in identifying partners that can deepen their 
knowledge space and help them develop expertise in certain area(s). Such strategy 
brings payoff reflected in more new patents and increase in sales. However, merging 
firms seem too keen on foreign merger partners and partners with similar technology 
knowledge as themselves. The merger outcome shows that domestic mergers run less 
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cultural related risks, and less related mergers won’t hurt innovation as much as the 
related ones do. Of course the “relatedness” is measured between firms in the same 
industry, which is considered to be related by some earlier researchers. It is also 
possible that these related mergers happened for market power or reasons other than 
promoting innovation, since related merger do improve sales in the short run(one 
year). However managers in high tech companies need to keep in mind that in the long 
run, the knowledge expertise may determine the fate of the company.  
2.10: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although the game setup is fairly general and allows the outside option of not 
merging with any other firm but stay alone, my current estimation setup does not 
include firms that did not participate in mergers. The control variables in both 
matching and outcome stages are not exhaustive and I may have left out many 
important factors that are considered by managers. However, due to the large scale of 
the study, it is hard to complement the financial data with either survey or manually 
collected data. Fortunately my model design of correlating matching model with 
outcome model partially makes up for the deficiency caused by missing variables. 
Echoing Sorensen (2007), the current matching game setup is a static equilibrium 
model, and it does not have dynamic features of the market or the repetitive 
participation of some firms.  
In the future I plan to include some randomly selected firms in each market as 
representatives of the “outside option”. The inclusion of these variables will allow me 
to estimate the threshold conditions for firms to enter a merger. I can also study the 
performance of merged firms in comparison to the firms that did not merge.  
The current model comparison is done mainly through Bayes Factor. To gauge the 
predictive ability of the model, some out of sample predictions can be done using the 
model. Besides the merger and acquisition problem, the matching model and the joint 
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estimation method can be applied to many other marketing topics, such as alliances, 
joint ventures, selection and evaluation of retailers and wholesalers, collaboration of 
clients and their ad agencies, as well as faculty co-authorship.  
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                     
REVIEW OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION RESEARCH IN MARKETING 
LITERATEURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are an important business phenomenon, as 
evidenced by the large and increasing volume of M&A activities over the years. As 
illustrated in Figure 3-1, the number of M&A deals in US started picking up in the 
mid 1990s, together with the total deal value. The trend peaked at 2006 with 12,000 
deals and over $1.4 billion in value. Even though firms can grow via acquisition, this 
topic is not a familiar phenomenon to many marketing scholars, and marketing is not 
the first functional area to enter managers’ mind when they think of M&A deals.  
In this review paper, I survey the M&A related research published in top 
marketing journals and discuss how it is related to the research in other business 
disciplines that study M&A phenomenon. This survey should help readers in 
appreciating the views of marketing researchers in the M&A field and help them 
incorporate M&A topics in their own research.  
M&A Activity--US and US Cross-Border Transactions
(Includes public and private transactions)
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Figure 3-1 US M&A Activities 
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First, I will start by defining Merger and Acquisitions. The dictionary 
definition of M&A is quite general: “[A merger is a] fusion of two companies or, 
sometimes, an acquisition or a takeover of one company by the other” (Reuters 1982: 
Glossary of International Economic and Financial Terms). 
An alternative definition of M&A emphasizes more on the process: The 
expression M&A has been established to represent both joint agreement between the 
management of two firms to merge that is submitted to the shareholders for approval 
(including consolidation where the separate firms are dissolved into a new joint 
corporate identity) and acquisition of one firm by another through tender offer (i.e., 
publicly announced takeover bid) (Larsson 1990, cf. Jensen 1985). 
From these definitions, I can see that M&A refers to two categories of merger 
activity: mergers by consolidation and mergers by acquisition. Scholarly literature 
generally uses the term ‘merger’ to include both consolidation and acquisition activity, 
but this review uses the term M&A (mergers and acquisitions) to encompass both 
these activities as a single business phenomenon. This is not to omit the differences 
between e.g. mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. Rather, the analysis concentrates on 
the effect M&A, as a whole, has on the organization of economic activity. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 3.2 reviews relevant theories 
in M&A from various fields such as economics, strategy, and finance. Section 3.3 
reviews M&A related research in top marketing journals. Section 3.4 summarizes the 
findings from the marketing literature and suggests future research directions.   
3.2: REVIEW OF M&A THEORIES 
The area of merger and acquisition attracts wide attention from a large variety 
of fields such as economics, finance, organizational behavior and law34.   Parvinen 
                                                 
34 Due to space limitation, many theories that are less relevant to marketing research, such as law and 
human resource literature are not reviewed here.  
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(2003) provides a comprehensive review on M&A and lists various theories regarding 
the explanations and justifications for M&A. Here I will summarize major schools of 
thought in the other literature and their relationship with marketing. These schools of 
thought can be classified as follows: strategy theories; process theories; financial 
theories; governance theories; and competence-related theories.  
3.2.1 The strategy theories 
According to Parvinen (2003), management theories are the first and foremost 
approach for M&A. Developed in 1980s and 1990s, strategy paradigms include 
competitive strategy (Porter 1980, 1985, 1996, Porter and Fuller 1986, Besanko et al. 
1990) and resource-based strategy (whose antecedents include Penrose 1959, Rumelt 
1974, Nelson and Winter 1982 and major contributions include Hamel and Prahalad 
1990, 1994, Singh and Montgomery 1987, Teece 1982, Barney 1988, Rumelt, 
Schendel and Teece 1994). These schools of thought are often cited as the theoretical 
foundation in marketing M&A studies, such as Capron and Hulland (1999), Bahadir, 
Bharadwaj and Srivastava (2008), Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland (2008), Silk 
and Berndt (1993), Singh and Zhu (2008), Katz (1991) and Chen and Zeng (2003). 
Key M&A related corporate strategy research areas include efficiency gains, 
risk diversification, operating synergies, competitive realignment, competence, 
resources, information realignment, and redistributive realignment (Weston et al. 
2001). The two most important M&A related strategy themes are relatedness and 
synergy. 
Earlier papers in the spirit of the resource-based theory of the firm (Rumelt 
1974, 1982, Bettis 1981, Nelson and Winter 1982) found that large firms with 
unrelated diversification (often as a result of M&A activity) were outperformed by 
firms with related activities on the whole. Porter (1987) argued that value can arise 
from appropriate portfolio management, restructuring, sharing of activities and the 
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transfer of resources. The relatedness of activities and the strategic and organizational 
fit are also further developed (Porter 1996). Based on these empirical findings, it is 
argued that relatedness is a driving force behind the successful co-existence between 
merged firms in certain industries such as pharmaceuticals. However, relatedness 
served as an empirical measurement for a more fundamental explanation of the source 
of merger gain, which is summarized below as synergy.  
The notion of synergy has derived from two particular intellectual orientations. 
The first is the theory of differential managerial efficiency (Teece 1987), which argues 
that M&A gains are due to more efficient organizations and pooling of complementary 
resources (Gammelgaard 2001). The other relates to the replacement of inefficient 
management following M&A, i.e. the operation of an allocation market for corporate 
control (Fama 1980, Manne 1965, Walsh 1988, 1989). Further, M&A synergies have 
been categorized into operational synergies35, collusive synergies36, managerial 
synergies37 and financial synergies according to their measurability and the ability to 
generate benefits (Weston et al 2001, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). In essay 1 in the 
dissertation, I developed the intensification and expansion factors as synergy measures 
partially based on the relatedness of the acquirer’s and target firm’s product and 
research portfolios. Of course these measures are proxies for actual/realized synergies, 
whose realization depends on other factors such as successful integration.  
3.2.2 Process theories 
The process theories (Hunt 1990, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Pablo 1994, 
Larsson and Finkelstein 1999) were spurred by the strategy school’s inability to 
emphasize the significance of the M&A process. The basic argument is that the M&A 
process itself can be an important determinant of the various M&A outcomes (Jemison 
                                                 
35 Resulting from economies of scale for example in production, R&D, staff functions and marketing.  
36 Resulting from increased market power and bargaining power. 
37 Corresponding to the efficiencies from the market for corporate control  
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and Sitkin 1986). As recognized by Puranam (2001, p.6-7), one of the central tenets in 
the process approach is that the acquisition of the equity of another company does not 
automatically lead to the creation of necessary links between the resources of the 
merging companies. Costly transactions, most importantly the alignment of incentives, 
the creation of coordination mechanisms and the adjustment of information flows 
governing the use of the resources, are needed (Ranft 1997, Zollo and Singh 2000).  
 
Figure 3-2: Conventional View of the M&A process (Haspeslagh and Jemison 
1991) 
Before the rise of the process stream in the 1980s, the conventional M&A 
literature argued for a sequential, one-process view of M&A as shown in Figure 3-2. 
Proponents of the process stream of M&A, however, argued that there are at least two 
different processes, namely the decision making process and the integration process 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, pp.12).  
 
Figure 3-3: The Process Streams’ View of the Embeddedness of the M&A 
Process in a Certain Strategic and Organizational Fit (Jemison and Sitkin 1986) 
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Figure 3-3 presents the process stream’s views of embedding the acquisition 
process in certain strategic and organizational fit and Figure 3-4 presents a coarse 
division of acquisition process problems. Both of these views encompass the same 
sequential steps as in the conventional view on the M&A process.  
Figure 3-4: The Process Streams’ View of the M&A Process Problems 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) 
3.2.3 Financial theories:  
Financial theories include capital markets perspective, corporate finance 
perspective and valuation theory. The capital markets perspective employs capital 
market theory to analyze M&A success, the role of globalizing capital markets in the 
formation of cross-border M&As, and the use of capital market instruments in 
performing as well as preventing M&A transactions. The key source of financial 
synergy from M&A are argued be a) reduced capital cost as internal financing is 
cheaper than external financing, b) the utilization of tax shield and c) the increase in 
the debt capacity of the merged company. In essay 2 of the dissertation, I do not 
emphasize the financial synergy as much as economic synergies. However, I include 
financial synergy terms in the balance model specification as a robustness check.  
Corporate finance literature develops agency theory and transaction cost 
economic theory which lie in the realm of institutional and organizational economics. 
Agency theory argues that problems arise in M&A situations when managers’ and 
owners’ interests are not congruent (Holmstrom 1979, Fama 1980). This may result in 
non-value creating acquisitive behavior due to e.g. empire-building acquisitions (Roll 
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1986) and managerial risk reduction through diversifying M&A (Amihud and Lev 
1981). Managerial hubris and empire building have been attributed as the most 
important motivations behind M&A behavior. Roll (1986) elevated hubris38 as an 
equally important motivation for M&A as taxes, synergy and removing inefficient 
management. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) relate the amount of acquisition 
premiums paid to the extent of CEO hubris, and their findings imply that hubris might 
actually be a primary reason for acquisition price-related M&A ‘failures’.   
3.2.4 Governance theories: 
Governance theories are many institutional and organizational theories related 
to governance of firm that are classified together by Parvinen (2003). The most 
prominent branches in this literature include the neoclassical firm-as–a–production 
function literature; the nexus of contracts view; the formal and positivist principal-
agent theories; early incomplete contracting theory characterized by the coordination 
problem; property rights theory; and transaction cost economics.  
The formal and positivist principal-agent theories include Hart and Holmström 
(1987), Ross (1973), Holmström (1979, 1982), Eisenhardt (1989); Jensen (1983, 
1985); Fama and Jensen (1983); Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Harris and Raviv 
(1978). With the incentive arguments, the principal-agent framework has implications 
for M&A at the level of the individual manager as discussed in the financial theories 
section above. 
The early discussion of incomplete contracting and coordination problem 
(Coase 1937; Simon 1945, 1951; Malmgren 1961) act as the basic foundations for the 
boundaries of the firm discussion. They introduce the key semantics and the central 
                                                 
38 Managerial hubris is the unrealistic belief held by managers in bidding firms that they can manage 
the assets of a target firm more efficiently than the target firm's current management. Managerial hubris 
is one reason why a manager may choose to invest in a merger that on average generates no profits 
(Barney and  Hesterly, 2008). 
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idea of incomplete contracting to the more recent transaction cost economics and 
property rights literature.  
Transaction cost economics (Williamson 1971, 1975, 1977, 1985, 1986, 1991, 
1996) has had significant influence over the development of M&A theories. 
Transaction cost economics assumes that contracts can be incomplete and lead to 
hold-up problems. If the two parties in transaction want to avoid transaction cost, they 
can merge with each other and internalize the market transaction costs. Transaction 
cost theory has been applied to vertical and international M&A cases (Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian, 1978). More specifically, the focus has been on synergistic efficiency 
considerations, and mergers have been analyzed with respect to their transaction cost 
economic properties (Richter 1999, p. 51-55). Richter's logic manifests how synergies 
between two separate businesses can and indeed lower the transaction costs of using a 
factor of production (e.g. the same investor, the same external consulting services, and 
the same distribution channel), thereby encouraging diversification into seemingly 
unrelated businesses. Similarly, potential benefits from diversification may arise if one 
business creates such positive externalities (e.g. a great motivation within a research 
department) that can be internalized by the other business in the form of productivity 
enhancing spillover effects. 
3.2.5 Competence theories 
Parallel to the governance perspective, the theory of the firm has also been 
enriched by theories known as the competence-(or, alternatively, resource-, capability-
, or knowledge-) based views of the firm. In these theories, the conceptual focus is on 
the efficient use of bounded knowledge39 and on adapting to unanticipated change. 
They consist of the resource-based perspective of the firm (e.g. ‘the resource 
                                                 
39 In game theory, bounded rationality is a concept based on the fact that rationality of individuals is 
limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of 
time they have to make decisions (Simon, 1957). 
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dependence’ view by Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; also Wernerfelt 1984; Dierickx and 
Coll 1989); the dynamic capabilities perspective (Nelson 1991; Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen 1990); the knowledge based theory of the firm (Kogut and Zander 1992; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995); and the core competencies approach (Hamel and 
Prahalad 1990; Sanchez and Heene 1997).  
The main messages of this school of thought are: 
 Firms exist because they produce and utilize knowledge, particularly tacit 
knowledge, more efficiently than markets (Kogut and Zander 1992).  
 Moreover, a routine is thought of as ‘the skill of an organization’. Capabilities 
(competencies, dynamic capabilities, higher-order organizing principles) are meta-
routines that represent a firm’s capacity to sustain a coordinated deployment of routines 
in its business operations (Foss and Foss 2000).                 
 The boundaries of the firm are determined by knowledge-based considerations, 
not by mere contracting related to the solving of various incentive conflicts. 
Knowledge assets that are non-contestable and idiosyncratic are usually governed 
within the firm, whereas complementary but dissimilar knowledge assets are best 
obtained through an inter-firm cooperative arrangement. (Foss and Foss 2000) 
 Firms’ internal organization is best understood as a matter of creating a shared 
context (e.g. in terms of organizational culture) that can help in integrating and utilizing 
essentially local knowledge to build and leverage core competencies (Foss and Foss 
2000; Sanchez and Heene 1997).  
The competence view provides a clear definition of boundaries of firm and 
therefore provided solid foundation for justification of M&A. The most conspicuous is 
the ‘synergy’ explanation for M&A, which essentially states that relatedness between 
firms is the key to M&A success (Lubatkin 1983, Singh and Montgomery 1987, 
Chatterjee 1986). Similarly, the role of M&A in acquiring otherwise hard-to-get 
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inimitable and distinctive resources and competencies has been acknowledged.  The 
knowledge-based theory has been used by many M&A researchers as the foundation 
for R&D motivated acquisition (Prabhu, Chandy, Ellis 2005). A distinctive stream of 
literature has concentrated on the transfer and acquisition of unique technologies 
through M&A (Hagedoorn 1990, Hagedoorn and Sadwski 1999, Laamanen and Autio 
1996, Laamanen 1997). Organizational learning through M&A (Kusewitt 1985, Zollo 
and Singh 2000, Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999) and M&A in technological and 
organizational innovation (Kabiraj and Mukherjee 2000) are related explanations. 
Many of these justifications for the existence of M&A rely on and emphasize the role 
of tacit knowledge in value creation.  
The preceding literature review shows an interesting phenomenon: many 
theories overlap and cross-fertilize each other. For instance, agency theory bellows 
(???) to corporate finance and governance theory, resource-based view is referred to in 
both strategy and competence theory. Many of the theories originate from the same 
school of thought and found applications in many different disciplines. This review 
therefore only serves as a rough road map of theories related to M&A, rather than 
bullet-proof standard of classification. Although not all of the theories are equally 
utilized by marketing scholars in their work, the survey provides useful background 
knowledge for anyone who wants to conduct research in this area. It is important to 
realize the existence of alternative theories while relying on one or two for an 
empirical study.  
3.3: REVIEW OF M&A RESEARCH IN MARKETING 
The survey in marketing literature is conducted by first selecting ten influential 
journals in marketing, and then finding all the M&A relevant articles in those journals.  
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For journal selection, I combined the rankings in Baumgartner and Pieters (2003) and 
Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) Article Influence Score.  
Baumagartner and Pieters (2003) ranked marketing journals by the citations 
they received in three time periods. I used the most recent period of the three (1996-
97). These authors also further classified the journals into 5 subareas (core marketing, 
managerial marketing, marketing applications, marketing education). For the purpose 
of my study, I selected journals based on their overall rankings, and did not include 
journals that are mainly managerially oriented (such as Harvard Business Review).  
I supplement my article selection with the SSCI 2008 Journal Citation 
Ranking, Social Science Edition. I accessed the ranking under the subject category 
“Business” via the eJournal Web of Science by the Institute for Scientific Information. 
I used the field “Article Influence Score” for my ranking, and since the ranking 
contains journals from all business fields, I selected journals that are largely marketing 
focused.  
With these two journal ranking sources, I come up with the list of ten journals 
included below. Although the rankings vary across the two sources, they are largely 
representative of the most influential journals in marketing.   
Top 10 Influential Journals in Marketing 
 Journal of Marketing 
 Journal of Marketing Research 
 Management Science 
 Marketing Science 
 Journal of Retailing 
 Industrial Marketing Management  
 Journal of Advertising Research 
 Marketing Letters 
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 International Journal of Research in Marketing 
 Journal of Product Innovation Management 
Next, I searched these journals for articles published between January 1990 
and January 2010 that contained the key words “merger” or “acquisition” in title or 
keyword (subject terms). I excluded the articles that use “acquisition” in the context of 
customer, knowledge or information acquisition.  I also excluded some articles from 
“Management Science” that are obviously in fields of finance, operational research or 
human resource management. With the above criteria, I ended up with 28 articles.   
As this summary indicates, a wide range of marketing topics, especially brands 
and markets, are related to M&A activities. As I will discuss later in the paper, many 
mergers and acquisitions are motivated by the acquiring company’s desire to 
strengthen its market position and obtain brands of the target company. Therefore it is 
not surprising to see these two topics receiving the most attention in the literature.  
Rather than review the literature from the viewpoint of these marketing topics, 
I do so in the M&A process framework. The frequency of marketing topics studied in 
the 28 selected articles is summarized below.  
Figure 3-5: Frequency of Marketing Topics in M&A Articles  
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ag
em
en
t 
ex
pe
rti
se
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
ho
riz
on
ta
l a
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s f
ou
nd
 th
at
 h
ig
hl
y 
im
m
ob
ile
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
an
 
le
ss
 im
m
ob
ile
 re
so
ur
ce
s t
o 
be
 re
de
pl
oy
ed
. F
ur
th
er
m
or
e,
 re
so
ur
ce
s t
en
d 
to
 
be
 re
de
pl
oy
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
ac
qu
ire
r t
o 
th
e 
ta
rg
et
 m
or
e 
of
te
n 
th
an
 in
 th
e 
re
ve
rs
e 
di
re
ct
io
n.
 F
in
al
ly
, m
ar
ke
tin
g 
re
so
ur
ce
 re
de
pl
oy
m
en
ts
 h
av
e 
m
in
im
um
 e
ff
ec
t o
n 
co
st
-b
as
ed
 sy
ne
rg
ie
s, 
bu
t a
 p
os
iti
ve
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
re
ve
nu
e-
ba
se
d 
sy
ne
rg
ie
s. 
 
  
3 
H
om
bu
rg
, 
B
uc
er
iu
s 
(2
00
5)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ur
ve
y)
 
H
ow
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
af
fe
ct
s p
os
t-m
er
ge
r 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
of
 p
os
t-m
er
ge
r i
nt
eg
ra
tio
n 
in
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
on
 M
&
A
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, 
m
ed
ia
te
d 
by
 in
te
gr
at
io
n 
ou
tc
om
es
, s
ho
w
s t
ha
t m
ar
ke
t-r
el
at
ed
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
af
te
r t
he
 m
er
ge
r o
r a
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
ha
s a
 m
uc
h 
st
ro
ng
er
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 th
an
 d
oe
s c
os
t s
av
in
gs
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f i
nt
eg
ra
tio
n 
is
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
l i
n 
te
rm
s o
f c
os
t s
av
in
gs
 b
ut
 d
et
rim
en
ta
l i
n 
te
rm
s o
f m
ar
ke
t-
re
la
te
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
  
4 
Pr
ab
hu
, 
C
ha
nd
y 
an
d 
El
lis
 (2
00
5)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
D
o 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
s i
nc
re
as
e,
 
de
cr
ea
se
, o
r h
av
e 
no
 e
ff
ec
t 
on
 in
no
va
tio
n?
 
Fo
r f
irm
s t
ha
t f
irs
t e
ng
ag
e 
in
 in
te
rn
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
s c
an
 h
el
p 
in
no
va
tio
n 
  
5 
B
ah
ad
ir,
 
B
ha
ra
dw
aj
 a
nd
 
Sr
iv
as
ta
va
 
(2
00
8)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
W
ha
t a
ff
ec
t t
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f a
 
ta
rg
et
 fi
rm
’s
 b
ra
nd
s i
n 
M
&
A
s?
 
A
cq
ui
re
r a
nd
 ta
rg
et
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s a
nd
 b
ra
nd
 p
or
tfo
lio
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 
ha
ve
 p
os
iti
ve
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
n 
a 
ta
rg
et
 fi
rm
’s
 b
ra
nd
 v
al
ue
. T
he
 p
os
iti
ve
 im
pa
ct
 o
f 
ac
qu
ire
r b
ra
nd
 p
or
tfo
lio
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 a
nd
 ta
rg
et
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y 
is
 lo
w
er
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
M
&
A
 is
 sy
ne
rg
is
tic
 th
an
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 n
on
-s
yn
er
gi
st
ic
. 
Jo
ur
na
l o
f 
M
ar
ke
tin
g 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
6 
So
re
sc
u,
 
C
ha
nd
y 
an
d 
Pr
ab
hu
 (2
00
7)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
Th
e 
ro
le
 o
f p
ro
du
ct
 c
ap
ita
l 
in
 M
&
A
s 
Th
is
 a
rti
cl
e 
sh
ow
s t
ha
t f
irm
s w
ith
 h
ig
h 
pr
od
uc
t c
ap
ita
l (
i.e
., 
th
os
e 
w
ith
 
gr
ea
te
r p
ro
du
ct
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 su
pp
or
t a
ss
et
s)
 m
ak
e 
sm
ar
te
r a
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
de
ci
si
on
s. 
Su
ch
 fi
rm
s a
re
 b
et
te
r a
t s
el
ec
tin
g 
ta
rg
et
s w
ith
 in
no
va
tio
n 
po
te
nt
ia
l a
nd
 th
en
 d
ep
lo
yi
ng
 th
is
 p
ot
en
tia
l t
o 
ga
in
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e.
 
Th
es
e 
fir
m
s a
ls
o 
pe
rf
or
m
 b
et
te
r i
n 
th
e 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 fi
na
nc
ia
l m
ea
su
re
s. 
  
7 
Sw
am
in
at
ha
n,
 
M
ur
sh
ed
 a
nd
 
H
ul
la
nd
 
(2
00
8)
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
 
an
d 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
ho
w
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
em
ph
as
es
 o
f m
er
gi
ng
 fi
rm
s 
(m
ar
ke
tin
g 
or
 re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t) 
cr
ea
te
 v
al
ue
 
in
 a
 m
er
ge
r c
on
te
xt
 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
em
ph
as
is
 a
lig
nm
en
t i
s a
 k
ey
 c
on
st
ru
ct
 th
at
 fa
ci
lit
at
es
 v
al
ue
 
cr
ea
tio
n.
 W
he
n 
m
er
gi
ng
 fi
rm
s h
av
e 
lo
w
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
em
ph
as
is
 a
lig
nm
en
t, 
va
lu
e 
is
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
w
he
n 
th
e 
m
er
ge
r m
ot
iv
e 
is
 d
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n.
 In
 c
on
tra
st
, 
w
he
n 
m
er
gi
ng
 fi
rm
s h
av
e 
hi
gh
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
em
ph
as
is
 a
lig
nm
en
t, 
va
lu
e 
is
 
en
ha
nc
ed
 w
he
n 
th
e 
m
er
ge
r m
ot
iv
e 
is
 c
on
so
lid
at
io
n.
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Jo
ur
na
l 
N
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 
M
et
ho
d 
Fo
cu
s o
f t
he
 S
tu
dy
 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 h
ow
 th
e 
ar
tic
le
 r
el
at
es
 to
 M
&
A
s 
M
an
ag
e-
m
en
t 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
8 
R
ao
, M
ah
aj
an
 
an
d 
V
ar
ai
ya
 
(1
99
1)
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
l a
nd
 
ill
us
tra
tin
g 
ex
am
pl
e 
(s
ur
ve
y 
da
ta
) 
D
ev
el
op
 a
 b
al
an
ce
 m
od
el
 
fo
r e
va
lu
at
in
g 
fir
m
s f
or
 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 
Th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
ne
ss
 o
f t
hi
s a
pp
ro
ac
h 
in
 th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 o
f o
ne
 fi
rm
 to
 
ac
qu
ire
 a
no
th
er
 fi
rm
 is
 in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l m
et
ho
ds
. T
he
 
co
nt
ex
t o
f t
he
 c
os
m
et
ic
 in
du
st
ry
 is
 u
se
d 
in
 th
is
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n.
 
R
es
ul
ts
 in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
m
od
el
 is
 q
ui
te
 su
ita
bl
e 
in
 d
es
cr
ib
in
g 
th
e 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 d
ec
is
io
n.
 
  
9 
H
en
na
rt 
an
d 
Pa
rk
 
(1
99
3)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
in
flu
en
ci
ng
 th
e 
w
ay
 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 fi
rm
s e
nt
er
 U
S 
m
ar
ke
t (
ta
ki
ng
 o
ve
r e
xi
st
in
g 
lo
ca
l f
irm
s, 
or
 se
tti
ng
 u
p 
ne
w
 v
en
tu
re
s)
 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 su
gg
es
t t
ha
t a
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
 a
re
 u
se
d 
by
 Ja
pa
ne
se
 in
ve
st
or
s 
w
ith
 w
ea
k 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
, w
hi
le
 in
ve
st
or
s w
ith
 st
ro
ng
 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 fi
nd
 th
at
 g
re
en
-f
ie
ld
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
re
 a
 m
or
e 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 w
ay
 
to
 tr
an
sf
er
 th
es
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 to
 th
e 
U
.S
. A
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
ch
os
en
 
to
 e
nt
er
 in
du
st
rie
s w
ith
 e
ith
er
 v
er
y 
hi
gh
 o
r v
er
y 
lo
w
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
s, 
w
he
n 
en
try
 is
 a
t a
 sc
al
e 
th
at
 is
 la
rg
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 th
e 
pa
re
nt
, a
nd
 w
he
n 
en
try
 is
 in
to
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t i
nd
us
try
. 
  
10
 
M
ar
ko
vi
tc
h,
 
St
ec
ke
l a
nd
 
Y
eu
ng
 (2
00
5)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
St
ud
y 
th
e 
ro
le
 st
oc
k 
pr
ic
e 
va
ria
tio
n 
pl
ay
s i
n 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g.
 
D
ru
g 
fir
m
s w
ho
se
 st
oc
k 
un
de
rp
er
fo
rm
ed
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 re
ac
t d
iff
er
en
tly
 
th
an
 d
ru
g 
fir
m
s w
ith
 h
ig
h-
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
st
oc
ks
. S
pe
ci
fic
al
ly
, l
ag
ga
rd
s 
te
nd
 to
 im
pl
em
en
t m
or
e 
ch
an
ge
s t
o 
th
ei
r c
ur
re
nt
 p
ro
du
ct
 p
or
tfo
lio
 a
nd
 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
th
an
 h
ig
h-
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
fir
m
s. 
Th
e 
m
or
e 
la
gg
ar
ds
 
un
de
rp
er
fo
rm
, t
he
 m
or
e 
th
ey
 im
pl
em
en
t a
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
 a
im
ed
 to
 
pr
od
uc
e 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 im
pr
ov
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
fir
m
’s
 p
ro
du
ct
 p
or
tfo
lio
. I
n 
co
nt
ra
st
, d
ru
g 
fir
m
s w
ho
se
 st
oc
ks
 o
ut
pe
rf
or
m
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 te
nd
 to
 
m
ak
e 
fe
w
er
 c
ha
ng
es
 to
 th
ei
r c
ur
re
nt
 p
or
tfo
lio
 a
nd
 d
is
tri
bu
tio
n.
 
In
st
ea
d,
 th
ey
 fo
cu
s m
or
e 
on
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
pr
od
uc
ts
. 
  
11
 
Zh
ao
 (2
00
9)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
is
 
a 
m
ot
iv
at
in
g 
fa
ct
or
 in
 fi
rm
s’
 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ho
w
 a
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 (o
r a
n 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 w
ith
dr
aw
al
) 
af
fe
ct
s t
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
 
in
no
va
tio
n 
in
 su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
ye
ar
s. 
Th
e 
au
th
or
 fi
nd
 th
at
 fi
rm
s e
ng
ag
in
g 
in
 a
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
re
 le
ss
 
in
no
va
tiv
e 
an
d 
ha
ve
 o
fte
n 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 d
ec
lin
es
 in
 te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l 
in
no
va
tio
n 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
ye
ar
s p
rio
r t
o 
th
e 
bi
d.
 A
m
on
g 
th
e 
bi
dd
er
s, 
th
e 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
m
or
e 
in
no
va
tiv
e 
on
es
 a
re
 le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 c
om
pl
et
e 
a 
de
al
. 
D
ur
in
g 
th
e 
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s a
fte
r t
he
 b
id
, s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l b
id
de
rs
 d
o 
no
t 
un
de
rp
er
fo
rm
 m
at
ch
in
g 
fir
m
s, 
w
he
re
as
 fa
ile
d 
bi
dd
er
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
un
de
rp
er
fo
rm
 th
ei
r n
on
-b
id
di
ng
 p
ee
rs
. A
nd
 fo
rm
er
ly
 le
ss
 in
no
va
tiv
e 
bi
dd
er
s b
en
ef
it 
m
or
e 
fr
om
 a
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
. 
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Jo
ur
na
l 
N
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 
M
et
ho
d 
Fo
cu
s o
f t
he
 S
tu
dy
 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 h
ow
 th
e 
ar
tic
le
 r
el
at
es
 to
 M
&
A
s 
A
dv
an
ce
s 
in
 
C
on
su
m
er
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
12
 
Pa
pa
va
si
le
io
u,
 
Sw
ai
n,
 a
nd
 
B
ha
tta
ch
ar
ya
 
(2
00
8)
 
Ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l 
C
on
su
m
er
's 
re
ac
tio
ns
 to
 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
s o
f s
oc
ia
lly
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s f
ou
nd
 th
at
 c
on
su
m
er
' r
ea
ct
io
ns
 to
 a
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
 a
re
 v
ar
ie
d,
 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
bo
th
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
' p
ro
fil
es
 a
s w
el
l a
s p
er
so
na
l 
at
tri
bu
tio
ns
 a
nd
 S
oc
ia
l V
al
ue
 O
rie
nt
at
io
n 
(S
V
O
). 
 
  
13
 
Pa
pa
va
si
le
io
u 
(2
00
9)
 
Ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l 
C
or
po
ra
te
 S
yn
th
es
es
: 
C
on
su
m
er
s’
 R
ol
e 
in
 
M
er
ge
rs
 a
nd
 A
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
 
Th
is
 p
ap
er
 su
gg
es
ts
 th
at
 th
e 
m
at
ch
in
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
tw
o 
co
rp
or
at
e 
im
ag
es
 a
s w
el
l a
s t
he
 n
am
in
g 
st
ra
te
gy
 (c
om
bi
ne
d 
vs
. s
ep
ar
at
e)
 a
ff
ec
t 
co
ns
um
er
's 
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f M
&
A
s. 
C
ho
os
in
g 
th
e 
le
ss
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
na
m
in
g 
st
ra
te
gy
 m
ay
 h
ar
m
 b
ot
h 
co
ns
um
er
s' 
at
tit
ud
es
 a
nd
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
in
te
nt
io
ns
.  
M
ar
ke
tin
g 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
14
 
Si
lk
 a
nd
 B
er
nd
t 
(1
99
3)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
H
ow
 im
po
rta
nt
 a
re
 
ec
on
om
ie
s o
f s
co
pe
 a
nd
 
sc
al
e 
in
 a
dv
er
tis
in
g 
ag
en
cy
 
op
er
at
io
ns
? 
Th
e 
ar
tic
le
 fi
nd
s b
ot
h 
sc
al
e 
an
d 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 sc
op
e 
ec
on
om
ie
s a
re
 
hi
gh
ly
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
 th
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
 o
f U
.S
. a
dv
er
tis
in
g 
ag
en
ci
es
. I
n 
th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 la
rg
e,
 fu
lly
 e
ff
ic
ie
nt
 fi
rm
s c
re
at
ed
 a
nd
 p
ro
du
ce
d 
m
or
e 
th
an
 h
al
f o
f a
ll 
th
e 
na
tio
na
l a
dv
er
tis
in
g 
ut
ili
ze
d 
in
 U
.S
. i
n 
19
87
, w
hi
le
 
va
st
 n
um
be
rs
 o
f s
m
al
l a
ge
nc
ie
s a
pp
ea
r t
o 
op
er
at
e 
w
ith
 su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l c
os
t 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
. T
he
 im
pl
ic
at
io
n 
fo
r m
er
ge
r i
s t
ha
t s
m
al
l a
dv
er
tis
in
g 
ag
en
ci
es
 sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 to
 m
er
ge
 to
 ta
ke
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
 th
e 
sc
al
e 
an
d 
sc
op
e 
ec
on
om
y.
  
  
15
 
Si
ng
h 
an
d 
Zh
u 
(2
00
8)
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
(s
ec
on
da
ry
 
da
ta
) 
Th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
pr
ic
es
 a
nd
 m
ar
ke
t 
co
nc
en
tra
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
au
to
 
re
nt
al
 in
du
st
ry
 
R
es
ul
ts
 sh
ow
 th
at
 ig
no
rin
g 
th
e 
en
do
ge
ne
ity
 o
f m
ar
ke
t s
tru
ct
ur
e 
se
ve
re
ly
 u
nd
er
es
tim
at
es
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f a
dd
iti
on
al
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s o
n 
pr
ic
es
, w
ith
 th
e 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s d
ou
bl
in
g 
in
 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 a
fte
r t
he
 c
or
re
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 d
ow
nw
ar
d 
bi
as
 in
 th
e 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 c
an
 h
av
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 fo
r h
or
iz
on
ta
l 
m
er
ge
rs
, w
hi
ch
 m
ay
 in
co
rr
ec
tly
 a
pp
ea
r i
nn
oc
uo
us
 w
he
n 
us
in
g 
a 
m
od
el
 th
at
 ig
no
re
s t
he
 e
nd
og
en
ei
ty
 o
f m
ar
ke
t s
tru
ct
ur
e.
 
Jo
ur
na
l o
f 
th
e 
A
ca
de
m
y 
of
 
M
ar
ke
tin
g 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
16
 
R
ei
d 
(2
00
2)
 
bo
ok
 re
vi
ew
  
M
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3.3.1 Merger and acquisition process: 
 I classify the marketing literature on M&A based on various stages of M&A 
activity. These stages are illustrated in figure 3-6. An M&A deal starts from changes 
in a firm’s endowment, either internal or external, such as lack of pipeline project, or 
the need to enter a new market. The firm’s response is either to consider a M&A, or 
pursue some alternative strategies such as alliance, or direct investment in the new 
geographic area to set up its own shop. If the firm decides to choose M&A, it will 
proceed to pick its M&A partner (with certain criteria). Once the mutual agreements 
are reached, a news announcement is made, and its effect on the stock market can be 
measured using event study method. After the announcement comes the lengthy 
period of integration process during which the two firms try to become one. In the 
long run the success of the deal can be measured. Although most papers cover only a 
part of the picture, an aggregation of the research gives a complete view across the 
entire M&A event. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6  M&A Timeline 
3.3.1.1 Endowment 
  Firm’s endowment reflects the external or internal conditions of the firm (often 
the acquiring firm) before the M&A decision is made. Certain industry environments 
can often trigger merger activities (Silk and Berndt 1993, Zhao 2009, Markovitch, 
Measurement 
Other strategies 
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Stechel and Yeung 2005). The current endowment of a firm affects its motivation to 
use M&A rather than other form of strategic activities to achieve its goal, whether it is 
entering a new market (Hennart and Park 1993, Chen and Zeng 2003), bumping up the 
innovation potential of the firm (Zhao 2009), changing the company’s social image 
(Papavasileious, Swain and Bhattacharya 2008), or obtaining certain exclusive 
resources (such as brands, sales forces, or marketing expertise) which are locked 
inside other firms. Differences in the initial endowments of the acquiring firms are 
also used to explain any difference in performance during the integration process or 
the eventual performance of the newly formed firm (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005, 
Bahadir, Bharadwaj and Srivastava 2008 Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland 2008).  
 The key findings of the marketing literature on the relationship between 
endowment and M&A activity can be summarized into two broad categories:  
i. Initial endowment influences the acquisition decision: Acquisition is used as 
method of international market entry when investors are of weak competitive 
advantage (Hennart and Park, 1993) or face high reputation barriers (Chen and 
Zeng, 2003). Acquisition is also used when companies diversify into unrelated 
business (Sanchez-Peinado and Menguzzato-Boulard 2009). Finally, less 
innovative firms are more likely to enter into acquisition in order to produce 
immediate improvement in the firm’s product portfolio (Markovitch, Steckel and 
Yeung, 2005; Zhao, 2009). 
ii. Initial endowment influences the success of an acquisition: For firms which 
engage in internal knowledge development, acquisition can be a tonic for 
innovation (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005). On the other hand, firms with high 
product capital (i.e., those with greater product development and support assets) 
make smarter acquisition decisions and perform better on long-term financial 
measures (Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu 2007).  
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These findings suggest that M&A (especially acquisition) is often used as a 
strategic option because it is quick and requires less industry expertise (as compared to 
internal research or Greenfield investment). In the case of international market entry, 
acquiring a local firm also avoids some entry barriers. However, M&A also brings 
new challenges in the integration (or redeployment) process, which I will discuss later 
on. Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis (2005) and Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu (2007) even 
suggest that the successfulness of M&A in certain aspects largely depends on the 
preparation of the firms before merger. However, since the analysis of the operating 
environment of the merging firms usually suggests that many M&As are reactions to 
difficulty, it might not be fair to judge their outcome by comparing the new firm’s 
performance to the average performance in the industry.  
The opportunities for potential research in the endowment area are plentiful. 
The existing studies show that firms undertaking M&A are often self-selected into 
merger and their actions are driven by certain purpose. These findings should not be 
overlooked by any M&A research; otherwise there is a danger that the resulting 
conclusions may be biased.  However, appropriate measures of endowments are not 
easy to come by, especially the ones beyond financial measures, such as market, 
personnel and innovation related measures. I will stress  the importance of proper 
measurement in a later section.   
3.3.1.2 Motivation 
The motivation part of the M&A process is important in its own right and has 
important implications for the measurement of M&A outcomes. Not all the theories 
reviewed earlier are equally relevant for the marketing field. The most commonly 
cited theories for M&A in the marketing literature are resource-based view of the firm 
(Capron and Hulland 1999, Homburg, Bucerius 2005, Hennart and Park 1993) and 
knowledge-based view of the firm (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005, Zhao 2009). In 
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addition, some of the intuitive economic theories are also mentioned, such as economy 
of scale, economy of scope (Silk and Berndt 1993), market power (Singh and Zhu 
2008), etc. The main findings of the marketing literature on M&A motivation can be 
summarized into two broad categories:  
i. Marketing related motivations: Scale and scope economies are important for U.S. 
advertising agencies, therefore small or medium firms have incentive to 
consolidate (Silk and Berndt 1993). Brands and marketing factors serve as 
important acquisition rationale in food and retail industries (Reid andDahlhoff 
2002, Kumar, Kerin and Pereira 1991).  
ii. Strategic motivations: Improving company’s innovativeness and product portfolio 
is an important reason for M&A, especially in innovation driven industries 
(Markovitch, Steckel and Yeung 2005, Zhao 2009 and Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 
2005). Whether the M&A is related (synergistic) or unrelated (diversifying) serves 
as an important mediator for effects of resource deployment (integration) and long 
term value creation (Bahadir, Bharadwaj and Srivastava 2008, Weber and 
Dholakia 2002, Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland 2008) 
The findings on marketing related motivations (Reid and Dahlhoff 2002) 
confirm the importance of marketing issues in M&A research and foreshadow the 
subsequent discussions on the importance of marketing resources integration and their 
contribution to M&A outcomes.   
In spite of the emphasis given to M&A motivations in the theoretical literature, 
the existing empirical literature inadequately controls for motivation when studying 
M&A outcome. In fact very few studies differentiate the M&A outcomes by their 
initial motivation. One reason is that motivation is difficult to classify and measure, 
the other is that stated motivations are often not entirely reliable, since the managers 
may try to justify their choice ex-post. However, given the number of empirical 
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studies trying to classify merger motivation, I am convinced that difficulties in 
measurement can be overcome, and differences in motivation can be controlled for in 
M&A outcome studies.   
3.3.1.3 Merger Partner Selection 
 Once the decision to do M&A is made, the next task is to choose a suitable 
target. This order of action is not strictly one way, since in some cases the acquisition 
decision is made after the target is identified. However, the acquirer still needs the 
implicit environment for M&A, and needs to decide in favor of using acquisition to 
achieve its strategic goals. Rao, Mahajan and Varaiya (1991) and Reid (2002) 
specifically listed the conditions an ideal target should satisfy and designed models to 
implement target selection. Kumar, Kerin and Pereira (1991) studied empirically the 
likely antecedent conditions for M&A activities and found marketing-related variables 
to be significant in predicting merger.  My first essay empirically studies the drivers of 
target selection process with emphasis on synergy and similarity and complementarity 
measures of synergy. 
The variables proposed as target selection criteria in these researches include: 
financial variables (total sales; sales growth; return on equity; debt/asset ratio; 
market/book ratio; insider share ownership), and marketing variables 
(product/market/distribution presence). The latter measurements are based on 
managers’ expectations and judgments, which are detailed and comprehensive, but 
also suffer from subjective biases and difficulty in large scale implementation. 
Moreover, solid empirical tests are lacking to verify the practicality of these methods. 
It is not clear whether the criteria listed in the models are used in business decisions. 
Kumar, Kerin and Pereira (1991) led the attempts in this direction; the other two 
essays in my dissertation also aim at contributing to the understanding of M&A 
partner selection criteria. Also worth noting is that Zhao (2009) looks at the bidding 
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war among several potential acquirers and analyzes the factors that make the final 
winner stand out. It is a rare study which gives attention to the target’s choice of 
acquirer (through market mechanism). The essay 2 in my dissertation highlights the 
mutual selection involved in M&A and uses a matching model to proximate the 
process.   
3.3.1.4 Announcement 
 Once the merger partner is decided and the deal is announced to the media, the 
stock market will react to the news with either positive or negative stock price 
movement. Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland (2008) use event study method to 
gauge the investors’ reaction to M&A announcement and judge whether a deal is 
successful or not. The event study method is widely used in the finance literature on 
M&A because, under the efficient market hypothesis, the stock market reaction to 
M&A announcement reflects the change in expected future cash flow from the merger. 
It is less commonly used in the marketing literature on M&A since the focus is usually 
on market related measures.  
3.3.1.5 Integration Process 
 Of course, expectations do not always turn into reality. The expected synergies 
can be delivered only if the integration process is successful. According to the 
resource based view of the firm, the purpose of M&A is to redeploy valuable 
resources (often in the form of intangibles) which are locked inside organizations and 
can only be acquired through merger or acquisition. Therefore the redeployment of 
these resources after merger becomes essential. A number of papers in marketing 
discuss the issue of redeployment in detail. The findings can be summarized into two 
broad categories:  
i. Type and direction of redeployment: Highly immobile resources (brands and sales 
force) are more likely than less immobile resources (general marketing expertise) 
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to be redeployed. Furthermore, resources tend to be redeployed from the acquirer 
to the target more often than in the reverse direction (Capron and Hulland 2008).  
ii. Impact of redeployment: Marketing resource redeployments have minimum effect 
on cost-based synergies, but a positive impact on revenue-based synergies (Capron 
and Hulland 2008). Market-related performance after M&A has a much stronger 
impact on financial performance than does cost savings. In addition, the extent of 
integration is beneficial in terms of cost savings but detrimental in terms of 
market-related performance (Homburg and Bucerius, 2005).  
These findings overwhelmingly suggest that marketing integration matters for 
the realization of M&A goals and reveal the direction of resource movement between 
the acquirer and the target. However, these studies are based on the “acquirer” or “two 
firm” centric view, and do not discuss the effect of M&A on the other parties related 
to the merging firms. In reality, many of the “intangible assets” of the merging firms 
are based on certain assumptions towards the other players in the network, such as 
suppliers, channel partners, or customers of the two firms. For such analysis, a 
network based approach is better suited (Oberg, Henneberg and Mouzas 2007) as 
illustrated below. 
Analysis of the merging firms’ network includes studying the reactions of 
channel partners (Palmatier, Miao and Fang 2006), suppliers (Anderson, Havila and 
Salmi 2001), customers (through their reactions to firm’s branding strategies) (Jaju, 
Joiner and Reddy 2006, Laforet and Saunders 1999), competitors (Katz 1991), and 
overall network interactions (Oberg, Henneberg and Mouzas 2007). Richey, Kiessling, 
Tokman and Dalela (2007) also discuss the importance of marketing managers since 
they are in charge of many business connections of the firm. Papavasileiou, Swain and 
Bhattacharya (2008) and Papavasileiou (2009) study the consumers’ reactions to 
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M&A not through their recognition of brands, but directly towards the image of the 
merged firm.  
 
Figure 3-7 M&A under Resource Based View of Firm 
The major findings on integration research can be classified into three broad 
categories:  
i. Impact on channels and marketing managers: Channel integration can be 
improved by accounting for factors unique to the M&A context and using an 
approach that triangulates multiple perspectives (Palmatier, Miao and Fang 
2006).The joint activity of maintaining the implicit contracts and retaining the 
relationship marketing managers have a stabilizing and positive impact on the 
productivity of subordinate marketing employees. These employees are a key 
success factor that enables the target firm to function effectively after the 
acquisition (Richey, Kiessling, Tokmand and Dalela 2007) 
ii. Impact on consumers: Brand equity related to corporate brands is often decreased 
as a result of M&A activities and individuals react differently to mergers 
employing different redeployment strategies (Jaju, Joiner and Reddy, 2006). The 
matching between two corporate images as well as the naming strategy (combined 
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vs. separate) affect consumer’s perceptions of M&As. Choosing the less favorable 
naming strategy may harm both consumers’ attitudes and purchase intentions 
(Papavasileiou 2009). The impact of acquisition on consumer-company 
identification for Socially Responsible Companies is a function of three factors: 
the CSR profiles of the acquiring and acquired companies; consumers’ attributions 
regarding the companies’ CSR policies, and consumers’ Social Value Orientation. 
(Papavasileiou, Swain, and Bhattacharya 2008) 
iii. Impact on suppliers: Mergers and acquisitions have important implications, either 
positive or negative, for the merged companies' customer and supplier 
relationships. Effects of M&A vary in accordance with the connectedness that 
prevails between the companies before the merger. The connected mergers are 
more likely to be affected than unconnected ones (Anderson, Havila and Salmi 
2001). 
iv. Impact on the network as a whole: Business relationships are intangible assets 
that might be part of the acquisition motivation, yet the transfer of these 
relationships can not be taken for granted. Without careful management, 
acquisition can have unexpected effects on these relationships (Anderson, Havila 
and Salmi 2001, Oberg, Henneberg and Mouzas 2007).  
These findings serve as a reminder that M&A is not simply a transaction 
between the two firms. The network relationship needs careful management; otherwise 
the “intangible assets” which motivate the M&A may lose their value as network 
partners adjust their behavior differently from the expectations of the merged firms. 
These studies also demonstrate the lengthy and complex nature of the integration 
process, which unless managed properly can significantly affect the M&A outcome. 
Relatively speaking, the internal affairs of the merged firm (such as consolidating 
production facilities to realize cost synergies, redeploying resources between acquirer 
 157 
and target, keeping talent from leaving the firm, resolving personnel issues etc.) are 
easier to control during the integration process than its external affairs (such as 
consumers’ and channel partners’ expectations). Since marketing mainly involves 
nurturing firm resources dependent on external relationships, the network approach 
becomes truly important for researchers and managers alike. Moreover, as Anderson and 
Naru (1990) and Katz (1991) suggest, a merger between two companies in an industry 
may lead to a change in the overall landscape, which requires that the marketing 
managers be well aware of the larger environment and the implications of 
competitors’ actions in real time. 
Although the network approach towards M&A deserves the attention and focus 
of researchers, one challenge in undertaking such research is that business network 
interactions are difficult to model and empirically measure. So far most studies in this 
area have relied on surveys, interviews and case studies. It would be ideal if modeling 
and empirical analyses are further introduced into this area of research.   
3.3.1.6 Outcomes 
Lastly, I review the outcome of mergers. Although the interest of many M&A 
researches, M&A outcome is seldom discussed in isolation. Instead, it is analyzed in 
relation to the M&A variables I mentioned before, such as the environment or the 
endowments of the firms before merger, or the integration process. Since I have 
already discussed these topics in the prior sections, I will focus on the measures used 
for M&A outcome in this section.  
The marketing literature on M&A seems to focus on the use of long term 
performance measures, such as long term financial returns (Sorescu, Chandy and 
Prabhu 2007), market share and profitability (Capron and Hulland 1999, Homburg and 
Bucerius 2005), and innovation performance (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005, Zhao 
2009) which is in contrast to the finance literature’s preference for using short-term 
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performance measures such as event window stock returns. This is because marketing 
studies focus on the economic value of M&A as measured by the improvement in 
certain areas of firm performance, rather than stock market’s expectations of synergies 
from a merger. The common shortcoming of the performance measures used in much 
of past research is that the unit of analysis is often the acquirer firm only, which 
doesn’t take into account the synergies and resources contributed by the target to the 
combined firm. Depending on the size and resource richness of the target, the impact 
of M&A on firm performance will differ across deals. Therefore it is better to use the 
combination of acquirer and target as the unit of analysis to measure the outcome of 
merger.    
3.4: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Through the review of M&A theories and marketing research on M&A, I reach 
the following conclusions: 
1. M&A is a topic that links marketing with many other disciplines such as 
economics, strategy, finance, law and human resource management. Those fields of 
study can provide valuable theoretical foundations for marketing studies in M&A.  
2. Marketing specific reasons such as brands, products, markets and consumers 
are important motivations for undertaking M&A, which highlights the importance of 
scholarly marketing research on this topic.  
3. Marketing scholars have demonstrated that redeployment of marketing 
resources (including brands, sales force, and general marketing expertise) have a 
significant impact on the outcome of M&A.  
4. The “intangible resources” which acquirers aim to acquire from M&A cannot 
simply be transferred the same way as physical resources, since they often involve 
other parties such as suppliers, retailers and consumers. Inappropriate management of 
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network of relationships with these external parties (or simply failure to expect their 
reactions) can negatively impact the new company’s image and reduce or eliminate 
the expected synergies from the deal.  
The gaps in the current research and suggestions for future marketing research 
in this area are summarized below:  
1. The current research often focuses on the acquirer firm, and seldom on the 
target. For example, the studies on M&A partner selection take the position of 
acquirer, and assume that the chosen target will always agree. This is not always the 
case as shown through bidding wars by Zhao (2009). The acquirer centric view is also 
reflected in the empirical measurements used in the literature. Many studies use only 
the acquirer’s performance measures, totally disregarding the fact that the target also 
contributes to the combined firm’s performance.  
2. The existing literature does not always control for the underlying motivation 
for M&A when drawing conclusions about the outcome of a deal. This is especially 
relevant for studies in which outcome is measured on a subset of firm performance. If 
the motivation for an M&A deal is to improve an area of firm performance which is 
not measured by a study, then the conclusions of that study may not be justified.  
3. While studying the motivations of M&A, special attention is needed towards 
management hubris, as suggested by the financial theories of M&A. Beyond the stated 
incentives revealed at press release, which is often biased by the executives’ incentive 
to justify the transaction, some objective measures should be used to classify the 
M&A motivation (as in the essay 1 of this dissertation).   
4. The network approach towards M&A studies is an important and valuable 
research paradigm. Future modeling effort and empirical analysis in this area is 
desirable to supplement the survey, interview and case based studies.  
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5. According to the endowment studies of M&A, many firms initiate M&A as a 
reaction to internal or external changes. If the firms involved in M&A are 
systematically different from their industry peers, their post-merger performances 
should not simply be compared to the industry average (or even its own performance a 
few years ago), since a decline in performance might still be better than what would 
happen if the merger did not happen at all. Ideally a group of firms that were facing 
similar conditions as the pre-merger firms should be selected to serve as the control 
group.   
6. Besides M&A, Hennart and Park (1993) and Chen and Zeng (2003) point out 
other forms of strategic moves as methods to enter new markets, which link the M&A 
research to other marketing studies on alliances (such as Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).  
There have been studies on the differences and relationship between M&A and 
alliance in other academic fields (e.g., Wang and Zajac 2007; Yin and Shanley 2008), 
while such studies are rare in marketing literature.  
7. The innovation focused research in M&A (Prabhu, Chandy and Ellis 2005, 
Zhao 2009) also suggests possible linkage to the R&D and product innovation areas of 
research in marketing. Innovation is an important and fruitful area of research; 
however appropriate measurements of innovation outcomes are hard to come by. The 
difficulty in measurement might explain why much innovation related research 
focuses on one or a few industries (because within an industry or similar industries, 
uniform measurements of innovation are easier to find). Nevertheless, new 
measurement of innovation might lead to unprecedented findings.  
8. M&A serves as a perfect topic at the intersection between marketing and 
finance, as a response to the call for more research across these two fields (Srivastva, 
Shervani and Fahey 1998; Hanssens, Rust and Srivastava 2009). Selected finance 
measures (such as stock market valuation, internal rate of return) can be adapted to 
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capture the impact of marketing changes due to M&A; marketing measures (such as 
customer satisfaction, product return rate) can also be linked to firm’s financial 
performance under the impact of M&A.   
In summary, M&A is a promising yet under-developed area of research in 
marketing. It presents both opportunities and challenges as an interdisciplinary topic 
of research. I hope more marketing scholars would find interest in this topic and 
contribute to people’s understanding in this area.   
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